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LOCATING THAT "INDISTINCT" AND
"VIRTUALLY NONEXISTENT" LINE BETWEEN
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LIABILITY
UNDER SECTION 10(b)
ROBERT A. PRENTICE*
The 1994 Supreme Court case Central Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, seemed to portend momentous
change in the jurisprudence of securities fraud. In ruling that
there is no aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court
overturned thirty years of precedent and seemingly freed securities
professionals from a kind of statutory sword of Damocles.
Professor Prentice, however, contends that Central Bank should
have a negligible effect on the liability of lawyers, accountants,
investment bankers and other professionals in securities fraud
cases. This is because much of what has been characterized as
secondary liability can and should be treated as primary liability.
After briefly revisiting the pre-Central Bank world and suggesting
that the scope of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should be
generously construed, Professor Prentice offers three basic
conclusions about post-Central Bank collateral defendant
liability. First, securities professionals will remain liable for their
own fraudulent statements. Second, collateral participants should
be held primarily liable for the statements of others under a
"participation" standard. Third, whistleblower liability will
continue its demise with little help from Central Bank. The
primary focus of the Article is the second conclusion, and
Professor Prentice demonstrates how the participation standard
historically was sufficient to impose primary liability and remains
so today.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 19, 1994, the United States Supreme Court, in Central
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,1 ruled that there is
no cause of action for aiding and abetting under Section 10(b) 2 and
Rule 10b-53 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4 Securities in-
dustry professionals such as attorneys, accountants, and investment
bankers breathed a collective sigh of relief, for they had been sub-
stantially hectored by such lawsuits. Consider accountants. In 1992
alone, the Big Six accounting firms paid more than a third of a billion
dollars ($373.8 million) in Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claims.5
1. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) [hereinafter Section 10(b)]. This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996) [hereinafter Rule 10b-5]. This rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
4. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. The Supreme Court's ruling was, in many
ways, a tribute to the prescience of Professor Fischel, who argued thirteen years earlier
that "the theory of secondary liability is no longer viable in light of recent Supreme Court
decisions strictly interpreting the federal securities laws." Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary
Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934,69 CAL. L. REV. 80,82 (1981).
5. See Karen Donovan, Quick Fallout Likely From Central Bank, NAT'L L.J., May
2, 1994, at B1.
Those same firms claim to have been facing more than $30 billion in such claims in
1993. See Marianne Lavelle, Lawyers and Accountants Hail Dodd-Domenici Bill, NAT'L
L.J., May 9, 1994, at B1. Judgments, settlements, and litigation expenses cost the Big Six
firms approximately 12% of their annual audit and accounting revenue after insurance
reimbursement. See Lee Berton, Big Accounting Firms Weed Out Risky Clients, WALL
ST. J., June 26, 1995, at B1.
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Because the majority opinion (a) overturned thirty years of set-
tled precedent confirmed by literally hundreds of lower court cases;
6
(b) eliminated what was by far the most frequently invoked avenue of
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 redress against collateral participants in
private damages actions;7 and (c) by its reasoning also clearly ren-
dered extinct (i) aiding and abetting claims by the SEC8 and (ii) other
secondary theories of liability, such as conspiracy, 9 Central Bank ap-
6. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 192-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In hundreds of
judicial and administrative proceedings in every circuit in the federal system, the courts
and the SEC have concluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.... [The Court has] reache[d] out to overturn a most considerable body
of precedent." (footnote and citations omitted)).
7. See Lewis D. Lowenfels, The Knowledge Requirement in Aider and Abettor Col-
lateral Liability, 21 REV. SEC. & COMMOD. REG. 191, 191 (1988) (aiding and abetting was
"[t]he most widely utilized legal theory under the federal securities laws upon which to
base actions against collateral or secondary parties by plaintiffs who are not in privity
with these parties"); Claudia MacLachlan, High Court Hears Case on Private Securities
Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 13, 1993, at 17 (quoting plaintiffs' attorney Edward Labaton as
saying that "[v]irtually all the cases against accountants are aiding and abetting cases").
8. In his Central Bank dissent, Justice Stevens reasoned that the majority opinion's
logic eliminated SEC authority to impose secondary liability. See 511 U.S. at 200-01
(Stevens, J., dissenting). However, Congress later partially restored SEC power to im-
pose liability for knowingly aiding and abetting in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67 Title I, § 104(2), 109 Stat. 737,757 (codified at 15
U.S.C.S. § 78t(f) (Law. Co-op. 1983 & Supp. 1996)).
9. See, e.g., In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that Central Bank renders conspiracy nonactionable); Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
933 F. Supp. 303, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); Van De Velde v. Coopers & Lybrand, 899
F. Supp. 731,738 (D. Mass. 1995) (same); In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898
F. Supp. 974, 981-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); Upton v. McKerrow, 887 F. Supp. 1573,
1580 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (same); In re Medimmune, Inc. Sec. Litig., 873 F. Supp. 953, 964 n.8
(D. Md. 1995) (same); In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 855 F. Supp. 1086, 1098 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (same). But see In re Towers Fin. Corp. Noteholders Litig., 936 F. Supp. 126, 129-
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (distinguishing between conspiracy and aiding and abetting and re-
fusing to hold that Central Bank, which did not involve a conspiracy claim, necessarily
dooms such claims).
There are very strong reasons to hold that respondeat superior liability, unlike con-
spiracy liability, should be treated differently than aiding and abetting liability and should
survive Central Bank A full discussion of that issue is outside the scope of this Article,
but I strongly believe that a recent case, ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Inter-
national Corp., No. 94 CIV 0119 (RLC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 592, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
23, 1996), which held that respondeat superior liability had been abolished by Central
Bank, was wrongly decided. See AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Prod., Inc., 42 F.3d
1421, 1429-32 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding in Lanham Act case that (a) aiding and abetting was
not strongly established in civil common-law practice, but respondeat superior liability
was, and (b) Central Bank evidenced Supreme Court's wariness of the nature of aiding
and abetting liability itself, and was not concerned with issue of upon whose shoulders to
place responsibility for conduct "indisputably proscribed" by the relevant statute);
Tranchina v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., No. CIV.A.95-2886 c/w 95-3165,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8110, at *11 (E.D. La. June 7, 1996) (holding that respondeat supe-
rior liability survives Central Bank); Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings, Inc., [1995 Transfer
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parently had the potential to effect a sea of change in the jurispru-
dence of securities fraud litigation. Indeed, many proclaimed just
such an effect. No less an authority than Joel Seligman pronounced
Central Bank "the most important federal securities law decision in
several years."'1 Roberta Karmel pronounced it "a watershed in fed-
eral securities law jurisprudence."" David Ruder commented that
the decision "marked a dramatic event in the history of the interpre-
tation of Rule 10b-5."'  Thomas 0. Gorman suggested that after
Central Bank, "it may be the SEC and plaintiffs who need 'litigation
reform' and legislative assistance."' 3
Realizing that Supreme Court decisions mean only what the
lower courts say they mean, Donald Langevoort has predicted that
lower court inertia will prevent the pendulum from swinging quite as
far away from the pre-Central Bank body of law as might be surmised
14from the tenor of the Supreme Court's opinion, which was obviously
quite hostile to securities fraud litigation. He predicted that, since
secondary liability theories are no longer available in such cases,
lower courts will be fairly generous in delineating the scope of pri-
mary liability in order to help reestablish the legal equilibrium that
was disrupted by Central Bank's abrupt departure from precedent.'5
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,741, at 92,509 (S.D.N.Y. May 2,1995) (holding that
respondeat superior survived Central Bank because "[u]nlike aiding and abetting liability,
... liability of a principal based upon apparent authority has long been recognized by
federal courts" in many settings and such traditions should not be lightly cast aside); see
also William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-Aiding
and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Persons, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and
The Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 348, 351-54 (1988) (noting that (a) aiding and
abetting and conspiracy liability are keyed to defendant's relationship with the plaintiff,
whereas respondeat superior liability turns on defendant's relationship with the primary
wrongdoer, and (b) the 1934 Act's "control liability" provision, § 20(a), was meant to
supplement, not replace, preexisting respondeat superior liability); Donald C. Langevoort,
Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella's History, Central Bank's Future, 20
DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 893-96 (1995) (noting that "[t]here is a substantial difference be-
tween the aiding and abetting and respondeat superior issues" and suggesting that
recasting claims from the traditional respondeat superior to primary liability will not be
unduly difficult).
10. Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 BUs. LAW. 1429, 1430
(1994).
11. Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Central Bank of Denver Case, N.Y.L.J.,
June 16, 1994, at 3.
12. David S. Ruder, The Future of Aiding and Abetting and Rule 10b-5 After Central
Bank of Denver, 49 BUS. LAW. 1479, 1479 (1994).
13. Thomas 0. Gorman, Who's Afraid of lOb-5? The Scope of a Section 10(b) Cause
of Action After Central Bank of Denver, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 247,248 (1994).
14. See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 865-67, 885-97.
15. See id. at 897.
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I offer a third view.16 It is my thesis that if the lower courts do
their job properly, Central Bank will be nearly a nonevent, an almost
otiose exercise of Supreme Court prerogative. It will have little im-
pact upon its subject matter area-the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
liability of attorneys, accountants, investment bankers, and other
collateral defendants in securities fraud cases. To be more specific, I
offer three primary conclusions about the proper status of collateral
defendant liability in the post-Central Bank world.
First, and uncontroversially, accountants, lawyers, investment
bankers, and others will remain liable for their own fraudulent state-
ments (and omissions) in the sale of securities. Such liability has, in
recent years, often been characterized as secondary." However, it
was, and remains, more accurately treated as primary liability.
Second, and quite controversially, these collateral participants
should remain liable for the fraudulent statements of others (usually
their clients) in at least two important sets of circumstances. In other
words, many of the numerous attempts of plaintiffs' attorneys to re-
cast what before Central Bank would have been denominated aiding
and abetting claims as claims of primary liability 8 under Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 should succeed. Unfortunately, many lower court
opinions have already held to the contrary, totally eliminating Sec-
tion 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability for the misstatements (and omissions)
of others.19 I hope to establish that these rulings are ill-founded and
that there remain significant legitimate avenues for imposing primary
16. I do so without disagreeing with Langevoort's equilibrium theory, which I believe
to be generally accurate. However, he may have underestimated the pent-up hostility to
securities fraud litigation among Reagan and Bush appointees to the bench.
Professor Coffee is also on record as doubting that Central Bank will make a huge
difference, at least for accountants. See John C. Coffee Jr., For Accountants, the Supreme
Court's Central Bank Decision is Likely to be the Victory that Wasn't; for Lawyers, the
Result is More Ambiguous, NAT'L L.J., July 11, 1994, at B4.
17. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 36 F.3d 255,264 (2d Cir. 1994) (attempt
to replead unsuccessful); Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (primary liability not alleged in original complaint). See generally Edward
Brodsky, Aiding and Abetting Claims Under Rule 10b-5, N.Y.L.J., June 14, 1995, at 3
(discussing the blurred line that inconsistent lower court decisions have created between
primary and secondary liability).
19. See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 1996); In
re JWP, Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Lycan v. Walters, 904 F.
Supp. 884, 901 n.12 (S.D. Ind. 1995); O'Neil v. Appel, 897 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (W.D. Mich.
1995); Cascade Int'l Sec. Litig., 894 F. Supp. 437, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Stamatio v. Hurco
Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1180, 1185 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec.
Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26,28 (D. Mass. 1994); Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 862 F. Supp.
1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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Section 10(b)/Rule lOb-5 liability upon defendants for the statements
of others.
This is the most contentious and important area of post-Central
Bank controversy and I give it the most attention. I will show that
significant "participation" in a fraud, even if one is not the speaker:
(a) was sufficient to impose primary fraud liability at common law;20
(b) was sufficient to impose primary Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity before the advent of aiding and abetting liability under Section
10(b)/Rule lOb-5;21 (c) was in many jurisdictions sufficient to impose
primary liability, as well as aiding and abetting liability, during the
_22heyday of the Section 10(b)/Rule lOb-5 aiding and abetting cases;
and (d) has twice been suggested by the Supreme Court as the ap-
propriate standard for primary liability under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.' Therefore, a "participation" standard is certainly appropri-
ate for determining the scope of Section 10(b)/Rule lOb-5 primary
liability of defendants in the aftermath of Central Bank.
My third basic conclusion is that Central Bank should have little
impact upon a third category of cases-those involving the whistle-
blower scenario. Rather, Central Bank merely hastens a preexisting
trend toward the demise of most whistleblower liability for securities
law professionals.
I do not wish to be too bold. As noted, many lower courts have
already botched the job of properly describing the parameters of
post-Central Bank primary liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5.
If those courts get the upper hand, my predictions, and much of Sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence, are out the window. Also,
Central Bank could prove to be an extremely significant case if it em-
boldens the Supreme Court to continue to overturn settled law in
order to pursue the majority's apparent goal of blunting a perceived
torrent of securities fraud litigation.
Nonetheless, I will argue that if the lower courts properly locate
what has been called that "indistinct and, in the minds of some
courts, virtually nonexistent 2 4 line between primary and secondary
liability under Section 10(b)/Rule lOb-5, then Central Bank will be
remembered as a pebble, rather than a boulder, tossed into a calm
20. See infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 294-300 and accompanying text.
24. Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud:
A Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637, 640 (1988).
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lake of established law.2 In Part I of the Article, I briefly trace the
history of aiding and abetting liability up through Central Bank in
order to provide a context for analysis." In Part II, I attempt to gen-
tly remind the courts that the scope of primary liability under Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 should be generously construed.27 In Part III, I get
down to the specifics of supporting the three conclusions drawn
above.2'
25. Even if I am correct about Central Bank's turning into a dud, there is still good
news on the horizon for collateral Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 defendants. Among those
positive developments are:
The Supreme Court's decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993), by re-
quiring that a defendant actually participate in the operation or management of the
criminal enterprise, see id. at 185, largely eliminated the liability of accountants, attor-
neys, and investment bankers under the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994). This, coupled with the provisions of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), largely eliminates securities fraud as a predi-
cate act under RICO. The logic of Central Bank could further constrict RICO's
application. See Taurie M. Zeitzer, In Central Bank's Wake, RICO's Voice Resonates:
Are Civil Aiding and Abetting Claims Still Tenable?, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 551,
570-83 (1996) (arguing that the logic of Central Bank dooms aiding and abetting theories
under RICO). However, most courts still recognize aiding and abetting under RICO.
See, e.g., Jaguar Cars Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258,270 (3d Cir. 1995).
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding § 12 of the 1933 Securities Act, including
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), which, by requiring that a defendant actually "solicit"
sales in order to be liable, see id. at 654, largely eliminated attorney and accountant li-
ability under § 12 of the 1933 Securities Act, and Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061
(1995), which limited the scope of § 12(2) to public offerings of securities only, and not to
private offerings or to secondary market trading. See id. at 1073-74.
The Supreme Court's adoption of a conservative statute of limitations for Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cases. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350,362 (1991).
The influential California Supreme Court's adoption of a relatively narrow standard
for accountants' third-party liability in negligence cases. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,
834 P.2d 745,768-73 (Cal. 1992) (adopting "Restatement approach").
Successful lobbying for state tort reform legislation to modify or eliminate joint and
several liability and otherwise improve the lot of deep pocket defendants. See generally
Dan L. Goldwasser, State Legislative Initiatives on Behalf of the Accounting Profession, in
ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY 1994, at 143 (PLI Litig. Course Handbook Series No. H-506,
1994) (discussing the opportunities for favorable legislation for the accounting profes-
sion).
Most important is passage of the PSLRA which, in addition to the change in RICO
noted above, made some extremely important changes in the 1933 and 1934 securities
acts. For a detailed background on this Act, see John W. Avery, Securities Litigation
Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335 (1996). For a summary of the PSLRA's more important provi-
sions, see infra note 96.
26. See infra notes 30-91 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 117-389 and accompanying text.
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Whether I am right or wrong, the subject under discussion is the
most important issue currently facing courts, lawyers, and parties in
the realm of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. As one court
recently stated: "[D]istinctions in conduct between primary and sec-
ondary liability are elusive. Prior to Central Bank of Denver the
distinction was academic. Now it is pivotal.,
29
I. A SUMMARY OF THE PRE-CENTRAL BANK WORLD
A. Elements of a Section 10(b) Cause of Action
In order to state a claim for primary liability under Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show, according to one popular
formulation, that the defendant (a) made a misstatement or omission,
(b) of a material fact, (c) with scienter, (d) in connection with the sale
or purchase of securities, (e) upon which the plaintiff relied, and (f)
that reliance proximately caused (g) damages to the plaintiff.3 0
As is well known, the private right of action for damages under
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 was first implied by the Kardon case 3' in
1946 and gained official Supreme Court acquiescence at least by
1983.32 Many current members of the Supreme Court clearly regret
that acquiescence and the fact that the substantial body of Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence represents a "judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn." 33
29. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 1996).
30. See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995). For a
general discussion of these elements as applied in a particular context (false statements
regarding technological breakthroughs), see generally Robert A. Prentice & John H.
Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of
High-Tech Companies, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20-62 (1994).
This formulation is arguably too narrow in that it focuses on only the two primary
forms of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 violation-misrepresentations and omissions in corpo-
rate communications. Perhaps it unfairly omits reference to other acts that are barred by
Rule 10b-5, including "devices," "contrivances," "schemes," "artifices," and "acts,"
"practices," or "courses of business" that operate as a fraud or deceit. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has tended to lump all deceptive activity not involving misrepresentations
or omissions into the "manipulation" category, and then held that "manipulation" is a
virtual term of art for practices such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices that
are intended to mislead investors. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-74
(1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,199 (1976).
31. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
32. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1975) (recognizing
that 35 years of accumulated lower court decisions implying a private cause of action un-
der Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 rendered its existence "simply beyond peradventure").
33. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,737 (1975).
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B. Elements of Aiding and Abetting Liability
One of the larger branches of the Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 judi-
cial oak came to be represented by aiding and abetting liability. As
Section 10(b) jurisprudence flowered in the 1960s,3 aiding and abet-
ting liability for Section 10(b) violations was initially recognized in
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co.3 and was eventu-
ally embraced by every circuit in multitudes of cases,36 although some
courts did express mild misgivings about the solidity of the doctrine's
foundation.7
The historical evolution of aiding and abetting liability under
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 has been explored in detail elsewhere 38 and
34. In 1972, David Ruder noted "[t]he explosive growth of securities law fraud litiga-
tion during the last decade under federal statutes and rules." David S. Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari De-
licto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 598 (1972).
35. 259 F. Supp. 673, 681 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir. 1969).
Actually, Brennan was the first major case to apply aiding and abetting theory to a private
Rule 10b-5 action for damages, but as early as 1939, the theory had been recognized in an
SEC action brought under § 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act. See SEC v. Timetrust, Inc.,
28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1939). Still, Brennan is the seed from which thousands of
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 aiding and abetting actions grew, playing a comparable role to
that of Kardon.
36. See, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.
1992); Akin v. Q-L Invs., 959 F.2d 521, 525-27 (5th Cir. 1992); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943
F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991); Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123-24 (7th
Cir. 1990); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir. 1987); Zoelsch v. Arthur An-
derson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
800 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (11th Cir. 1986); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 778-79
(1st Cir. 1983); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982); lIT v. Corn-
feld, 619 F.2d 909, 922-25 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579
F.2d 793, 799-801 (3d Cir. 1978).
37. See, e.g., Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d at 1311 n.12.
38. See, e.g., Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 24, at 643-751; Joel S. Feldman, The
Breakdown of Securities Fraud Aiding and Abetting Liability: Can a Uniform Standard Be
Resurrected?, 19 SEc. REG. L.J 45 (1991); Ralph C. Ferrara & Diane Sanger, Derivative
Liability in Securities Law: Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding
and Abetting, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1007 (1983); Sally Totten Gilmore & William H.
McBride, Liability of Financial Institutions for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Securities
Laws, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811 (1985); William C. Humphreys, Jr., Aiding and
Abetting Liability of Accountants in Securities Fraud Cases, 17 SEc. REG. L.J. 375 (1990);
Kuehnle, supra note 9; Patrick J. McNulty & Daniel J. Hanson, Liability for Aiding and
Abetting by Silence or Inaction: An Unfounded Doctrine, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 14 (1993);
Ruder, supra note 34; Lawrence R. Bard, Note, A Distinct-Responsibility Approach to
Accountants' Primary Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 193 (1992);
Clyde A. Billings, Jr., Note, The Private Action Against a Securities Fraud Aider and
Abettor: Silent and Inactive Conduct, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1233 (1976); Mary T. Doherty,
Note, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, 25 IND. L. REV. 829 (1992); John H. Karnes,
Jr., Comment, Lenders' Liability for Aiding and Abetting Rule 10b-5 Violations: The
Knowledge Standard, 41 SW. L.J. 925 (1988); Jeffrey Farley Keller, Comment, Aiding and
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need not be repeated here. To summarize briefly, however, the lower
courts developed two primary approaches to aiding and abetting li-
ability.39 The majority approach was based on a three-part test which
was variously stated but typically provided that to establish aiding
and abetting a plaintiff had to prove: (a) a primary violation by an-
other party; (b) that the defendant had "knowledge" of the wrong
and of his role in furtherin% it; and (c) that the defendant substan-
tially assisted the violation. Most courts applied a "sliding-scale"
analysis that required actual intent to aid the fraud if the aiding and
abetting defendant owed no fiduciary duty to plaintiff.41  Indeed,
many courts spoke of the requirement that defendant act with "high
conscious intent" in order to be liable in the absence of a duty to
speak.41 "High conscious intent," several courts stressed, required
more motivation by accountants or lawyers than the simple desire to
be paid or to retain a client.43 And, according to several other courts,
mere performance of "grist of the mill" services by attorneys, ac-
countants and underwriters was usually insufficient to constitute
Abetting Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5: The
Infusion of a Sliding-Scale, Flexible-Factor Analysis, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1189 (1989);
Don J. McDermett, Jr., Note, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule 10b-5.:
The Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1087 (1984); Timo-
thy M. Metzger, Comment, Abandoning Accountants' Liability for Aiding and Abetting
10b-5 Securities Fraud, 87 NW. U.L. REV. 1374 (1993); Cheryl L. Pollak, Note, Rule 10b-5
Liability after Hochfelder: Abandoning the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 218 (1977); Elizabeth Sager, Comment, The Recognition of Aiding and Abetting in
the Federal Securities Laws, 23 Hous. L. REv. 821 (1986); John T. Vangel, Note, A Com-
plicity-Doctrine Approach to Section 10(b) Aiding and Abetting Civil Damages Actions, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 180 (1989); Edward Brodsky, Aiding and Abetting, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8,
1993, at 3.
39. A more detailed summary of these exact points, but pertaining only to lawyer
defendants, is contained in Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behav-
ioral Inquiry Into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 84-89
(1993).
40. See, e.g., Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d at 1311; Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas,
522 F.2d 84, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir.
1974)).
41. See, e.g., Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455,459 (8th Cir. 1991); Metge v. Baehler, 762
F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir.
1982). However, some courts held that recklessness satisfied the scienter requirement for
aiding and abetting even if defendant did not owe a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs. See, e.g.,
Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 502 F. Supp. 1060, 1066-67 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
42. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 925 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Woodward, 522
F.2d at 97); Schick v. Ernst & Whinney, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 95,764, at 98,666-67 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1991).
43. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Turtur, 892 F.2d 199, 207 (2d Cir. 1989); In re
Westinghouse Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,750, at
97,600 (W.D. Pa. July 27, 1993); Ernst & Whinney, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. at 98,667.
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"substantial assistance" or to provide evidence of scienter 44
However, if something approximating a fiduciary duty was es-
tablished, then the collateral defendant could be liable for aiding and
abetting on the basis of mere recklessness. 45 For collateral defen-
dants, many courts focused the matter of the existence of a duty upon
whether the asserted aider and abettor could reasonably have fore-
seen that the plaintiff would rely on its actions.46
A minority approach, pioneered by the Seventh Circuit, func-
tionally eliminated aiding and abetting liability by requiring that
defendant breach a duty owed to plaintiffs before aiding and abetting
liability could be imposed.47 This line of cases basically required
plaintiffs to establish all the elements of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
primary liability, except that the defendant was a purchaser or seller,
before collateral participants such as lawyers or accountants could be
held liable as aiders and abettors. Although the analysis underlying
48the holdings in these cases was suspect, the ultimate outcomes nowlook prescient in light of Central Bank.
C. Observations Regarding Pre-Central Bank Litigation
A few pertinent lessons can be drawn from an analysis of the
rather confused pre-Central Bank body of aiding and abetting juris-
prudence.
(1) The lower courts' creation of an aiding and abetting theory of
44. See, e.g., Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 785 F. Supp. 695, 704-05 (M.D. Tenn.
1992).
45. See Akin v. Q-L Invs., 959 F.2d 521, 526-27 (5th Cir. 1992); In re AM Int'l Sec.
Litig., 606 F. Supp. 600,606 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Bromberg & Lowenfels put it this way:
[A] majority of cases hold that there must be a duty, sometimes described as a
fiduciary duty, running from the alleged aider and abettor to the plaintiff for
recklessness to satisfy the second requirement of aiding and abetting. If there is
no such duty running from the alleged aider and abettor to the plaintiff, then the
knowledge required on the part of the alleged aider and abettor scales upward
from recklessness to full scienter, approximating intent to defraud.
Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 24, at 678.
46. See, e.g., In re Storage Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 630 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (D. Colo.
1986); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314, 1356 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); In re Investors Funding Corp. of New York Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 550, 558-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,898, at 95,690 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979), affd, 623 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1980); Competi-
tive Assocs., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 478 F. Supp. 1328, 1341
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
47. See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624,628 (7th Cir. 1990); Barker v. Hender-
son, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,495-96 (7th Cir. 1986).
48. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
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liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10-5 led to no hue and cry from its
potential targets. Although over time summary and analysis of the
first case to adopt the theory, Brennan v. Midwestern United Life In-
surance Co.,4 9 became a standard feature of every law review article
discussing secondary liability, it was not a matter of significant con-
cern at the time. At least two reasons are obvious:
(a) There simply was not much securities fraud litigation under
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 or any other theory at the time. The huge
body of law that currently exists was only beginning to develop.' The
fad of almost always suing a wrongdoing company's accountants and
attorneys was also in its nascent stages.
(b) By the time that the Seventh Circuit affirmed Brennan in
1969, becoming the first circuit court of appeals to accept aiding and
abetting as a theory of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability, there were
already plenty of cases on the books finding collateral defendants
such as attorneys, accountants, and investment bankers primarily li-
able for just the sort of acts that later came to be characterized as
alleged aiding and abetting. In other words, the "knowing" provision
of "substantial assistance to the effectuation of a fraud," which is the
essence of the majority formulation of aiding and abetting, also con-
stitutes in most cases "participation" in that fraud which, at common
law and under pre-Brennan Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 litigation, had
been sufficient to establish primary liability. I will talk about the
common law in more detail later,5' but in pre-Brennan Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence, attorneys had already been told by
the Second Circuit that they could be primarily liable for passing on
their clients' communications, knowing those communications were
inaccurate, even when the attorneys claimed that they had acted as
"mere scriveners."52 Corporate directors had already been held pri-
marily liable for playing an "integral role" in the fraudulent
communications of others.53 Securities firms had already been held
primarily liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 for failing to stop
correspondents from stealing from their customers. 4 Supervisors of
49. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
50. Professor Conard has traced the securities fraud "litigation explosion" to SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), the opinion which first revealed the
broad potential for § 10(b) liability. See Alfred F. Conard, Enterprise Liability and In-
sider Trading, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 913, 929 (1992).
51. See infra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
52. See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486,489 (2d Cir. 1968).
53. See Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376,1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
54. See Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104, 122
(W.D. Ark. 1949).
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securities sales representatives had already been held primarily liable
for the lies of those sales representatives.55 Broker-dealers had al-
ready been warned that they could be held primarily liable for
passing a newspaper report to customers knowing that it contained
misrepresentations, even though the misrepresentations were those
of the newspaper. 6 Similarly, stock brokers had already been held
primarily liable for "participating" in another's fraudulent scheme.57
In later years, such claims would almost always be brought as aiding
and abetting claims, but by the time Brennan was decided by the Sev-
enth Circuit, there was substantial precedent on the books that such
actions constituted primary violations of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5.
Thus, Brennan's main effect was simply to add a new theory for im-
posing liability for activities that were already actionable under
established law.
(2) Given that the formulation of aiding and abetting liability
brought very little conduct under the liability blanket of Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 that was not already there and punishable as pri-
mary conduct, the lower courts seldom troubled themselves to draw
any sort of a line between primary liability on the one hand, and aid-
ing and abetting liability on the other.5 If both theories punished
virtually the same conduct, there was no reason to draw such a dis-
tinction.59
(3) In many cases where aiding and abetting terminology was
used and liability was found, primary liability could obviously have
been found as well. Indeed, some courts merely held that all ele-
ments of primary liability appeared to be present and therefore, of
necessity, the criteria for aiding and abetting liability also had to be
55. See SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962,968 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
56. See SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp., 154 F. Supp. 395,399 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
57. See Fry v. Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 477,478 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
58. See, e.g., Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 917-18 (6th Cir. 1991)
(holding that attorney's assistance in drafting a false offering circular constituted both
primary and secondary wrongdoing); Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290,
297, 301 (5th Cir. 1990) (same conduct held to constitute both primary and aiding and
abetting violations); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135,
144 (7th Cir. 1969) (upholding claims of both primary and aiding and abetting liability
based on same conduct); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding
insiders primarily liable and "equally liable" with aiders and abettors).
59. Indeed, even plaintiffs' attorneys often failed to clarify whether they were claim-
ing defendants were liable as primary or secondary violators, although this occasionally
brought criticism from the courts. See The Limited, Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 645 F. Supp.
1038, 1043 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that one element of every well-pled complaint is a
statement regarding whether defendant is being sued as a primary or secondary violator);
Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 534 F. Supp. 873, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (complaining




(4) That there was little or no difference between pre-Brennan
primary liability and post-Brennan aiding and abetting liability is
vividly illustrated by the futile efforts of the courts over thirty years
to draw any sort of meaningful distinction between the two. As
noted above, most courts just did not bother to delineate between
primary and secondary liability. Those that did try typically ended up
terribly frustrated. Their efforts to draw a distinction between pri-
mary and secondary liability have been aptly described as "erratic.'
A reading of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Akin v. Q-L Investments,
Inc., 2 is instructive in this regard. In surveying aiding and abetting
law, the court found that precedent in the circuit created three differ-
ent paths to Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability, each more circuitous
than the other, and noted that the aiding and abetting "'theory' of
liability is mushy and difficult to apply. Were we writing on a clean
slate, it would give us pause."''
The Seventh Circuit had even greater problems. Preceding the
Supreme Court by several years in its overt hostility to federal securi-
ties fraud litigation and its determination to overturn established
precedent in an attempt to blunt such lawsuits6" the Seventh Circuit
held that in order to establish aiding and abetting liability, plaintiff
had to establish all the elements of primary liability. Having pro-
nounced that aiding and abetting liability on the one hand and
primary liability on the other required proof of the same elements,
the Seventh Circuit felt constrained to conjure up a distinction be-
tween the two. It did so by ruling that "primary and secondary
liability differ in that one may be held secondarily liable without
having actually purchased or sold a security, '" implying that one
60. See, e.g., Lerch v. Citizens First Bancorp., Inc., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,258, at 95,172 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 1992); Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie,
Inc., 702 F. Supp. 962, 978 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that because primary liability was
adequately pled, "[i]t follows that the complaint adequately pleads aiding and abetting").
61. Pollak, supra note 38, at 243.
62. 959 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1992).
63. Id. at 526; see also Mirotznick v. Sensney, Davis & McCormick, 658 F. Supp. 932,
941 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (admitting that jurisdiction's differentiation between primary and
aiding and abetting liability may be "more semantic than real" where defendant's in-
volvement is minimal).
64. See Sherry R. Sontag, Harder to Sue, NAT'L L.J., June 17,1991, at 1.
65. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilkins-Lowe & Co. Inc., 29 F.3d 337, 340 n.4
(7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Renovitch v. Kauffman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1045 n.7 (7th Cir. 1990));
see also Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123-24 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990)
("Secondary liability... differs from primary liability in that secondary liability can at-
tach to one who has not actually purchased or sold a security."); LHLC Corp. v. Cluett,
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cannot be primarily liable under Section 10(b) unless they purchased
or sold securities.
This was clearly very wide of the mark. Nothing in the wording
of Section 10(b) limits primary liability to sellers, and Congress
knows how to limit liability to sellers if it wants to do so.66 The lower
courts have long held non-sellers to be liable for their misrepresenta-
tions and omissions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.67  And
several Supreme Court cases have addressed Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-
5 liability regarding non-seller defendants without ever mentioning
that only sellers can be liable under the provision. 6 Central Bank
would have been the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to
declare that only sellers could be liable under Section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5;69 instead, as noted earlier, the Court expressly declared that
Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[A] party other than a purchaser or
seller of securities faces liability as an aider and abettor ... only if it would have been
primarily liable had it purchased or sold the securities.").
66. See McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1996); Adam v. Silicon
Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Spear v. Ernst &
Young, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 98,399, at 90,743 (D.S.C.
1994)).
67. See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
accountant liable as primary violator); Competitive Assocs. v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding "in connection with" re-
quirement satisfied regarding non-selling accountant defendant); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314, 1351 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding account-
ant liable as primary violator) (collecting cases); Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp.
653, 663, 667 (D. Kan. 1980) (finding "in connection with" element satisfied in case
against accountant); Lingenfelter v. Title Ins. Co. of Minn., 442 F. Supp. 981, 993 (D. Neb.
1977) (holding that "defendant need not be a 'seller' to be liable" under Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5); Bredehoeft v. Cornell, 260 F. Supp. 557, 559 (D. Or. 1966) (holding
that defendant need not be a "purchaser" to be liable); Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A.,
Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (same); New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F.
Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (stating that a purchaser, seller, or third person may be
liable); see also ROBERT J. HAFT, LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR
SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS § 3.05, at 3-26 (1994-1995) (criticizing Seventh Circuit's
holding in Robin); Kuehnle, supra note 9, at 318 (criticizing Seventh Circuit approach).
Fortunately, at least one post-Central Bank case has rejected the notion that Central Bank
limits Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability to sellers only. See Spear, [1994-1995 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,743.
68. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (accountant
defendant); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (stock broker defendant); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (accountant defendant).
69. One could, of course, argue that Central Bank was not the "perfect opportunity"
to make such a declaration because this was not the issue before the Court. However, as
has been widely noted, the Supreme Court itself didn't decide the issue that the parties
had raised (the particulars of aiding and abetting liability), but a different issue (its very
existence). See Lisa Klein Wager & John E. Failla, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.-The Beginning of an End, Or Will Less Lead to More?,
49 Bus. LAW. 1451, 1452-53 (1994).
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there are often multiple violators of this antifraud rule.70  Because
there can be only one seller, non-sellers must be included among
those "multiple violators." Indeed, as noted above, the Court itself
said that "[a]ny person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or
bank ... who makes a material misstatement... may be liable as a
primary violator" of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 if all the elements of
the offense are present, thereby clearly indicating that defendant's
identity as a seller (or purchaser) is not an element of the offense.7'
The Seventh Circuit's holdings in this area are so tortured and so
plainly wrong that they stand as testament to the difficulty of finding
any principled distinctions between primary and secondary liability
under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5.72
(5) Most aiding and abetting cases fell into one of three catego-
ries.
(a) First, many of the claims framed as aiding and abetting in-
volved misleading communications by the collateral defendants
themselves, often complicated by a failure to correct.73 There should
have been no doubt before Brennan and there should be no doubt
after Central Bank that one's liability for one's own misrepresenta-
tions and omissions is primary, not secondary.
(b) Many aiding and abetting cases attempted to impose liability
upon collateral defendants for the misstatements (or omissions) of
others. Even in the post-Brennan, pre-Central Bank period when
aiding and abetting liability was in its prime, several lower courts con-
70. See 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
71. Id.
72. The Seventh Circuit completed its embarrassment in this area by issuing an
opinion three months after Central Bank was decided that assumed the continued viability
of aiding and abetting liability. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wilkins-Lowe & Co.,
29 F.3d 337,340-41 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1994).
73. See, e.g., Akin v. Q-L Indus., 959 F.2d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
same conduct, preparing reports that omitted crucial information, constituted both a pri-
mary and secondary violation by accountant); Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919
F.2d 290, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that issuance of a false audit opinion may consti-
tute both primary and secondary violations); In re Sahlen & Assocs. See. Litig., 773 F.
Supp. 342, 351-60 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that certifying false financial statements con-
stitutes both aiding and abetting and a primary violation); Gutfreund v. Christoph, 658 F.
Supp. 1378, 1385-86 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding that issuing a false projection can constitute
aiding and abetting); Summer v. Land & Leisure, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 380, 386 (S.D. Fla.
1983) (holding that certifying an inaccurate financial statement and failing to correct it
constitute aiding and abetting); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F.
Supp. 1134, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that a misstatement can constitute a primary
violation or aiding and abetting); Resnick v. Touche Ross & Co., 470 F. Supp. 1020, 1023
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that certification of false financial statements by accountant can
constitute both a primary violation and aiding and abetting).
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tinued to hold collateral defendants such as accountants primarily
liable for the communications of others if their participation in the
misleading communication was "direct" and other elements of Sec-
tion 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability were met. For example, the Sixth
Circuit developed a "direct contact" test holding that collateral par-
ties' direct contact with investors gave rise to an affirmative
obligation to disclose what their clients or others had omitted.74
Many other courts had a lower standard of liability, holding collateral
defendants liable for simply 'participating" in the drafting of their
clients' misleading documents. These will be the most controversial
post-Central Bank cases.
(c) Many other cases involved the failure of attorneys or ac-
countants to "blow the whistle" on their clients' fraud.76 Most courts
74. See Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991) The court
noted:
This court applies a "direct contact" test for determining whether a defendant is
liable as a primary violator.
"[O]nly those individuals who had an affirmative obligation to reveal what
was allegedly omitted can be held as primary participants in the alleged de-
ception... [.] A person undertaking to furnish information which is
misleading because of a failure to disclose a material fact is a primary par-
ticipant. Conversely, a person who does not undertake to furnish any
information, and who is not aware of what information has been furnished,
is under no duty to disclose material information in his possession."
Id. at 917 (quoting SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 223 (6th Cir.
1982)). The court affirmed the liability of an attorney who helped draft and edit commu-
nications of his client that he knew were misleading. See id& at 918. However, the court's
opinion carries no indication that there was actually "direct contact" between the defen-
dant attorney and the plaintiff investors. Liability was imposed primarily because the
attorney worked on misleading documents that he knew would be shown to investors. See
id. at 919; see also SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding defendant
liable where he "knew or should have known that the omitted information was signifi-
cant").
75. See, e.g., Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1991)
(imposing primary liability apparently because of the defendant attorney's participation
in the drafting of a client limited partnership's misleading offering memorandum); Moore
v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 305 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that direct participation is key to
being primary violator); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1312 (4th Cir. 1982)
(ruling that accountant may be primarily liable "if its participation in the misrepresenta-
tion is direct"); In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1991)
(similar); Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, 713 F. Supp. 1019, 1025 (W.D. Mich.
1989); SEC v. Electronic Warehouse, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Conn. 1988); Lubin v.
Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1449 (S.D. Cal. 1988); Union Carbide Corp. Consumer
Prod. Business Sec. Litig., 676 F. Supp. 458, 467-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that invest-
ment banker's participation in preparing client's fraudulent announcements leads to
primary liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)). Although the Breard approach has gener-
ally been regarded as imposing liability for a lesser degree of misconduct than Molecular
Technology's "direct contact" test, factually the cases seem nearly indistinguishable.
76. See, e.g., Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 653 (9th Cir.
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declined to impose such a duty,7 meaning that failure to blow the
whistle leads to neither primary nor secondary liability. Although
most courts did not expressly so recognize, if a duty to "blow the
whistle" does exist, failure to do so is properly characterized as lead-
ing to primary liability rather than mere secondary liability in the
form of aiding and abetting or conspiracy.
If one were to graphically represent primary and aiding and
abetting liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5, it would be useful
to draw two concentric circles. The inner circle would represent pri-
mary liability. The outer circle would represent aiding and abetting
liability, but it would be only the tiniest fraction larger than the inner
circle because in theory and in application the two areas of fraudulent
conduct covered by the two theories are nearly coextensive. Any
space in the outer circle not covered by the inner circle should
probably be filled with question marks, because during the thirty-
year existence of the aiding and abetting theory, no court or com-
mentator ever clearly established exactly what is covered by aiding
and abetting liability that is not covered by primary liability. I will
suggest that the question marks might be replaced by cases finding
aiding and abetting liability in what have been called "standing
around" liability cases and some closely-related whistleblowing
cases.
78
D. Central Bank and Its Implications
As with the'pre-Central Bank state of the law, there has been
copious summary and analysis of the Central Bank opinion79 that will
1988); Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding that an accounting firm can aid and abet by substantially assisting a cover-up);
Gilmore v. Berg, 761 F. Supp. 358, 373 (D.N.J. 1991) (same). Although most cases of
failure to "blow the whistle" involved lawyers or accountants, similar aiding and abetting
claims were lodged against brokers for handling stock transactions. See, e.g., Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 48 (2d Cir. 1978); Martin v. Pepsi-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 639 F. Supp. 931, 935 (D. Md. 1986). Other claims were lodged against banks
for lending money. See, e.g., Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 626-30 (8th Cir. 1985); Mon-
sen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793,797-99 (3d Cir. 1978).
77. See infra notes 314-25 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 326-33 and accompanying text
79. See, e.g., Brodsky, supra note 18; Gorman, supra note 13; Karmel, supra note 11;
Langevoort, supra note 9; Ann Maxey, Competing Duties: Securities Lawyers' Liability
After Central Bank, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2185 (1996); James D. Redwood, Toward a
More Enlightened Securities Jurisprudence in the Supreme Court? Don't Bank on It Any-
time Soon, 32 Hous. L. R-V. 3 (1995); Ruder, supra note 12; Seligman, supra note 10;
Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal
and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489 (1995); Wager & Failla,
supra note 69; John F. Olson et al., The End of the Section 10(b) Aiding and Abetting Li-
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not be supplemented here.' The Central Bank majority opinion has
been properly criticized (a) for bringing an unduly stinted and for-
malistic dictionary-style analysis to federal securities laws;8' (b) for
being unfairly selective in its application of that analysis;2 (c) for
disingenuously mischaracterizing the history of Section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5 analysis; (d) for being unduly influenced by unsubstantiated
ability Fiction, INSIGHTS, June 1994, at 3; David J. Baum, Comment, The Aftermath of
Central Bank of Denver: Private Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1817 (1995); Sean G. Blackman, Note, An Analysis of
Aider and Abettor Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1323
(1995); Stephen J. Brown, Note, Central Bank: The End of Secondary Liability Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1515 (1995);
Nathan F. Coco, Comment, Has Legislative History Become History?: A Critical Exami-
nation of Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 20 J.
CORP. L. 555 (1995); Craig J. Concannon, Note, Central Bank of Denver v. First Inter-
state Bank.- The End of Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 14 ST. LOUIS. U. PUB. L. REV. 679 (1995); Carrie E. Goodwin,
Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank: Not Just the End of Aiding and Abetting
Under Section 10(b), 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1387 (1995); Nicole Miller, Note, The
Judicial Rejection of Aiding and Abetting Civil Liability Under Section 10(b): Will Central
Bank of Denver Spell the End of the Implied 10(b) Cause of Action?, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
913; Scott M. Murray, Note, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver:
The Supreme Court Chops a Bough From the Judicial Oak: There is no Implied Remedy
to Sue for Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule lOb-5, 30 N. ENG. L,
REV. 475 (1996); JoErin O'Leary, Note, Securities Regulation-Central Bank, Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 33 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1053 (1995); Susan
E. Springer, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank and the Demise of Section 10(b)
Private Aiding and Abetting Liability: Opting for a Rule of Economic Efficiency, 4 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 213 (1995); John F. X. Peloso & Stuart M. Sarnoff, What Now for Aider
and Abettor Liability?, N.Y.L.J., June 16, 1994, at 3.
80. A brief glance at the majority opinion in Central Bank discloses that it held that
there is no aiding and abetting liability under Section 10(b) because: (a) the statutory text
does not mention such secondary liability, see 511 U.S. at 170-78; (b) no express liability
provision in the 1933 or 1934 securities acts includes an aiding and abetting cause of ac-
tion, see id at 178-80; (c) post-1934 legislative developments do not definitively indicate
that Congress intended aiding and abetting liability to exist, see id. at 185-90; (d) policy
arguments do not show that elimination of aiding and abetting liability would lead to re-
sults so "bizarre" as to override the supposed clarity of the statutory text, see id at 190-
92; and (e) imposition of aiding and abetting liability cannot be based on the general fed-
eral criminal aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, see id. at 190.
81. See Alan R. Bromberg, Aiding and Abetting: Sudden Death and Possible Resur-
rection, 27 SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 133, 139 (1994) (arguing that the Central Bank
holding was "simplistic" and "overly literal"); Redwood, supra note 79, at 7 (suggesting
that the Supreme Court should do more than thumb through the dictionary).
82 See Redwood, supra note 79, at 16 n.50 (pointing out that the Supreme Court in
quoting Section 10(b) actually left out its final words which, significantly, are "as neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors").
83. The Court stated that in determining the scope of Section 10(b)'s grant of rule-
making authority, it had limited its analysis to the text of the statute, whereas in
determining the elements of liability within that proper scope it had used broader means
of statutory interpretation. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173-74. In fact, the Court has
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policy claims that should have been essentially irrelevant to its stated
mode of analysis; 4 (e) for failing to give deference to the SEC's in-
terpretations pursuant to the Chevrons' doctrine;s6 (f) for ignoring
evidence that Congress has implicitly approved the existence of Sec-
tion 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 aiding and abetting liability; 8 (g) for
underemphasizing the importance of investor protection and of
ethical behavior and its role in creating an efficient capital market
system;89 and (h) for being inconsistent with a strong modem trend in
both civil and criminal law to recognize "that those who play a sub-
stantial role in a harm are subject to liability."'
Such criticisms are at this point essentially water under the
bridge.9 The key question now is the impact of the decision. In the
long run, the ultimate impact of Central Bank will depend upon how
broad the lower courts determine the scope of primary liability under
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 to be.
often used the broader tools of statutory construction to determine scope-type questions.
See Bromberg, supra note 81, at 136 n.28.
84. See Seligman, supra note 10, at 1433. For a collection of sources that support the
Central Bank majority's jaundiced view of securities litigation, see Blackman, supra note
79, at 1359.68.
85. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-45 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled that courts should defer to agencies' interpreta-
tions of the statutes they administer so long as (a) the statutory language does not clearly
resolve the issue, and (b) the agency's interpretation is not manifestly unreasonable.
86. See Nat Stem, The Constitutionalization of Rule lOb-5, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 1,
27-28 (1995).
87. See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 887.
88. See Gorman, supra note 13, at 260 (arguing that Central Bank weakens the deter-
rent effect of federal securities laws and unintentionally chills investor confidence in
markets); Kuehnle, supra note 9, at 316 (arguing pre-Central Bank that in light of (a) the
existence of secondary liability in the common-law scheme pre-dating passage of the 1933
Securities Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act, and (b) Congress's clear intention to
provide investors protections at least as strong as those existing at common law, persons
who took the position that "controlling person" liability was the exclusive form of secon-
dary liability available under the federal securities laws "have a heavy burden to establish
that Congress meant something that it easily could have said, but failed to say").
89. See O'Leary, supra note 79, at 1071.
90. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 887.
91. And, they are not unique to Central Bank. Similar criticisms can be made re-
garding most of the Supreme Court's decisions in Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cases over the
past two decades. See generally Stem, supra note 86 (criticizing the Supreme Court's
decisions regarding Section 10(b) as "inconsistent" and involving poor statutory interpre-
tation).
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II. A GENTLE REMINDER THAT THE BOUNDARIES OF SECTION
10(B)/RULE 10B-5 PRIMARY LIABILITY SHOULD BE GENEROUSLY
DESCRIBED
It is important to remember that Central Bank itself does not in
any way directly address the proper scope of primary liability under
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. Indeed, the Central Bank majority itself
stressed that the scope of Section 10(b) liability on the one hand, and
the particulars of its recognized existence on the other, are two com-
pletely different questions requiring different modes of analysis.2
Central Bank merely holds that there is no basis in the statute's lan-
guage for recognizing the existence of secondary liability. A holding
that there is no secondary liability does not necessarily carry any im-
plications for the proper scope of primary liability. True, the
majority did engage in some gratuitous bashing of securities fraud
litigation, 3 but that, at least according to the Central Bank majority,
is essentially irrelevant to determination of the correct parameters of
primary liability. 4
To the extent that such policy matters are considered anyway,
there is also substantial evidence casting doubt upon the "litigation
crisis" mentality that apparently motivated the Central Bank major-
ity.95 In any event, passage of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) substantially undermines any
"litigation crisis" rationale96 and should allow courts to recall that
92. See 511 U.S. at 172-76.
93. See id. at 189 (referring to securities fraud litigation's "danger of vexatiousness"
and to the "ripple effects" from "uncertainty and excessive litigation").
94. If the majority is correct, and the wording of the statute is the only determinant of
the scope of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability, see id. at 173, then policy considerations
regarding the pros and cons of federal securities class actions and their impact on innova-
tion and capital formation are irrelevant.
95. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial
Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REv. 17, 33 n.59 (1993) (noting that al-
though "hundreds" of securities class actions are filed every year, many of these relate to
the same alleged offense and are eventually consolidated into a single suit); Baruch Lev,
Disclosure and Litigation, 37 CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 1995, at 8, 9 (suggesting a de-
tailed empirical study that responsible communications with investors do not generate
frivolous securities fraud litigation); Seligman, supra note 10, at 1434 ("[L]ess than one
percent of the 17,400 companies that filed with the SEC in 1993 have been subject to
[securities] litigation in any given year.").
96. Among other things, the PSLRA (a) placed significant limitations on the
"professional plaintiffs" supposedly behind most federal securities law class actions, see
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(a) (West Supp. 1996); (b) created a "safe harbor for forward-looking
statements," thereby codifying defendants' "bespeaks caution doctrine" defense, see id.
§ 77z-2(c)(1); (c) altered in a pro-defendant fashion the requirements of loss causation,
see id. § 771(b); (d) heightened plaintiffs' pleading requirements, see id. § 78u-4(b); (e)
[Vol. 75
SECTION 10(b) LIABILITY
Section 10(b) is a remedial statute with broad remedial purposes 97
that should be flexibly and liberally construed to effectuate its com-
pensatory purposes. In its more generous moments, even the
Supreme Court has recognized the investor protection policies that
underlay much of Congress's motivation in passing the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.99
The main goal of the 1934 Act was to eliminate to the extent
possible fraudulent securities transactions.'00 The 1934 Act's investor
provided rules for discovery disputes that greatly benefit defendants, see id. § 78u-
4(a)(3)(iv), (b)(3); (f) discourages litigation by sanctioning "abusive" suits, see id. § 78u-
4(c); and, most importantly perhaps, (g) did much to eliminate collateral defendants' joint
and several liability, see id. § 78u-4(g)(2)(B)(ii).
In the six weeks before the PSLRA was passed, forty-four Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
class action lawsuits were filed against accounting firms. In the four months following
passage of the PSLRA, no such suits were filed. See Karen Donovan, Bean Counters in a
Bind: Trade-Off Expands Duties, NAT'L L.L, Apr. 29, 1996, at B1. However, plaintiffs
and plaintiffs' attorneys being the resourceful creatures that they are, state court securi-
ties fraud filings have increased dramatically since passage of the PSLRA, and federal
filings have made a comeback as well. See Mike France, Bye, Fraud Suits. Hello, Fraud
Suits, Bus. WK., June 24, 1996, at 127; Dean Starkman, Securities Class-Action Suits Seem
Immune to Effects of New Law, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12,1996, at B7.
97. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (Section 10(b) is remedial
legislation); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731, 739 (10th Cir. 1974) (remedial pur-
pose); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir.
1974); Arpet, Ltd. v. Homans, 390 F. Supp. 908, 910 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (remedial purpose);
Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154,1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (remedial purpose).
98. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)
(flexible interpretation); In re American Continental CorpJLincoln S&L Sec. Litig., 49
F.3d 541, 543 (9th Cir. 1995) (read flexibly in order to effect remedial purposes); Interna-
tional Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1345 (2d Cir. 1974) (interpret flexibly, not
technically and restrictively); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970)
(interpret broadly).
99. See, e.g., Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985)
(concluding that the objective of securities laws was "protection of the investing public
and the national economy through the promotion of 'a high standard of business eth-
ics' "); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1977) ("[The] cases forcefully
reflect the principle that '§ 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively'
and that the statute provides a cause of action for any plaintiff who 'suffer[s] an injury as
a result of deceptive practices touching its sale [or purchase] of securities ......."(citations
omitted)); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (stating that
the main purpose of the 1934 Act was "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor"); Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 12; SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (noting that the fundamental pur-
pose of securities laws "is to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities
industry").
Admittedly, the current Supreme Court is not likely to stress these numerous hold-
ings, but to respond as in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980), that "generalized
references" to the securities laws' "remedial purposes" are not enough justification to
construe a securities statute liberally.
100. See S. REP. No. 73-792, at 1-5 (1934); see also Brennan v. Midwestern United Life
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protection goals have been under significant assault lately by a wave
of financial fraud accompanied by audit and other failures,' so it is a
particularly inappropriate time to ignore the Act's basic purposes.
Furthermore, the SEC "does not have the resources to investigate
every instance in which a public company's disclosure is questionable
... [and would not] even if the Commission's resources were substan-
tially increased."02 Therefore, the SEC encourages private
enforcement of the securities laws and urged the Supreme Court in
Central Bank to recognize aiding and abetting liability in both private
actions and SEC enforcement actions. The Supreme Court has, in
earlier Rule 10b-5 decisions, noted the importance of not undermin-
ing the congressional policy favoring private damage actions as an
important mode of enforcing federal securities statutes.1 A broad
reading of the scope of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 primary liability
would help minimize fraud in the markets and thereby bolster inves-
tor confidence in those markets and make them more efficient as
well. 10
4
Furthermore, Section 10(b) was patterned, roughly, upon the
common law of fraud and deceit.1 5 To the extent that Congress in-
Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969) (1934
Act "is directed toward the creation and maintenance of a post-issuance securities market
that is free from fraudulent practices").
101. See Diana B. Henriques, Business Fraud of the '90s: Falsifying Corporate Data,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992, at Al (there seems to be a sharp resurgence of fraud rooted
in the way public companies are managed); Anthony Lewis, Maintain Laws Against Secu-
rities Fraud, Hous. CHRON., May 23, 1995, at 16 ("It is a peculiar time to weaken legal
protections: a time of spectacular financial frauds.").
It is also a time when a recent survey indicates that 47% of top executives are willing
to misstate financial records, see Arthur P. Brief et al., What's Wrong with the Treadway
Commission Report? Experimental Analyses of the Effects of Personal Values and Codes
of Conduct on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 15 J. Bus. ETHics 183, 190 (1996), and
where companies are increasingly outsourcing their internal audit functions away from
the internal employees who have been uncovering most of the frauds to outside auditors
who have failed to uncover the frauds. See Lee Berton, Who is Going to Audit the Audi-
tors?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 1996, at B1. This outsourcing in and of itself creates serious
questions about the ability of outside auditors to adequately check their own work. See
id.
102. Securities Fraud Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 113 (1993) (statement of William R. McLucas).
103. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 307 (1985); see
also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 636-37 (1988) (same in 1933 Act case).
104. See John A. MacKerron, The Price Integrity Cause of Action Under Rule 10b-5:
Limiting and Expanding the Use of the Fraud on the Market Theory, 69 OR. L. REv. 177,
181-82 (1990).
105. See Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224 (8th Cir. 1975) (common-law
fraud concepts underlie the securities laws and provide guidance as to their reach and
application); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968) (Section
10(b) "should be interpreted as an expansion of the common law [in order] to effectuate
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tended to alter the common law, it intended to make it easier, not
more difficult, for securities law plaintiffs to recover under Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 than it had been under the common law," because
Congress realized "that the common law and state legislation af-
forded the public insufficient protection against plain fraud both in
the issuance of securities and in post-issuance trading."'0 7 The Su-
preme Court has concluded that Congress intended provisions such
as Section 10(b) to "rectify perceived deficiencies in the available
common-law protections,"' and to add to those protections.c' This
conclusion is justified by the legislative history, because the House
Report on the 1934 Act indicated:
If investor confidence is to come back.., the law must ad-
vance. As a complex society so diffuses and differentiates
the financial interests of the ordinary citizen that he has to
trust others and cannot personally watch the managers of all
his interests as one horse trader watches another, it becomes
a condition of the very stability of that society that its rules
of law and of business practice recognize and protect that
ordinary citizen's dependent position."'
Professor Loss has also noted that "[b]ecause of the legislative
background it seems reasonable to assume at the very least that the
most liberal common law views on these questions should govern un-
der the statutes.""' Courts should bear this in mind as they establish
[its] broad remedial [purpose]").
106. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. 472 U.S. at 310 (stating that the Supreme
Court has "eschewed rigid common-law barriers in construing the securities laws"); Har-
ris, 523 F.2d at 224-28 (observing that Rule 10b-5 offers greater protection to plaintiffs
than does the common-law tort of fraud); Resort Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Chuck Ruwart
Chevrolet, Inc., 519 F.2d 317, 321 (10th Cir. 1975) (same); James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483
F.2d 944, 946 (6th Cir. 1973) (noting that Rule 10b-5 plaintiff does not face same limits to
recovery as common-law fraud plaintiff); Kubik v. Goldfield, 479 F.2d 472, 476 n.6 (3d
Cir. 1973) (stating that plaintiffs need not prove all elements of common-law fraud to
recover under 10b-5); SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir.
1972) (same).
107. 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 27-28 (3d ed. 1989).
108. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (citing SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
109. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1988) ("Actions under Rule
10b-5 are distinct from common-law deceit and misrepresentation claims and are in part
designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law." (citations
omitted)).
110. H.R. REP. No. 73-1383, at 5 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 5, n.158, item 18
(J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973).
111. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 812 (1983); see also
1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 2.7(1), at 55 (1992) ("When it turned its attention to securities legislation, Con-
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the boundary between actionable primary and nonactionable secon-
dary liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5.
If in deciding the scope of primary liability the courts interpret
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 "so as to prevent fraud," 2 the concept of
primary liability will be given a broad range and the remedial and
antifraud purposes of the legislation will be served. Nothing in Cen-
tral Bank forbids this. After all, even the Central Bank majority
opinion admitted that there is room for primary liability for collateral
defendants under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5:
The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not
mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are al-
ways free from liability under the securities Acts. Any
person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank,
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material
misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under
10b-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability
under Rule 10b-5 are met. In any complex securities fraud,
moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators; in this
case, for example, respondents named four defendants as
primary violators.1'3
In summary, although one reads the Central Bank opinion in
vain trying to find even the slightest hint that the majority realizes it,
it nonetheless remains true that Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 constitute a
broadly remedial measure meant to give purchasers and sellers of
securities more, not less, protection than they received from com-
mon-law theories of fraud and deceit. This gentle reminder to the
Court unfortunately seems necessary in light of its decision in Mer-
gress plainly expressed its wish that injured investors have an easier time [than at com-
mon law]."); Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5:
Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96, 138 (1985)
("Congress's determination that common law protections were deficient suggests that in
the face of divided common law opinions, the most liberal common law views of 1934
should govern.").
112. Resort Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Chuck Ruwart Chevrolet, Inc., 519 F.2d 317, 321
(10th Cir. 1975).
113. 511 U.S. at 191 (citations omitted). The dissent chimed in on this point:
Indeed, the [majority] anticipates that many aiders and abettors will be subject
to liability as primary violators. For example, an accountant, lawyer, or other
person making oral or written misrepresentations (or omissions, if the person
owes a duty to the injured purchaser or seller) in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities may be liable for a primary violation of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.
Id. at 199 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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tens v. Hewitt Associates." The Mertens Court, faced with an am-
biguous statute, strained the statutory language to reach a
conservative result that was outrageously at odds with the undeniably
remedial purpose of the statute. Although Mertens involved a to-
tally different statute and issues that are distinguishable, its holding
was an uncomfortable reminder of what a conservative court can do
when it starts picking lexicographical nits in disregard of obvious leg-
islative intent.
III. THE PROPER SCOPE OF PRIMARY LIABILITY UNDER SECTION
10(B)/RuLE 1OB-5
As noted earlier, analysis of primary liability can be broken
down into three broad categories: (a) defendants' responsibility for
their own misstatements (or omissions); (b) defendants' responsibil-
ity for the misstatements (or omissions) of others in which they
participated; and (c) defendants' responsibility for the misstatements
(or omissions) of others regarding which they did not "blow the whis-
tle." I shall address these seriatim.
114. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
115. The Mertens majority held that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) did not authorize suits for money damages against nonfiduciaries who
knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty. See 508 U.S. at 251-63.
This holding was based on extremely vague and contradictory statutory language and
ignored five basic points made by the dissenters: (a) the language at issue authorizing
plaintiffs to seek "appropriate equitable relief" plausibly means relief which was available
in courts of equity for a breach of trust; (b) compensatory money damages were in fact
available in the equity courts for breach of trust; (c) nonfiduciaries who knowingly par-
ticipated in another's breach of trust were liable for such damages at common law; (d)
ERISA was grounded in the common-law experience and to be guided by the principles
of trust law; and (e) ERISA was meant to provide more protection for plaintiffs than had
the common law while the majority's interpretation clearly provided them with less. See
id. at 263 (White, J., dissenting).
116. See, e.g., Maria Linda Cattafesta, Note, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates: Nonfidu-
ciary Liability for Money Damages Under ERISA, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 1165, 1175 (1994)
(suggesting that "the Mertens decision will result in a level of protection for plan partici-
pants and beneficiaries who are victims of fiduciary breaches that is lower than that
formerly available to such victims under the common law of trusts prior to ERISA's en-
actment, a result that directly counters ERISA's purpose"); Gregory A. Hewett, Note,
Should Non-Fiduciaries Who Knowingly Participate in a Fiduciary Breach Be Liable for
Damages Under ERISA?, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 773, 800 (1993) (stating that "the Court in
Mertens disregarded ERISA's fundamental purpose and accepted a strained interpreta-
tion of the statute that has left plan participants and beneficiaries with less protection
than the common law provided").
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A. Primary Liability for One's Own Misrepresentations (or
Omissions)
This is an easy one. In Central Bank, the majority accepted the
universal rule that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 impose an obligation
upon persons not to defraud investors through affirmative misrepre-
sentations.117 Not just corporations, but all actors (accountants,
attorneys, underwriters, etc.) have a duty"' not to tell lies in settings
where they can reasonably foresee that investors will be misled and
consequently injured. 9
For example, false statements in a bank's opinion letter,2  or an
attorney's tax or bond opinion letter can lead to primary Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability when all other statutory elements are pres-
ent. When an accounting firm certifies a financial statement, it will
be primarily liable for inaccuracies that occur therein, assuming the
other elements of Section 10(b) liability are present,2 because such
117. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 108 ("[T]he making of misrepresentations which dis-
tort the transmission of accurate information is the core conduct which Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 are meant to deter. That such misrepresentations are made by accountants or
lawyers should not provide a shield from liability.").
118. The "duty" element is one of the key requirements of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
liability. In cases involving affirmative misrepresentations and half-truths, existence of a
duty running to investors is generally presumed. See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841
F.2d 502, 506 (3d Cir. 1988). Where the asserted wrong is a mere failure to speak, such a
duty may be more difficult to locate. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
119. See Akin v. Q-L Invs., 959 F.2d 521,531-32 (5th Cir. 1992).
120. See Herskowitz v. NutrilSystem, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1988).
121. See, e.g., Kline v. First W. Gov't Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 486-88 (3d Cir. 1994);
Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1991); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766
F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1985); Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856, 862
(10th Cir. 1980); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 540.41 (2d Cir. 1973); Gilmore v.
Berg, 761 F. Supp. 358, 371 (D.N.J. 1991); Stevens v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., 694 F.
Supp. 1057, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585,598 (D. Haw. 1985).
12Z See, e.g., Akin, 959 F.2d at 531-32; Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310,
1330-31 (8th Cir. 1991), affd sub nom Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 1066 (1993);
Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290, 295-97 (5th Cir. 1990); Manufacturers
Hanover Trust v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 1986); Herzfeld v. Laven-
thol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 33-37 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Sahlen &
Assoc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 351-60 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Quantum Overseas, N.V. v.
Touche Ross & Co., 663 F. Supp. 658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), order rev'd, 762 F.2d 930 (2d
Cir. 1984); Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 552 F. Supp. 439, 454 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (" 'Accountants may be primary wrongdoers when they [prepare and certify finan-
cial statements that] contain misrepresentations or omit to state facts necessary to make
what is said not misleading [because] [f]inancial statements certified by an accountant for
presentation to investors give rise to a direct duty to the public.'" (quoting Seiffer v.
Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653, 667 (D. Kan. 1980) (alterations in original)); Resnick
v. Touche Ross & Co., 470 F. Supp. 1020, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
This is well settled despite the accounting profession's early insistence that figures in
a certified financial statement were not representations by the auditor since they were
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a certification is equivalent to any misrepresentation made in a busi-
ness transaction in that it supplies information naturally and
justifiably relied upon by others to make investment decisions.'23
This liability extends to misstatements of an issuer where the lawyer
or accountant also happens to be a principal of that issuer, such as a
director or important officer. 4  Although there exists an ongoing
controversy regarding the scope of accountants' and attorneys' liabil-
ity for negligent statements,2 there is near unanimity in both state
law and federal law, which can be traced back to the Ultramares
case,126 that a speaker's liability on fraud-related theories (such asSection 10(b)/Rule 10b-5) extends to all reasonably foreseeable
prepared primarily by the client. See T.J. Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Re-
sponsibilities to Third-parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31, 62 & n.110 (1975).
123. See Fine, 919 F.2d at 298 (stating that accounting firm potentially primarily liable
for its own misstatements); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990)
(noting that although it is difficult to distinguish primary from secondary liability, "[w]hen
an accountant certifies that a firm's financial statements 'present fairly' its financial posi-
tion ... it is certifying the absence of materially misleading omissions, a source of primary
liability. If it acts with the necessary mental state, the case for direct liability is com-
plete."); Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 552 F. Supp. 439, 454-55 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Seiffer, 487 F. Supp. at 667; Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
This liability can attach even if there was no direct communication from defendant to
plaintiff. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 1996); see
also Humphreys, supra note 38, at 383-84 ("If the alleged misrepresentation or omission
occurred in the context of financial statements reported on by the accountant, there is no
need to analyze aiding and abetting liability, the accountant's duty to disclose or the ac-
countant's relationship to the investing public. The inquiry should be limited to whether
there was a materially misleading omission or misrepresentation in those statements re-
sulting from the accountant's fraudulent conduct."); Metzger, supra note 38, at 1391-92
(discussing duties and responsibilities of accountants).
124. See, e.g., Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., 855 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
lawyer who was also director, secretary, and shareholder liable for company's misrepre-
sentations); Pucci v. Santi, 711 F. Supp. 916, 925-26 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (same); Felts v.
National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54,68 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (same). The relatively
controversial "group published" theory extends primary liability for disclosure deficien-
cies in corporate communications to those officers actively involved in the corporation's
affairs. See, e.g., Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987).
125. See generally Brian K. Kirby & Thomas L. Davies, Accountant Liability: New
Exposure for an Old Profession, 36 S.D. L. REV. 574 (1991) (examining developing theo-
ries of accountant liability and their impact on the accounting profession); Gary Lawson
& Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-Party Liability of Accountants
and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1309 (1991) (describing
legal standards used by courts in cases of third-party claims of negligent misrepresenta-
tion and reviewing trends of the last two decades).
126. In Ultramares, Judge Cardozo was careful to distinguish between mere negli-
gence, regarding which he was concerned about sheltering accountants from
indeterminate liability to an indeterminate number of persons for an indeterminate time,
and fraud, as to which he was determined not to "emancipate accountants from the con-
sequences." Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441,448 (N.Y. 1931).
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127
Of course, a distinction is typically drawn between active misrep-
resentation cases, where it is universally recognized that injured
third-parties may sue for fraud, and nondisclosure cases, where the
common law typically did not impose liability. Notwithstanding this
bifurcation, the common law recognized numerous situations where a
duty to disclose did arise vis-A-vis third-parties. The Supreme Court
has acted in recent years as though there was only one such excep-
tion-the fiduciary duty exception.' 2s But, in point of fact, the
common law has recognized multiple exceptions to the traditional
caveat emptor rule. Because the 1934 Exchange Act was passed to
127. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying rule
to author of tax investment letter); FDIC v. Hudson, 758 F. Supp. 663, 670 (D. Kan. 1991)
(citing the rule generally); In re Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp.
550, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same); Oleck v. Fischer, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 96,898, at 95,699 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979), affd, 623 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that accountant who is reckless is liable to parties whose reliance upon the false
document is reasonably foreseeable); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 753 (Cal.
1992) (applying rule to auditors), rev'd on other grounds, 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); Fidel-
ity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Atherton, 144 P.2d 157, 161 (N.M. 1943) (applying rule to
county-employed auditors); Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d
1032, 1070 (Wash. 1987) (noting that rule may be applied to professionals other than ac-
countants). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 531, illus. 4 (1977)
(illustrating accountants' liability to third-party relying on his or her report); W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 744-45 (5th ed.
1984) (noting that reliance by third-parties on information need merely be foreseeable);
Bonita A. Daly & John M. Gibson, The Delineation of Accountants' Legal Liability to
Third-parties: Bily and Beyond, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 609, 618 (1994) ("[A]ccountants
may be held liable not only to their clients but also to reasonably foreseeable third-parties
for intentional fraud .... ").
128. A duty to speak obviously arises where there is a fiduciary relationship or some
other relationship of trust and confidence. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
228 (1980).
129. The Supreme Court's seeming presumption that the fiduciary relationship situa-
tion is the only one imposing a duty to speak is woefully inconsistent with the common
law. Numerous other exceptions exist to the general rule, which is fortunate, since the
general rule reflects "dubious business ethics." See KEETON ET AL., supra note 127,§ 106, at 737. These exceptions are now so numerous that it is at least plausible to argue
that they have swallowed the traditional rule of caveat emptor. As one commentator has
noted, "[tihere are... occasional modem cases which have held that so long as one ad-
versary does not actively mislead another he is perfectly free to take advantage, no
matter how unfair, of ignorance .... These are surely singularly unappetizing cases." Id.
§ 106, at 737-38. Even a partial listing of these exceptions is lengthy.
For example, a second exception arises from the rule that even if a defendant does
speak truthfully, he must say enough not to mislead. In other words, silence can lead to
liability for half-truths. See Dennis v. Thomson, 43 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Ky. 1931); Smith v.
Pope, 176 A.2d 321, 324-25 (N.H. 1961); Uptegraft v. Dome Petroleum Corp., 764 P.2d
1350, 1353 (Okla. 1988) (duty to speak may arise from partial disclosure); Palmiter v.
Hackett, 185 P. 1105, 1106 (Or. 1920).
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Third, one who speaks truthfully and then learns either that (a) he was mistaken at
the time he spoke, or (b) the facts have changed since he spoke so as to make his state-
ment inaccurate, must speak out. Silence in such situations constitutes fraud. See
Fitzgerald v. McFadden, 88 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1937); Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368, 373
(2d Cir. 1893); Mammas v. Oro Valley Townhouses, 638 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Ariz. App.
1981); Tempo Tamers, Inc. v. Crow-Houston Four, Ltd., 715 S.W.2d 658, 669 (Tex. App.
1986).
Fourth, a duty to speak out may be imposed when one party realizes that the other is
acting under a misapprehension. See Tyra v. Cheney, 152 N.W. 835, 835 (Minn. 1915);
Shea v. H.S. Pickrell Co., 748 P.2d 980,982 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
Fifth, a duty to speak out is often imposed when one party has such a superior posi-
tion, perhaps because of training, education or professional experience, that it is natural
for the other party to rely. See First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. First State Ins.
Co., 899 F.2d 1045, 1057 (11th Cir. 1990) (superior expertise); Mancini v. Gorick, 536
N.E.2d 8, 9-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (noting that defendant's position may lead to natural
reliance).
Sixth, a duty to speak out can be imposed in situations where one party has superior
knowledge or access to information. See FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 619
(7th Cir. 1989); Kociemba v. G. D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1526 (D. Minn. 1989);
Posner v. Davis, 395 N.E.2d 133 (Il. App. Ct. 1979); Irons v. Community State Bank, 461
N.W.2d 849, 854 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (ruling that duty to speak can arise from inequality
of condition and knowledge); Silva v. Stevens, 589 A.2d 852,857 (Vt. 1991).
Seventh, a duty to speak out may arise if a party actively conceals material facts. See
American-Traders' Nat'l. Bank v. Henderson, 133"So. 36, 37 (Ala. 1931); Nicolet, Inc. v.
Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 149 (Del. Super. 1987); Moser v. DeSetta, 589 A.2d 679, 682 (Pa.
Super. 1989).
Eighth, a duty to speak out can be imposed in situations where the elements of es-
toppel apply. See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.2d 254, 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(because seller had told the public of ghosts in her house, "she may be said to owe no less
a duty to her contract vendee").
Ninth, courts often impose duties to speak out in cases of latent or hidden defects
that the buyer is unlikely to discover through a reasonable inspection. See Schnell v. Gus-
tafson, 638 P.2d 850, 852 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Harton v. Harton, 344 S.E.2d 117, 119
(N.C. App. 1986).
Tenth, courts often impose a duty to speak in contracts of uberrima ides, of utmost
good faith. See Jewish Center of Sussex County v. Whale, 397 A.2d 712, 715-16 (N.J.
Super. 1978); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 47 A. 825,826 (Vt. 1900).
Eleventh, where one is in a position where her silence will convey a misleading im-
pression, a duty to disclose may arise. See Atwood v. Chapman, 68 Me. 38,42 (1877).
Twelfth, a duty to disclose arises whenever one couples silence with any artifice or
trick designed to lull the other party into a sense of false security. See First Nat. Bank v.
Elam, 258 P. 892,898 (Okla. 1927).
Thirteenth, there have been numerous modern cases that impose a duty to disclose
where failure to do so would strike a normal person as unethical. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 127, § 106, at 739; see also Hand v. Dayton-Hudson, 775 F.2d 757,759 (6th Cir.
1985) (speaking of "equitable duty" of disclosure); Southern Land Dev. Co. v. Meyer, 159
So. 245, 246 (Ala. 1935) ("good faith" standard); Berger v. Security Pac. Info. Sys., Inc.,
795 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) ("in equity or good conscience" test); Wein-
traub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 71 (N.J. 1974) ("conscience and duty" test); George
Cohen Agency, Inc. v. Donald S. Perlman Agency, Inc., 114 A.D. 930, 932 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985) (holding that disclosure is required where necessary for "good faith"); Oller-
man v. O'Rourke Co., Inc., 288 N.W.2d 95, 107 (Wis. 1980) (using "reasonable
expectation of honesty in the marketplace" standard).
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eliminate the philosophy of caveat emptor and to raise the level of
ethics in the stock marketplace,3 ' those exceptions should be ex-
panded, not minimized, in Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence.
Some lower courts had already invoked these non-fiduciary duty
common law exceptions as a basis for primary liability before Bren-
nan introduced aiding and abetting liability.'
Liability for one's own misstatements (or omissions) was often
characterized as aiding and abetting liability before Central Bank was
decided.' However, it was really primary liability and it remains so
today. Of this, there should be no doubt, although tangential ques-
tions regarding duties to correct and to update will remain.133 The
post-Central Bank cases are having no difficulty with such situa-
tions.'3
B. Primary Liability for the Misstatements (or Omissions) of Others
The most important and controversial question that arises fol-
lowing Central Bank is this: Can one owe (and breach) a duty to the
investing public, and therefore be viewed as primarily liable, based
on another's misstatement? Most often the issue will be whether ac-
countants, lawyers, investment bankers or others can become so
involved in their clients' communications that they should be held
130. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)
(concluding that fundamental purpose of securities laws is "to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry").
131. See Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (invoking "change
of facts" exception).
132. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
133. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that accountants
have duty to correct misstatements they discover upon which they know public is relying);
Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 658 F. Supp. 271, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (ruling
that accounting firms have duty to correct); In re AM Int'l Sec. Litig., 606 F. Supp. 600,
607 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (concluding that accounting firm has "a duty to take reasonable ac-
tion to disclose errors or to correct financial statements for which it previously gave its
opinion"); Summer v. Land & Leisure, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 380,385 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (duty to
correct).
134. See, e.g., McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
accounting firm directly liable for issuing a false audit opinion with knowledge that the
opinion would be made public); Trust Co. of La. v. N.N.P., Inc., 92 F.3d 341, 350-53 (5th
Cir. 1996) (affirming verdict against attorney who wrote misleading letters to potential
investors); Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1436-38 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming
verdict against accounting firm for statements it made in financial statements); Anixter v.
Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding accountants liable
for statements directly attributable to them); In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig.,




primarily liable for affirmative misrepresentations contained therein.
The two lines of cases that have developed in Central Bank's wake
are nearly polar opposites.
1. The Post-Central Bank Cases Summarized
a. The Narrow View
In the wake of Central Bank, several lower courts have adopted
a narrow view of what activity can constitute a primary violation of
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. This narrow view asserts that if a defen-
dant did not make a particular false statement, the defendant cannot
be liable for the false statement. No amount of participation or assis-
tance to the maker of the statement can convert the defendant into
anything more than an aider and abettor. Under this view, lawyers,
accountants, and underwriters cannot be primarily liable for state-
ments issued under the names of their clients.135
For example, in In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Securities
Litigation,36 the trial court allowed investors to sue Kendall Square's
auditor over its statements in an unqualified opinion issued regarding
certain of Kendall Square's financial statements. The court correctly
viewed the opinion as a representation by the accounting firm which,
if it contained intentionally false misstatements or omissions, could
be the basis for primary liability under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. 37
However, the court refused to allow plaintiffs to pursue a claim based
upon the auditor's mere review and approval of other financial
statements and prospectuses. These communications were the cli-
ent's, not the auditor's. At most, the auditor substantially assisted
the client in making the communication, and that was deemed insuf-
ficient for liability after Central Bank."" The court also held that the
135. Several pre-Central Bank cases took this same point of view. For example, in
Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd, 730 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 927
F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991), the court refused to hold a law firm liable for drafting an offering
memorandum that contained false statements that were not attributed to the law firm
itself. See id. at 533-34. The only portions of the offering memorandum that were attrib-
uted to the law firm-a legal opinion and a tax assistance letter-did not contain false
statements. See id at 533-34.
And in Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), the court held that "a law-
yer or law firm cannot be held liable for the representations of a client, even if the lawyer
incorporates the client's misrepresentations into legal documents or agreements neces-
sary for closing the transaction." Id. at 495.
136. 868 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 1994).
137. See id. at 27-28.
138. See id. at 28 ("Because Price Waterhouse did not actually engage in the reporting
of the financial statements and prospectuses, but merely reviewed and approved them,
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auditor's involvement in structuring many of the client's improperly
recognized transactions did not make the subsequent improper re-
porting the auditor's communication rather than the client's.
139
Coopers & Lybrand was the collateral defendant on the hot seat
in In re Cascade International Securities Litigation."40 Coopers had
been hired to audit two of Cascade's numerous subsidiaries and to
provide other accounting advice to Cascade. Levy was Cascade's
auditor. Plaintiffs alleged, in part, that Coopers gave tax advice to
Cascade and to Levy and gave advice regarding whether Cascade
should consolidate its financial statements with those of its numerous
subsidiaries. The court held that "[t]his advice did not act as a state-
ment by Defendant Coopers & Lybrand upon which the public
relied, and, at the most, could only be considered as aiding or abet-
ting the fraud being committed by Cascade which is not actionable
under Central Bank."'14'
The narrow view stands for the proposition that a defendant's
"substantial assistance" to another's misrepresentations cannot lead
to primary liability,'42 and is consistent with many cases decided by
the statements are not attributable to Price Waterhouse and thus Price Waterhouse cannot
be found liable for making a material misstatement." (emphasis added)).
139. See id. at 28 n.1 ("[T]he participation in the 'structuring' does not constitute the
making of a material misstatement; rather, it is the improper reporting of the 'structured'
transactions by the Company in its quarterly statements that constitutes the alleged Sec-
tion 10(b) violation.").
Other courts addressing accountants' Section 10(b) liability have accepted the dis-
tinction drawn by Kendall Square. For example, in O'Neil v. Appel, 897 F. Supp. 995
(W.D. Mich. 1995), the court held that an accounting firm that issues an unqualified audit
report that it knows is false and will be attached to an SEC filing can be primarily liable,
but that same firm is not liable for merely reviewing and approving documents of the
client. See id. at 1000; see also Stamatio v. Hurco Co., 885 F. Supp. 1180, 1185 (S.D. Ind.
1995) (appearing to hold that primary liability attaches only to those who misrepresent or
omit a material fact); Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (holding that issuance of a false "clean" audit report would be actionable, but not
advising, concurring, guiding, approving, and otherwise directly and substantially assisting
a client's fraudulent treatment of items on its financial statements).
140. 894 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
141. Id. at 442.
142. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e
conclude that in order for accountants to 'use or employ' a 'deception' actionable under
the antifraud law, they must themselves make a false or misleading statement (or omis-
sion) that they know or should know will reach potential investors.").
In a case involving manipulation rather than false statements, a court recently held
that a stock trader could, with full knowledge of a manipulative plot and with intent to
profit, assist that plot by executing trades that he knew were wash sales and other ma-
nipulative devices and yet be only an aider and abettor not reachable by Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5. See SEC v. U.S. Envtl., 929 F. Supp. 168, 171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Ac-
cording to the court, unless the defendant "controlled" the manipulative scheme, he was
merely an aider and abettor. See id. at 171.
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the lower courts both before'43 and after 4 Central Bank.
Although courts taking this narrow view are not unanimous re-
garding all possible scenarios, 45 the purest version of this view is
summarized in the following words of one court:
[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant
must actually make a false or misleading statement in order
to be held liable under Section 10(b). Anything short of
such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and no matter
how substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger
liability under Section 10(b). 46
b. The Broad View
Not all lower courts are following the narrow view. Some have
held that under proper circumstances Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 col-
lateral defendants can indeed be held liable for statements made by
others. For example, in In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation,14
plaintiffs challenged thirteen public statements made by the client
143. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1988), va-
cated on other grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); Friedman v. Arizona
World Nurseries Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 521, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir.
1991); Buford White Lumber Co. Profit Sharing & Say. Plan & Trust v. Octagon Proper-
ties Ltd., 740 F. Supp. 1553, 1570 (W.D. Okla. 1989).
Langevoort, quite correctly, calls these holdings "troubling" if the attorneys were ac-
tively involved in preparing the client's fraudulent communication, "for when the lawyer
bears such primary responsibility for the misinformation, there is no need to invoke sec-
ondary liability. The very idea of aiding-and-abetting liability is to reach those who only
assist, rather than commit, a primary violation." Langevoort, supra note 39, at 86 n.40.
144. See, e.g., Klein v. Boyd, No. 95-5410, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19153, at *80-82
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (law firm held not to be liable for false statements and omissions in two
documents that it prepared for its client because the firm's name did not appear on the
document); In re JWP, Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that members of audit committee could not be liable for statements they did not make);
Lycan v. Walters, 904 F. Supp. 884, 901 n.12 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (rejecting the notion that an
attorney could be primarily liable under Section 10(b) for circulating a client's statement
that he knows to be false); see also Brown v. Benchmark Power Corp., No. 95-35578, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 20523, at *10 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating cryptically in opinion not for pub-
lication or citation that for an auditor to be liable it must do more than merely audit and
fail to publicly blow the whistle on client's wrongdoing--"There must also be some sort of
public statement or other affirmative act" (emphasis added)).
145. For example, in Walco Investments, Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576, 1582-83
(S.D. Fla. 1995), the court took the narrow view that an underwriter could not be liable
for statements it did not make, yet hedged the ruling by suggesting that primary liability
could be based on disseminating false statements made by others, which other narrow
view cases, such as In re MTC Electronic Technology Shareholders Litigation., 898 F.
Supp. 974,987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), appear to reject.
146. In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. at 987.
147. 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
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company in press releases and SEC filings, none of which attributed
its existence to the company's auditor or even hinted that the auditor
might be involved in its issuance. However, based on plaintiffs'
claims that the auditor was "intricately involved" in the creation, re-
view, or issuance of the misleading statements, the court held that the
statements might well be attributable to the auditor and that the
auditor could be primarily liable for their inaccuracies. The court
rejected the auditor's claim that these were the client's communica-
148tions and that the most it had done was aid and abet their making.
Similarly, in In re Software Toolworks Inc.,'49 the Ninth Circuit
held that underwriters who joined with other professionals in drafting
a client's letter to the SEC and accountants who reviewed, discussed,
edited, and helped draft letters to the SEC were both potentially
primarily liable.
Several other courts have found the approaches of ZZZZ Best
and Software Toolworks to be persuasive and have held, conse-
quently, that under proper circumstances collateral Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 defendants could be primarily liable for theirinvolvement, 5 "central involvement, or for being "primary ac-
tors"' 53 or for "actively participating ' -" in the "preparation ' rs5 of
fraudulent communications of others even after Central Bank."6
148. See id. at 966-72.
149. 38 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1994).
150. See id. at 1087 (underwriters) & 1090 n.3 (accountants).
151. See Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1401-02 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (regarding accounting firm that was "involved" in preparation of client's prospec-
tus, interim financial statements, and press releases which were part of an overall scheme
to defraud).
152. See Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 432 (N.D. Ii. 1995)
(holding accountants potentially primarily liable because they played "a central role in
the drafting and formation of the alleged misstatements" which client incorporated into
its prospectus).
153. See Employees Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381,389
(S.D. Cal. 1994) (citing Software Toolworks for the view that one who plays a "significant
role" in the preparation of a fraudulent communication is a "primary actor" who can be
primarily liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5).
154. See Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding underwriter potentially "responsible" and therefore primarily liable for "actively
participat[ing] in formulating the language of the prospectus" even though the prospectus
was issued in the client's name).
155. See Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 111, 119 (N.D. I11.
1995) (noting Rule 10b-5's "wide-open language" in holding liable all those who prepared
a false memorandum issued in a corporation's name).
156. See also In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 980
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (expressing tentative belief that corporate officers can be primarily li-
able for statements for which they were not personally responsible); In re U.S.A. Classic
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2. The Post-Central Bank Cases Analyzed
Before I set forth what I believe to be the viable post-Central
Bank theories for imposing primary liability upon some defendants
for statements issued under the names of others, let me emphasize
why the courts taking what I have denominated as the "narrow view"
of this issue have erred.
The "narrow" view, premised on the notion that one cannot ever
be liable for statements made by another, does create a "bright-line"
test. Such tests have their advantages, primarily those that stem from
having a clear rule that people can count on in planning their activi-
ties and having a rule that is easily and (relatively) inexpensively
litigated. 5 7 With the narrow view, participants in the securities indus-
try know that if their name is not on the report as author, the chances
of their being held liable for damages in a Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
private damages action are virtually nil. Accountants and lawyers
know that they can respond, when called upon by clients for assis-
tance in editing, drafting, and even circulating documents to
investors, without the risk of incurring Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 li-
ability. But that advantage, admittedly important to the Central
Bank majority,158 is outweighed by the narrow view's weaknesses.
The principal weakness of the narrow approach lies in its poten-
tial to allow egregious wrongdoing to go unpunished159 and serious
Sec. Litig., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,837, at 93,046 (S.D.N.Y.
June 16, 1995) (holding issuer, corporate officers, and underwriter all potentially primar-
ily liable as "direct participants" in fraudulent scheme).
On the other hand, if collateral defendants assist a primary wrongdoer's scheme in
ways that do not involve false representations or omissions, it does not seem that they
have done anything more than aid and abet. See, e.g., Primavera Familienstiftung v.
Askin, No. 95-8905, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12683, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (drawing such a
distinction).
157. Cf Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting
that while the rule in Central Bank is "far from a bright line," it "provides more guidance
to litigants than a rule allowing liability to attach to an accountant or other outside pro-
fessional who provided 'significant' or 'substantial' assistance to the representations of
others").
158. The majority stated that one of the primary problems with recognition of aiding
and abetting liability was that "the rules for determining aiding and abetting liability are
unclear, in 'an area that demands certainty and predictability.' "511 U.S. at 188 (quoting
Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)). How the Supreme Court squared its decision to
overturn 30 years of settled law with the need for "certainty and predictability" is not
exactly clear.
159. Depending on how lower courts (and, perhaps ultimately, the Supreme Court)
shape the outlines of primary liability in post-Central Bank jurisprudence, bad actors in
the securities industry could have a field day. Redwood has predicted: "After the Su-
preme Court's decision, aiders and abettors have nothing to fear from the violations, even
if known and approved by them, of others with whom they associate in a securities trans-
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fraud-inflicted injuries to go uncompensated.1" Lower courts adopt-
ing the narrow view have held that an accounting firm, for example,is not primarily liable if it reviews a client's false financial state-
ments, 1  approves a client's false financial statements, 62 structures
transactions that the clients can report in a misleading fashion,1
gives advice on their erroneous reporting, 4 assists in drafting false
letters to the SEC,16 or takes a client's statement that it knows is false
and shows it to potential investors on the client's behalf."'
Given the narrow view's bright-line test, a collateral defendant
could do all these things in a single case yet still not be considered a
primary violator of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. Indeed, a defendant
could do all these things even in a situation where the defendant (a)
profited from the fraud, and (b) owed a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff
and still not face a private damages action under Section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5, according to this bright-line test. It is silly to conclude, in a
case in which an accountant (or lawyer or investment banker) has this
level of involvement, scienter, and motivation, that the communica-
tion is solely the client's simply because it is issued under the client's
name.
67
Consider a hypothetical example. Under the narrow view, a
action that injures public investors." Redwood, supra note 79, at 28-29.
Hewing closely to a narrow view of Central Bank leaves courts saying: "Yes, it's un-
ethical. Yes, it's immoral. But, golly, we can't seem to do anything about it." See United
States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 628 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting "misappropriation" theory
of insider trading), cerL granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1997) (No. 96-842).
160. Of course, there are many situations where Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 defendants
should not be liable for the statements of others. For example, corporations should not be
held liable for statements in newspapers over which they had no control, even if those
articles contain references to unidentified sources supposedly inside the corporations.
See, e.g., In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Kidder
Peabody Sec. Litig., [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,030, at
94,097 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1995); Hershfang v. Citicorp., 767 F. Supp. 1251, 1255 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
161. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Appel, 897 F. Supp. 995, 1000 (W.D. Mich. 1995); In re Kendall
Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26,28 (D. Mass. 1994).
162. See, e.g., O'Neil, 897 F. Supp. at 1000; In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec.
Litig., 868 F. Supp. at 28; Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371,1378 (E.D.
Pa. 1994).
163. See, e.g., In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. at 28.
164. See, e.g., Cascade Int'l Sec. Litig., 894 F. Supp. 437, 442 (S.D. Fla. 1995); Vos-
gerichian, 862 F. Supp. at 1378.
165. See, e.g., Walco Inv., Inc. v. Thenen, 881 F. Supp. 1576, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
166. See, e.g., Lycan v. Walters, 904 F. Supp. 884, 901 n.12 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
167. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and
Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 508 (1994) ("If conduct results from concerted ac-
tion by both [client and lawyer], attributing responsibility for that conduct to only one
would not make sense.").
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lawyer could conceive of the idea of a fraudulent press release, write
the release in its entirety, induce the client to issue it in the client's
name, then personally show it widely to unsuspecting investors to
whom he owed a fiduciary relationship, and pocket some of the pro-
ceeds, and yet not be deemed a primary violator of Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5. A rule that produces this result is clearly inconsis-
tent with the spirit that animated passage of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Acte' and promulgation of Rule 10b-5.1' 9 It is inconsistent
with professional rules of ethics,7 with the common law of fraud and
deceit, and with the pre-Brennan Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 case law
regarding primary liability. Perhaps any bright-line test carries the
potential to be attacked via a "parade of horribles" posed by imagi-
native opponents. But this parade of horribles is neither imaginary
nor hypothetical-it is based on real cases decided since Central
Bank.
If a "bright-line" rule that one entity can never be responsible
for another's statements were adopted, puppeteers who manipulate
fraudulent schemes from behind the scenes by pulling the strings and
171
making others talk will go unpunished . If such a test were adopted,
an important line of cases based on Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.7
would be senselessly overruled. Most cases relevant to this discus-
sion involve the liability of collateral participants for statements of
their clients, the issuing companies. But consider the converse situa-
tion-the liability of a company for statements of others, say, stock
analysts. Elkind held that a company may be held primarily liable
under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 for false statements issued by a stock
analyst if the company has so "entangled itself" with the issuance of
the analyst's report that the statements contained therein may fairly
be attributed to the company.
168. This is true notwithstanding the Supreme Court's attempt in Central Bank to read
investor protection goals out of the 1934 Act's legislative history (which history the Court,
in turn, attempted to read out of the process of statutory interpretation). See supra notes
100, 105-13, 130.
169. See infra note 402 and accompanying text.
170. An attorney who discovers that a client is engaged in fraud is not to assist that
fraud but may instead have to withdraw from the representation. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2 cmt. (1983).
171. See Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 433-34 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(preserving "puppeteer" liability).
172. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
173. See id at 163 ("We have no doubt that a company may so involve itself in the
preparation of reports and projections by outsiders as to assume a duty to correct material
errors in those projections. This may occur when officials of the company have, by their
activity, made an implied representation that the information they have reviewed is true
1997]
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Plaintiffs in In re ICN/Viratek Securities Litigation74 alleged that
officials of the defendant company reviewed the full text of a stock
analyst's report immediately before its issuance and made several
changes and additions to it while failing to correct other inaccuracies
that they knew existed in the report. Judge Kimba Wood rejected
defendants' assertion that Central Bank had overruled the Elkind line
of cases and that, therefore, they could not under any circumstances
be liable for another's misstatements. Emphasizing that Central
Bank addressed only the existence of a secondary liability theory un-
der Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 and did not in any way attempt to
establish the parameters of primary liability, 75 Judge Wood held that
the Central Bank ruling had no implications for Elkind's holding re-
garding the scope of primary liability. She noted:
Here, plaintiffs' claim may be characterized as an aiding and
abetting claim, but it may just as easily be characterized as a
claim of primary liability, pled on the theory that defendants
used PaineWebber as their agent to make false or mislead-
ing statements to the market. If claims of agency such as
these did not give rise to primary liability under Elkind,
then a corporation, acting with scienter, could use an ana-
lyst, acting without scienter, as its agent to make false
statements to the market, and neither the analyst nor the
corporation would be liable under § 10(b) .... My view is
that neither the Second Circuit, in Elkind, nor the Supreme
Court, in Central Bank, intended this result."6
Related to the pre-publication entanglement theory of Elkind,
assume that Company A, which had nothing to do with preparation
of a stock analyst's report it knows to be unduly optimistic, circulates
that report to many potential investors. Courts have held that when
companies knowingly recirculate the inaccurate statements of ana-
lysts, they should be liable even though the statements are clearly
identified as the communications of the analysts, not of the company
which had no role in preparing them.'77 No reasoning in Central
or at least in accordance with the company's views."). See generally Frank Placenti, When
Securities Analysts are Brought 'Over the Wall' to Conduct Due Diligence in IPOs, Their
Research Reports Risk Improper Disclosure of Nonpublic Information, NAT'L. L. J., Sept.
2, 1996, at B6, B8.
174. [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,213, at 95,084 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4,
1996).
175. See id. at 95,086.
176. Id. But see In re MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 984-87
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding directly contrary).
177. See Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995); In re Cypress
Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 1369, 1377-78 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Strassman v.
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Bank undermines this line of cases, yet the narrow view that one can
never be liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 for the statements of
others is inconsistent with its continued existence and opens up a
great opportunity for fraudulent behavior.
The bright-line, narrow approach is not only terribly unfair and
disruptive of existing precedent, but it cannot be justified as a matter
of statutory interpretation either. As noted earlier, there is no doubt
that there will be at least some primary liability for ancillary defen-
dants-both the Central Bank majority and the dissenters agreed on
that point. The narrow view, as applied by most courts, ignores the
language of the statute, certainly something the Central Bank major-
ity would not countenance. As others have pointed out, Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 both condemn those who "employ[] a manipu-
lative device or makefl a material misstatement" and "it seems
certain that more than one person can 'employ' a device or 'make' a
misstatement.""17 As the majority noted in Central Bank, "[i]n any
complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple
,,179
violators ....
Furthermore, the view that one can be liable only for one's own
statements arguably ignores the fact that both Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 condemn those who employ devices or make misstatements
"directly or indirectly." Those who make statements commit fraud
directly. If others are to be liable for "indirectly" committing fraud,
then liability must extend beyond the speakers themselves.Y° In
Central Bank, the majority opinion held that the term "indirectly"
did not encompass aiders and abettors who do not do the prohibited
acts at all,181 but made no effort to indicate what the term does mean.
The majority specifically noted that the term was included in the
Fresh Choice, Inc., No. 95-20017, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19343, at *30-33 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
7, 1995); In re Rasterps Corp. Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,467, at 91,195 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1994).
178. Thomas L. Riesenberg, Fraud Claims Against Professionals After Central Bank,
INSIGHTS, Feb. 1995, at 9, 13. Cases involving "manipulation" make up a relatively small
percentage of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cases and receive little attention in this Article.
However, the same questions and controversies exist in manipulation cases as in mis-
statement cases. For example, in SEC v. U.S. Environmental, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 168
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), the court held that one who knowingly participates in "manipulation" is
not primarily liable under Rule 10b-5 unless he had a manipulative purpose. See id. at
170-71. In other words, if A has a scheme to manipulate, she can recruit B and C to help
her with the scheme and they will not incur Rule 10b-5 liability even if they knowingly
assist the law violation with the intent to profit. This is another unseemly hole in the anti-
fraud shield that Congress meant to erect.
179. 511 U.S. at 191.
180. See Riesenberg, supra note 178, at 13.
181. See 511 U.S. at 175-76.
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statute, but then construed the statute (and the rule) as if the term
were not there. This is hardly sound statutory interpretation.1" But
if the language means anything (other than that aiding and abetting is
covered by the statute)," it must mean that persons can primarily
violate Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 without speaking themselves.
Speaking lies themselves would be a direct misrepresentation.
Central Bank's reply brief argued that the "indirectly" language
was simply Congress's method of making corporations responsible
for the actions of their agents.184 There is no real evidence of this,
and the argument makes it extremely anomalous that some courts are
now holding that Central Bank eliminated just such respondeat supe-
rior liability.18 As Langevoort has pointed out, the very nature of
fraud tends to be sneaky, behind-the-scenes, and indirect,86 and it is
more logical to conclude that Congress was trying to prevent and
punish that type of activity. Respondeat superior liability was already
firmly established at common law"7 and Congress probably assumed
that it would continue to be so.
Even attorneys for the major accounting firms admit that the
narrow view is unjustifiable.1 8 Among all its other problems, it fails
to appreciate how lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers can
become pragmatically and, even morally, responsible for their clients'
transactions as well as communications.
182. Cf. Association of Bituminous Contractors., Inc. v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 853, 862
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (interpreting the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 in a
way that gave meaning to the terms "lessee" and "owner") (citing 2A JABEZ GRIDLEY
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §46.06 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973)).
183. It must mean, at the very least, that respondeat superior liability must exist under
Sec. 10(b). See John J. Musewicz, Vicarious Employer Liability and Section 10(b): In
Defense of the Common Law, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 778 (1982) ("A reasonable
interpretation ... is that an employer who employs someone who commits a securities
fraud in violation of the 1934 Act has indirectly violated rule 10b-5.").
184. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Central Bank (No. 92-854).
185. See supra note 9.
186. See Langevoort, supra note 9, at 889.
187. See, e.g., AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1431
(3d Cir. 1994) (discussing origins of respondeat superior liability under federal common
law).
188. See Riesenberg, supra note 178, at 13. Riesenberg is counsel for Ernst & Young.
189. See, e.g., Painter, supra note 167, at 543-45 (explaining how lawyers, for example,
become involved in structuring their clients' deals and gain financial and egotistical incen-
tives to ensure that the transactions are completed); Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Note,




3. A Suggested Regime
It is clear that the narrow view is wrong-headed. Primary liabil-
ity for the misstatements (or omissions) of others must exist in some
situations. But what are those situations? The broad post-Central
Bank view of primary Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability, as explicated
by the lower courts and summarized earlier in this Article, has its
strengths and weaknesses. If "intricate involvement," "substantial
participation," or some similar standard is applied, what does it mean
exactly? How and where do we draw the lines? If drafting a client's
fraudulent press release constitutes a primary violation but merely
being a client's auditor (and having nothing to do with a specific
fraudulent statement) does not, where on the continuum between
those two activities do we draw the line and say mere aiding and
abetting has ended and primarily liability begun?
These are troubling questions. Still, if defensible and workable
lines can be drawn, a liberal view of primary liability is much more
justifiable than the narrow, bright-line approach. I believe that the
role of accountants, attorneys, and other collateral participants must
obviously involve more than simply "standing around."' 9 Collateral
participants in securities transactions should not become potential
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 defendants simply by the fact that their
serving as professionals hired by a client lends a patina of respect-
ability to what turns out to be a fraudulent operation. Some level of
actual involvement (with scienter) in the false communication should
be required in order to satisfy all the elements of Section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5 primary liability. I suggest two primary avenues for liability,
without ruling out others.
a. Implied Representations
First, I suggest that there are situations where, by their visible
and significant participation in a client's communications, securities
professionals impliedly represent to the investing public that, at the
very least, they know of no fraudulent misrepresentations or omis-
sions in those communications. Where these collateral defendants
190. Accountants have for many years complained about "standing around" liability-
being sued, even though they had done nothing wrong, because they were "deep pockets"
located in the vicinity of their failing clients. See, e.g., Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Black Days
for Accounting Firms, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1992, at A10; Shaun F. O'Malley, Legal Li-
ability is Having a Chilling Effect on the Auditor's Role, 7 ACCr. HORIZONS, June 1993, at
82; Walter P. Schuetze, The Liability Crisis in the U.S. and Its Impact on Accounting, 7
AcC. HORIZONS, June 1993, at 88; Lawrence A. Weinbach, The $30bn Question Behind
US "Litigation Crisis," FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at 27.
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do, in fact, know of such fraud, they are implicitly lying to the in-
vesting public and should be held primarily liable for Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 violations. To allow lawyers,191 accountants, in-
vestment bankers and others to transmit the statements of others that
they know are inaccurate and that they know Will be relied upon by
investors, and yet escape Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability, is to al-
low them to make implicit misrepresentations in connection with
securities transactions with impunity.
In a pre-Central Bank article, Professor Langevoort argued re-
garding attorneys specifically that they should be liable for clients'
misstatements so long as their role is so significant that the primary
elements of reliance and causation can be established:
Under both state and federal law, the duty of truthfulness is
triggered when the lawyer comes into sufficiently direct
191. At least regarding the lawyer as a "letter carrier," this is an area of intense con-
troversy. For example, in the famous Kaye, Scholer proceeding, members of the law firm
had allegedly forwarded to the FHLBB various files and documents which they knew
were false and misleading. See generally Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer:
Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1019, 1025-37 (1993) (discussing the aftermath of the Kaye, Scholer enforcement action).
Such an act, according to the ethically economical view of Professor Fried, is per-
fectly fine:
[Clearly in such instances it is not the lawyer who lies, it is not the lawyer who
asks that the lie be believed. He is like the letter carrier who delivers the false-
hood, and whether he is free to do that is a matter more of legal than of personal
ethics.
CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 193 (1978). The better view is expressed by Pro-
fessor Painter:
The falsehoods may have been those of Charles Keating and Lincoln [Savings],
but they were forwarded to the FHLBB by no ordinary letter carrier, rather by
one of New York City's most prominent law firms, and in at least one instance,
by the firm's managing partner himself. Even absent any additional representa-
tions by Kaye, Scholer, this in itself was a representation to the FHLBB about
the quality of the information being furnished and about the monitoring process
from which it had come. Clients pay a substantial premium to employ firms like
Kaye, Scholer in part because of their value as "reputational intermediaries."
For a law firm to deny responsibility for forwarding false documents to regula-
tors is to deny responsibility for using reputation to facilitate a
misrepresentation.
Painter, supra note 167, at 573-74 (footnote omitted).
192. Compare this to the situation in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163
(2d Cir. 1980), discussed supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text, wherein the Second
Circuit held that companies may become so involved in the preparation of statements by
outsiders as to become legally responsible for the accuracy of those statements when "by
their activity, officials of the company have, made an implied representation that the in-
formation they have reviewed is true or at least in accordance with the company's views."
This is exactly the point being made about the involvement of auditors, lawyers, under-
writers and others in the preparation of a company's statements.
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communication with the third-parties so as to bear primary
responsibility for the flow of information. So long as victims
of fraud can establish reliance and causation they may re-
cover against the attorney under both state and federal
securities law.193
He went on to argue that:
[P]rimary liability is appropriate when the lawyer's in-
volvement in the disclosure materials is such that a
reasonable investor would rely directly on her skill, dili-
gence and expertise, in evaluating its contents. That would
take into account both the extent of the involvement and,
more important, how much information was communicated
to investors about the attorneys' role."
Per Langevoort, a proper rule would give rise to primary liability
when a defendant participates significantly in the preparation or
communication of another's misleading statement (or omission) under
circumstances in which it would be reasonable for third persons to rely
upon the defendant in accepting the truthfulness of the representations
made.
Consider the hypothetical example noted in Part III.B.2.-a law-
yer (or accountant, or investment banker) conceives of a false
representation, drafts it, induces the client to issue it, and then com-
municates it to potential investors. The duty not to speak falsely
arises from the substantial participation in a false communication un-
der circumstances in which the attorney can foresee that the
communication,9 5 and the lawyer's role in preparing it, will be relied
upon by investors. I believe that in such cases the securities profes-
sionals are not simply "failing to act." Rather, by their visible
participation in the fraudulent scheme, they are impliedly represent-
ing that they know of no fraud being committed. If collateral
defendants act with scienter, and if they do know that a fraud is oc-
curring and that they are advancing it by drafting, editing, or
communicating their client's lies to persons who know of their roles
in the activity, then they are themselves misleading those third-
parties... and should be liable to them.
193. Langevoort, supra note 39, at 83 (footnote omitted).
194. Id. at 83 n.30.
195. Pre-Central Bank cases often stressed that professionals, such as lawyers, must
realize that their statements will be relied upon by third-parties before they could be li-
able to those investors under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Schwartz,
947 F.2d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 1991); Rose v. Ark. Valley Env. & Util. Auth., 562 F. Supp.
1180 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
196. See Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 653 (9th Cir. 1988)
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A recent article broke down pre-Central Bank Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 cases against attorneys into three categories de-
pending on the defendant's level of involvement: (a) merely revising
or reviewing client documents; (b) preparing and drafting client
documents based on client-supplied information; and (c) issuing an
attorney opinion letter based on client-supplied information.19 The
article argued that there should be no post-Central Bank primary li-
ability for the attorney in either (a) or (b) because the attorney is not
speaking.19 This seems wrong. If an attorney takes client-supplied
information that she knows is false and either revises documents or
drafts them in toto and then allows them to be issued knowing they
will be relied upon by investors, "speaking" has occurred. Any rea-
sonable investor, seeing the attorney's role in these transactions
would conclude that the attorney is "saying" that she believed the
documents to be fraud-free. 9 It takes a very cynical view of the role
of attorneys, accountants, and investment bankers in our commercial
world to believe that such an implied representation is not being
made.
In SEC v. Universal Major Industries Corp.,"° defendant general
counsel wrote 118 letters to debenture holders who exercised a con-
version privilege in connection with his company's stock.2 ' In each
letter, the counsel included a statement that he rendered no opinion
as to the legality of the conversion of stock, but relied upon an at-
tached letter of special counsel that the conversion did not violate the
Securities Act.' The trial court rejected this "obvious attempt to
avoid a personal commitment," finding "that the letters could rea-
sonably have been understood by their recipients as an expression of
appellant's own opinion concerning the legality of the issuances
which they covered., 21 The appellate court affirmed.' 4 I believe
that, at a minimum, the defendant general counsel was stating that he
("Investors can reasonably be expected to assume that an accounting firm would not con-
sent to the use of its name on reports and offering memoranda it knew were fraudulent.").
197. See Scott M. Herpich, Note, Relying on Client-Supplied Information: An Attor-
ney's Liability Exposure Under Rule 10b-5, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 661,661-62 (1995).
198. See id. at 671.
199. The logic here that silence in such cases is tantamount to an implicit affirmative
representation is the same as in the many cases that hold that silence, when there is a duty
to speak out, is as much a fraud as an actual affirmative misrepresentation. See, e.g.,
Wade v. Thomasville Orthopedic Clinic, Inc., 306 S.E.2d 366,368 (Ga. App. 1983).
200. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
201. See id. at 1045-46.
202. See id. at 1046.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 1054.
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had no real reason to disbelieve the attached conclusion of the special
counsel.20
The biggest stumbling block to a plaintiff's recovery in such
cases might be the reliance element. As phrased, the test requires
both reliance upon the actual false statement and reliance upon the
collateral defendant's visible role in the preparation and/or commu-
nication of that false statement. Only With this visibility can it be
concluded that the collateral defendants have indeed made an im-
plied representation to the plaintiffs.
Reliance has been called "the subjective counterpart to the ob-
jective element of materiality."' 206 The Tenth Circuit has suggested
that reliance is the "critical element separating primary from aiding
and abetting violations."2 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Central
Bank faulted plaintiffs for attemptin to impose 10b-5 liability when
the reliance element was missing, and commentators have sug-
gested that the reliance element will be plaintiffs' biggest stumbling
block in attempting to recast aiding and abetting claims as primary
liability claims because accountants and others who act behind the
scenes in preparing and editing2rospectuses, for example, are not
directly relied upon by investors.
205. In Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), the court held that "lawyers
do not vouch for the probity of their clients when they draft documents reflecting their
clients' promises, statements, or warranties." Id. at 495. As far as this statement goes, I
agree. I believe that the attorney is not saying, "What my client says is true." But I do
believe that the attorney is impliedly representing: "I do not know that what my client
says is false." If the attorney does, with scienter, help his client draft or transmit a com-
munication to investors that the attorney knows is false, and may do so with legal
impunity, then heaven help the legal profession and heaven help investors.
The better decisions hold that" '[a] lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a
statement with regard to securities which he knows to be false simply because his client
has furnished it to him.'" In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1249 (W.D. Mich.
1991) (quoting SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486,489 (2d Cir. 1968)).
The better view also holds that when the underlying client-supplied materials on
their face appear to be unreliable, the attorneys' or accountants' failure to investigate
further indicates that they had no genuine belief upon which they could predicate their
opinions. See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770,776 (3d Cir. 1985); McLean v. Alexan-
der, 599 F.2d 1190, 1198 (3d Cir. 1979).
206. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1117 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989).
207. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996). This
seems wrong because attorneys or accountants who are actively and visibly involved in
preparing or communicating a client's statement to potential investors are making the
implied representation that they know of no fraudulent representations contained therein.
208. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994).
209. See Wager & Failla, supra note 69, at 1461.
1997] 737
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
i Non-efficient Markets
In cases involving non-efficient markets, plaintiffs will often
have difficulty establishing reliance. In the suggested scheme, it is
important that the attorney's (or accountant's or underwriter's) role
be sufficiently visible that it is reasonable for the plaintiffs to rely
upon the defendant as vouching in some sense for the truthfulness of
the representation. For example, when an accountant visibly plays a
major role in writing and editing a communication to be filed with the
SEC and the SEC is told to consult the accountant if it has any ques-
tions, the reliance element would appear to be easily satisfied.
Who would conceive, in such a case, that the accountant knew the
communication was riddled with lies? If it turns out that such scien-
ter did exist, the accountant should be liable.
When an attorney hands her client's communication to a poten-
tial investor knowing that the communication is inaccurate and that
the investor is going to rely upon it, the reliance element is easily
met. As noted earlier, such an attorney is making an implied repre-
sentation: "Here is what my client says and I have no strong reason
to believe that it is not true." Similarly, when issuers become inti-
mately involved in the pre-publication drafting of an analyst's
descriptions of the companies' prospects or in the post-publication
recirculation of copies of those descriptions, while knowing that they
are false, the reliance requirement is easily met. In such cases, the
reader of those reports can clearly and justifiably reason that the
companies are representing their accuracy even though they are not
.technically the companies' communications.
In these cases where plaintiffs are informed as to the specific
roles that accountants, attorneys or other collateral participants play
in certain communications issued by their clients (or vice versa), the
reliance element is easily established. The more difficult question is
whether plaintiffs should be allowed to establish reasonable reliance
in the absence of information about a defendant's specific involve-
ment in company communications. Should they be allowed to
assume that the collateral defendants are playing the normal role that
such defendants play in similar transactions? 21 After all, prominent
law firms, accounting firms, and underwriters all lend reputational
210. See, e.g., In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 38 F.3d 1078, 1090-111 (9th Cir.), modi-
fied on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1994).
211. The typical roles played by attorneys and accountants in such transactions are
easily identified. See generally Lawson & Mattison, supra note 125, at 1312-17 (outlining
the duties of accountants and attorneys in typical corporate transactions).
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capital to their clients. They are handsomely compensated for doing
so. Investors and lenders rely on that reputation as a matter of
course. For that reason, it seems proper to apply some fairly liberal
assumptions regarding what is reasonable reliance by plaintiffs. 2
(a) Accountants
Consider the role of accountants. Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 li-
ability arises from either the primary or the secondary securities
markets. The accounting profession's reputational capital plays a
major role in the workings of each.
Regarding primary markets, companies going public for the first
time typically do not have an established track record and the market
knows relatively little about them. It is critical that they signal the
market regarding, among other things, the reliability of their financial
statements.2 A primary method of doing so is to hire a "Big Six"
212. This Article addresses primarily the liability of collateral participants in securities
transactions, such as lawyers and accountants. However, a strict application of the nar-
row view of primary Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability might also allow officers and
directors who "participate" in their company's fraudulent communications to escape li-
ability. After all, the statement typically is issued in the company's name, not in the name
of any of the officers and directors. The reasoning of the narrow view which exonerates
lawyers and accountants from their clients' false statements can also be used to exonerate
officers and directors, especially in light of the potential demise of the respondeat superior
doctrine in Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5.
This, of course, would be another tragic and silly result of Central Bank were it to
come to pass. No court has specifically reached such a conclusion, but the logic of the
narrow view justifies it. Officers and directors of companies who are actively involved in
drafting and communication of their firms' fraudulent statements should be, and prior to
Central Bank were, primarily liable. Most jurisdictions even applied a "group published"
presumption to assist plaintiffs in the pleading stage. That presumption basically allowed
courts to assume that officers and directors who were active in the corporation bore some
responsibility for its fraudulent statements. See, e.g., In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 60
F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1995); Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 367-
68 (1st Cir. 1994); Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987);
Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., Nos. 1:95-CV-141, 1:95-CV-290,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11804, at *12, *57 (W.D. Mich. July 25, 1996); Golden v. Terre
Linda Corp., No. 95-C0657, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10672, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1996);
Degulis v. LXR Biotechnology, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1301, 1311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re
Newbridge Networks Sec. Litig., 926 F. Supp. 1163, 1174-75 (D.D.C. 1996). The narrow
view is arguably inconsistent with the "group published" doctrine and with the very no-
tion of holding directors and officers liable for their participation in the false
communications of their employers.
213. See Krishnagopal Menon & David D. Williams, Auditor Credibility and Initial
Public Offerings, 66 Acct. REv. 313, 316 (1991). Concomitantly, investors and others
must devise surrogates for determining the (difficult to ascertain) quality of audits and
size of firms is a reasonable surrogate. See Linda E. DeAngelo, Auditor Size and Audit
Quality, 3 J. ACCr. & ECON. 183, 186 (1981).
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accounting firm. 14 The mere fact that a firm doing an initial public
offering (IPO) has a Big Six firm as its auditor provides credibility,
215
attracts more investors, 16 and allows the issuer to charge more for its
shares than it otherwise could.217 The Big Six firm is paid for its work
but receives a premium for its reputation as well. - In part, this is
true because informational asymmetries make it very difficult for
211
shareholders and creditors to assess the accuracy of any given audit,
so the auditor's reputation must serve as a proxy for the quality of
any given audit.220
In secondary markets, "name brand" accounting firms offer
214. Studies indicate that this is a common method of signaling the market. See, e.g.,
Charles G. Carpenter & Robert H. Strawser, Displacement of Auditors When Clients Go
Public, 131 J. Acr. 55, 58 (1971); Menon & Williams, supra note 213, at 330-31; Sheri-
dan Titman & Brett Trueman, Information Quality and the Valuation of New Issues, 8 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 159, 170 (1986); Robert Wilson, Auditing: Perspectives from Multi-
Person Decision Theory, 58 ACCr. REV. 305,308 (1983).
Companies undergoing IPOs are advised to hire prestigious accounting firms to give
the impression of reliability to their financial statements. For example, Sutton and
Benedetto advise:
One key consideration is which accounting firm to hire. Many investment bank-
ers insist that one of the "Big Eight" [now "Big Six"] accounting firms be used.
While this may not seem necessary, to the underwriter it is. The major account-
ants have been through the process many times before and are less likely to miss
some important aspect of reporting. Perhaps the most important aspect, however,
is that of image. A financial statement audited by a reputable, well-known ac-
counting firm carries more weight than an unknown one.
DAVID P. SuTrON & M. WILLIAM BENEDETrO, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: A
STRATEGIC PLANNER FOR RAISING EQUITY CAPITAL 32 (1988) (emphasis added).
215. See Menon & Williams, supra note 213, at 330 (noting that firms going public
often replace smaller auditors with large national firms and "credibility is the reason").
216. See id. at 317.
217. See DAN A. SIMUNIC & MICHAEL T. STEIN, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN
AUDITING: AUDITOR CHOICE IN THE MARKET FOR UNSEASONED NEW ISSUES 1
(1987); Ronald J. Balvers et al., Underpricing of New Issues and the Choice ofAuditor as a
Signal of Investment Banker Reputation, 63 Acr. REV. 605, 620 (1989); Randolph P.
Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial Public Offerings, 39
J.L. & ECON. 545, 597 (1996); Randolph P. Beatty, Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of
Initial Public Offerings, 64 Acr. REV. 693, 708 (1989); Carpenter & Strawser, supra note
214, at 58; DeAngelo, supra note 213, at 194.
218. See Jere R. Francis & Daniel T. Simon, A Test of Audit Pricing in the Small-Client
Segment of the U.S. Audit Market, 62 Acr. REV. 145, 155 (1987); Zoe-Vonna Palmrose,
Audit Fees and Auditor Size: Further Evidence, 24 J. ACCr. RES. 97, 108 (1986); Titman
& Trueman, supra note 214, at 162. A critical factor in the ability of any accountant to
exploit the role of reputational intermediary is its own reputation as being independent.
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549,607 n.166 (1984).
219. See SIMUNIC & STEIN, supra note 217, at 18.
220. See Nicholas Dopuch & Dan A. Simunic, Competition in Auditing: An Assess-
ment, in FOURTH SYMPOSIUM ON AUDITING RESEARCH 443-44 (1982).
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similar reputational value, which may account for the fact that the
Big Six audit 494 of the Fortune 500 and 90% of publicly-traded
companies in the U.S.221 As Gilson and Kraakman have pointed out,
"[a]n issuer can internalize some of the economies of scale and scope
of outside auditors by conducting a substantial portion of its audits
internally, but it can never internalize their reputational role."'m In-
deed, for public corporations it has been argued that "[t]he key
attribute of the audit service is likely to be its credibility as perceived
by the shareholders." m Current shareholders, as well as potential
investors and lenders, rationally believe that a credible auditor's
clean opinion regarding financial statements reduces the likelihood
that management is hiding self-serving behavior.224  As a conse-
quence, firms choosing Big Six auditors have higher firm value,
ceteris paribus, than those choosing less credible auditors.2
Clients are well aware of the concept of reputational capital and
use it to great effect, often to assist their fraudulent activities. Con-
sider the infamous PTL case, where televangelist Jim Bakker
repeatedly solicited funds from viewers, pleading in his telecasts that
his books were continually subject to the scrutiny of Big Six ac-
counting firms and, therefore, he must be credible and on the level.226
221. See Accounting Firms Predict Dim Future If Joint and Several Liability Remains,
Sec. Law Daily (BNA) (June 16,1993), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNASLD File.
222. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 218, at 609 n.166. Indeed, the trend is to out-
source internal audit work to the Big Six as well, creating potential conflict of interest
situations. See Lee Berton, Who Is Going to Audit the Auditors?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5,
1996, at B1.
223. SIMUNIC & STEIN, supra note 217, at 9.
224. See Dopuch & Simunic, supra note 220, at 407.
225. See SIMUNIC & STEIN, supra note 217, at 60.
226. See generally GARY L. TIDWELL, ANATOMY OF A FRAUD: INSIDE THE FI-
NANCES OF THE PTL MINISTRIES 243-44 (1993). Tidwell cites three different statements
by Bakker that illustrate his use of his auditors' reputational capital to advance his fraud.
On January 31, 1986, Bakker told his TV audience: "We are acccountable. We have
been audited by Deloitte, Haskins and Sells for many years, and now, by Laventhol and
Horwitz [sic], and here is-the audit for 1977. How many ministries can say this? 1978,
complete audit. 1979, 1980,1981, 1982, 1983,1984, and 1985." Id at 243. On February 6,
1986, Bakker responded to allegations of PTL abuses by telling his audience:
In fact, I'm having an audit firm now-an outside audit firm come in to audit that
because they don't want to take any of our word, even though they can see the
checks, they can see the statements, they are still going to go through this audit
and have someone outside of PTL come in and look at it that knows bookkeep-
ing and can-and can say, yes this is exactly how it was done.
Id. at 244. Finally, on April 18, 1986, during a telethon, Bakker told viewers:
We don't mind letting you know that we print audits of this ministry. We
have done it for, what, ten years now, and we go through an audit almost a hun-
dred percent of the time.
An outside auditing firm, one of the big audit firms of America, is in here at
1997]
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(b) Underwriters
Underwriters also lend reputational capital to their clients. For
example, it is well known that initial public offerings are often sub-
stantially underpriced.227 There are several theories regarding the
reasons for this underpricing, none apparently conclusive. But
what is known is that underwriters with strong reputations underprice
less than other underwriters. 9 In other words, an issuer that hires a
top underwriter is able to charge more for its shares. In large part,
all times auditing this ministry at our own expense, thousands of dollars, tens of
thousands of dollars, to be responsible. And we are going to go forward, but it's
time God's people say enough is enough.
Id. See generally Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1994) (civil lawsuit), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 1107 (1995); U.S. v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991) (criminal action).
227. Several studies have indicated that IPOs are generally underpriced between five
and twenty percent. See, e.g., Robert Hansen, Evaluating the Costs of a New Equity Issue,
4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 42, 42 (1986) (noting underpricing of 15 to 20%); Roger G.
Ibbotson, Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 235, 254
(1975) (finding underpricing to be 11.4%); Robert E. Miller & Frank K. Reilly, An Ex-
amination of Mispricing, Returns, and Uncertainty for Initial Public Offerings, 16 FIN.
MGMT 33, 34 (1987) (finding underpricing of 9.87%); Jay R. Ritter, The "Hot Issue"
Market of 1980, 57 J. Bus. 215, 218 (1984) (finding underpricing around 19%); Clifford
W. Smith, Jr., Investment Banking and the CapitalAcquisition Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 3,
20-21 (1986) (finding underpricing to exceed 15%) Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Raising Capital:
Theory and Evidence, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 6, 18 (1986) (finding underpricing of
15% or more).
228. Professor Tinic has posited one of the most interesting theories for underpricing,
reckoning that underwriters underprice in order to reduce the likelihood of securities
fraud litigation and to put a cap on recovery. See Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public
Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789, 790 (1988). There is substantial reason, how-
ever, to disbelieve this explanation for underpricing. See generally Alexander, supra note
95, passim (1993) (arguing that the lawsuit avoidance theory only accounts for a small
portion of underpricing and suggesting alternative explanations for underpricing); John
H. Langmore & Robert A. Prentice, Contribution Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of
1933: The Existence and Merits of Such a Right, 40 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1082-89 (1991)
(arguing that Tinic's theory only accounts for a portion of the underpricing).
229. See Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, and the
Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 213, 217 (1986); Richard Carter
& Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045,
1057 (1990) ("The reputation variable provides more explanatory power than any other
variable."); Dennis E. Logue, On the Pricing of Unseasoned Equity Issues: 1965-1969, 8 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 91, 98-102 (1973); Brian M. Neuberger & Carl T.
Hammond, A Study of Underwriters' Experience with Unseasoned New Issues, 9 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 165, 172-73 (1974); Brian M. Neuberger & Chris A.
LaChapelle, Unseasoned New Issue Price Performance on Three Tiers: 1975-1980, 12 FIN.
MGMT. 23, 27 (1983). But see James M. Johnson & Robert E. Miller, Investment Banker
Prestige and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 17 FIN. MGMT. 19, 28 (1988)
(arguing that IPO underpricing is unrelated to underwriter prestige).
Therefore, other things being equal, firms choosing underwriters with good reputa-
tions will be worth more than those that do not. See Balvers et al., supra note 217, at 620;
Titman & Trueman, supra note 214, at 171.
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this is because the aura of respectability lent to the client by the un-
derwriter translates into more willing investors happy to pay a higher
price.20 In the words of Gilson and Kraakman, "[itn essence, the in-
vestment banker rents the issuer its reputation." '  In turn, such
underwriters are able to charge higher fees and commissions to the
issuers232 By paying more to hire underwriters with strong reputa-
tions, sellers signal the market that they have confidence in the
information they are providing. 33
(c) Attorneys
Attorneys play a similar role in lending reputation to clients.
Gilson and Kraakman have written extensively regarding the role of
attorneys (as well as accountants and investment bankers) as
"reputational intermediar[ies]," which they define as "someone paid
to verify another party's information."' ' Although there is not the
extensive body of literature regarding the reputational role of attor-
neys in IPOs as there is for accountants and underwriters, the effect
is likely similar.235 As Gilson explains:
[L]awyers and accountants commonly play the role of repu-
tational intermediary. And once we think of them as being
in the business of selling-more accurately, renting-their
reputations, a number of examples readily come to mind in
which this phenomenon seems to be at work. Practicing
lawyers will recall instances when, having been advised that
they were to represent their client in a transaction with an
unfamiliar party on the other side, their initial question to
their client concerned the identity of the other side's law-
yers. Implicit in the question is that the identity of the
lawyer conveyed information about the lawyer's client; i.e.,
230. See Alexander, supra note 95, at 67.
231. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 218, at 620.
232. See Giuffra, supra note 189, at 126 n.49 ("Leading investment banks command
premium fees for rendering fairness opinions; investors trust the monitoring abilities of
these investment banks and expect a bank's prospects for future premiums to deter care-
lessness or corruption.").
233. The reputation of investment bankers plays a similar role in mergers and acquisi-
tions. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 218, at 604 n.159; Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking
Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51, 58-
59 (1982).
234. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239,289 (1984).
235. See Maxey, supra note 79, at 2218 ("In the context of a public offering, fees paid
to independent securities lawyers may represent, in effect, a purchase of the imprimatur
of the securities lawyers whose opinions provide comfort to the underwriter and who lend
their reputations in dealing with the SEC and the market.").
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a reputable business lawyer would not risk his reputation by
representing an untrustworthy client2 6
Langevoort makes a complementary point regarding the role of law-
yers as the "financial engineers" of their clients' deals:
Law firms frequently utilize their reputational capital to
overcome lingering suspicions by opposing parties. It is thus
too quick to say that lawyers are not a proximate cause of a
tainted transaction simply because their role was limited to
advice and drafting.
Gilson points out that opinion letters issued by lawyers often
specifically provide that the firm has made no independent investiga-
tion of the facts, yet the letter still carries weight because of the law
firm's reputation. s This reputation effect allows law firms with good
and widely-known reputations to charge higher fees than equally-
competent but lesser known firms.239
Thus, the evidence is strong that collateral defendants such as
accountants, underwriters, and attorneys do serve as reputational in-
termediaries. The very fact that they represent their client adds
credibility to the client. This enables the client to do deals it could
not otherwise do and to charge prices that it could not otherwise
charge. In turn, the accountants, underwriters, and attorneys are able
to charge higher fees than they would otherwise charge if they did
not serve the role of reputational intermediary. It also earns them
dismissal from time to time when courts accept the argument of pres-
tigious accounting or law firms that they certainly would never risk as
valuable a commodity as their reputation simply in order to earn a
fee from a dishonest client.24
236. Gilson, supra note 234, at 290-91 (footnote omitted); accord Ronald J. Gilson &
Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into
the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 367-68(1985).
237. Langevoort, supra note 39, at 88; see also Painter, supra note 167, at 548
("[C]lients may take advantage of credibility they gain from lawyers to make misrepre-
sentations in negotiations while their lawyer 'reputational intermediaries' stand by and do
nothing.").
238. See Gilson, supra note 234, at 293.
239. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 236, at 368.
240. This argument has been repeatedly accepted in the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g.,
Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986). There
is considerable reason to believe, however, that the argument is seriously flawed. See
Langevoort, supra note 39, at 112-13 (arguing that the threat of reputational harm alone
may not be likely to force lawyers to be more careful in dealing with their clients); Giuf-
fra, supra note 189, at 127-28 (arguing that investment bankers rarely suffer harm to their
reputations unless legal liability is imposed).
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Given the very strong evidence that the typical Section
10(b)/Rule lOb-5 collateral defendants (accountants, attorneys, in-
vestment bankers) do serve as reputational intermediaries upon
which third-parties such as investors and lenders reasonably rely, how
is the reliance element to be applied? To ignore the reputational in-
termediary role altogether allows accountants, underwriters, and
attorneys to profit substantially from renting their reputations to cli-
ents, and then to simultaneously deny that injured plaintiffs have any
right to rely on those same reputations. On the other hand, to allow
plaintiffs to assert no more than: "Hey, defendant is a prestigious
accountant (or underwriter or attorney) so I assumed its client's
communications were all legitimate!" casts too wide a net.
The answers to two key questions will shape the proper applica-
tion of this rule. First, is plaintiff investor entitled to assume that
accountants or lawyers or other collateral participants played their
normal role in preparing or distributing the client's communications,
or must the investor prove that the specific defendant participated
significantly in this particular communication? Only requiring actual
proof of significant participation eliminates the threat of "standing
around" liability. Therefore, such proof must be required. An ac-
countant or attorney usually has no obligation to "blow the whistle"
on a client's fraudulent representation if she had no significant role in
preparing or communicating it. Professionals have no free floating
duty to monitor all of their clients' communications for accuracy.
Rather, they should be liable only where their visible role in prepara-
tion or communication of the client's inaccurate statement that they
knew would be shown to investors indicated that they vouched for its
credibility.
Second, what is meant by "relying upon the defendant"? As-
sume that an investor relies upon a misleading statement issued by
Company A. He knows at the time that Company A has auditor X
and outside counsel Y. Only later does the investor learn that audi-
tor X and outside counsel Y participated significantly in preparing
the communication. The investor is able to prove the collateral de-
fendants' significant participation, but does this establish the reliance
requirement? Or should plaintiff be required to prove that he or she
knew of the roles of the auditor and outside counsel at the time he or
she evaluated the credibility of the client's statement?
In non-efficient markets, the better view is that the plaintiff
should be required to show pre-existing knowledge of the defendant's
role in the participation, although this is a difficult call. Only with
such proof can plaintiff reasonably claim that she understood that the
19971
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defendant had made an implied representation regarding the client's
statement's accuracy.
ii. Efficient Markets
In cases involving securities traded in efficient markets,24 ' plain-
tiffs should be allowed to utilize the fraud-on-the-market theory?' to
establish the reliance element somewhat more easily than plaintiffs in
non-efficient markets. The fraud-on-the-market theory allows plain-
tiffs to establish the reliance element of a Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
claim even though they may not have read or even seen the misrepre-
sentations of which they complain. The Supreme Court adopted the
theory in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,243 and explained its rationale by
quoting the following passage from Peil v. Speiser:
244
"The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis
that, in an open and developed securities market, the price
of a company's stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its business....
Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of
stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the mis-
statements .... The causal connection between the
defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in
such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reli-
ance on misrepresentations." 24
In explaining the mechanics of the theory, the Court said:
241. The fraud-on-the-market theory is, in turn, based on the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis (ECMH), which, in its "semi-strong" form "states that, at any point in time,
market prices are an unbiased forecast of future cash flows that fully reflect all publicly
available information." RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE
ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 136 (1993). Neither the ECMH nor the
fraud-on-the-market theory applies in non-efficient markets, see Gruber v. Price Water-
house, 776 F. Supp. 1044, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1991); In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F.
Supp. 785, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1990), although some courts have recognized a more limited
fraud-created-the-market theory for these non-efficient markets. See, e.g., Ross v. Bank
South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 729-30 (11th Cir. 1989); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 469-72
(5th Cir. 1981); Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., 746 F. Supp. 1264, 1293 (D.N.J. 1990).
The courts have developed at least some rough criteria for judging the difference
when the market for a particular security is efficient and when it is not. See generally
Michael W. Prozan & Michael T. Fatale, Revisiting "Truth in Securities": The Use of the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 687 (1992) (surveying court
approaches). A particularly popular formulation is contained in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F.
Supp. 1264, 1285-87 (D.N.J. 1989).
242. For an excellent discussion of the early development of the fraud-on-the-market
theory, see Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982).
243. 485 U.S. 224,247 (1988).
244. 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986).
245. 485 U.S. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d at 1160.61).
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The modem securities markets, literally involving millions
of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-to-face
transactions contemplated by early fraud cases, and our un-
derstanding of Rule 10b-5's reliance requirement must
encompass these differences.
In face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an in-
vestor's reliance upon information is into the
subjective pricing of that information by that in-
vestor. With the presence of a market, the market
is interposed between seller and buyer and, ide-
ally, transmits information to the investor in the
processed form of a market price. Thus the mar-
ket is performing a substantial part of the
valuation process performed by the investor in a
face-to-face transaction. The market is acting as
the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him
that given all the information available to it, the
value of the stock is worth the market price.'
If the fraud on the market theory can be used by plaintiffs to es-
tablish the reliance element vis-A-vis communications they have
never seen, it should be equally available to establish reliance upon
the substantial participation of defendants in those communications
when that substantial participation has been visible to the market,
even though perhaps not to the particular plaintiffs.247 As noted in
the discussion above,248 the market does take into account the reputa-
tional role of accountants, attorneys, underwriters and others in
assessing the market price of an issuer's securities. That information
is embedded in the market price established for shares traded on an
efficient market.249 Plaintiffs who buy those shares implicitly rely
upon the efficient market to value those shares accurately and are
misled when it does not. Given that, in cases involving efficient mar-
kets where the fraud-on-the-market theory applies, there seems no
reason why plaintiffs should not be able to invoke it to establish the
reliance element in a primary Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 claim. In In
re ZZZZ Best, ° the court seemed to rely upon elements from the
246. Id. at 243-44 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
247. To be clear, the defendants' significant participation in their client's misleading
statements is not being presumed. Plaintiffs must prove that element. However, if plain-
tiffs succeed in showing, for example, that an issuer's accountant knowingly participated
in a major way in the client's issuance of a materially false representation, plaintiffs' reli-
ance on that statement should be presumed.
248. See supra notes 217,229 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
250. In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
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fraud-on-the-market theory in holding:
While the investing public may not be able to reasonably at-
tribute the additional misstatements and omissions to
[ZZZZ Best's accountant] E & Y, the securities market still
relied on those public statements and anyone intricately in-
volved in their creation and the resulting deception should
be liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5."1
iii. Disclaimers
A discussion of the reliance element is not complete without ex-
amining the question of whether plaintiff investors could reasonably
assert the reliance element in a situation where an attorney, account-
ant, or underwriter had disclaimed responsibility for facts conveyed
on grounds that they were merely the representations of clients. In
other words, the collateral participant attempts to disclaim any im-
plied representations of her own regarding the accuracy of the
client's communications. Although the courts have disagreed, 2 the
trend appears to be to give legal effect to such disclaimers.2
Certainly there is every reason to give effect to disclaimers in
some circumstances. For example, a disclaimer that informs poten-
tial investors or lenders that an accountant has performed a mere
review rather than a full-blown audit properly gives the readers of the
disclaimer an accurate picture of the accountant's activities and in-
forms them of the limits of sensible reliance upon the reviewed
financial statements.2 However, when disclaimers are invoked to
protect collateral defendants who have knowingly promulgated cli-
ents' statements that they knew were false, or based conclusions upon
client-provided assumptions that they knew were inaccurate, fraud is
encouraged.
Unfortunately, the modern trend is ill-reasoned. Proper treat-
ment of such disclaimers is exemplified by the controversial case
251. Id at 970.
252. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Berg, 761 F. Supp. 358,370 (D.N.J. 1991) (denying disclaimer
defense).
253. See, e.g., Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469, 475
(4th Cir. 1992); Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243,
245-46 (8th Cir. 1991); Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 521, 541
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), affid, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1991); Buford White Lumber Co. v. Octagon
Properties, Ltd., 740 F. Supp. 1553, 1562-63 (W.D. Okla. 1989); Andreo v. Friedlander,
Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 651 F. Supp. 877,881 (D. Conn. 1986).




Kline v. First Western Government Securities, Inc.,5 wherein the de-
fendant law firm argued that its opinion letters contained disclaimers
explicitly indicating that (a) the representations were based on as-
sumed facts supplied by the client, and (b) the law firm had
undertaken no independent investigation as to the accuracy of the
statements. 6 Given this, the law firm argued that no investor could
have reasonably relied upon the law firm's representations in the
opinion letter."7 Although many courts would apparently agree with
the law firm, fortunately the Third Circuit did not. Such a disclaimer
should only be a defense if the law firm, not having undertaken an
independent investigation, truly has no substantial reason to believe
that the client's factual representations are inaccurate. But where, as
alleged in Kline, the lawyers do in fact know or have very strong rea-
son to know that the client-represented facts are simply not true,
enforcement of such a disclaimer would be unjust and improper.
Disclaimers for negligence are usually enforceable, but attempts to
disclaim liability for fraud and other intentional torts must fail. In-
vestors who see such a disclaimer are put on notice that the opinion is
based on client-supplied information and that the law firm has under-
taken no independent investigation of its own. They are not
reasonably put on notice that the law firm is passing along facts that,
despite not having undertaken an independent investigation, it knows
to be materially misleading.
Fortunately, the Kline court did not give effect to the disclaimer.
he court, instead, judged the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' reli-
ance by weighing five factors: "(1) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship; (2) plaintiffs' opportunity to detect the fraud; (3) the
sophistication of the plaintiffs; (4) the existence of long-standing
business or personal relationships; and (5) access to the relevant in-
255. 24 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1994).
256. See idL at 486.
257. See id. at 488.
258. See, e.g., Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1994) (parties may not "use
contractual limitation of liability clauses to shield themselves from liability for their own
fraudulent conduct"); Arnold v. National Aniline & Chem. Co., 20 F.2d 364, 370 (2d Cir.
1927) (same); Reece v. Finch, 562 So. 2d 195, 199 (Ala. 1990) ("A disclaimer cannot be
used to insulate a party from liability for an intentional tort."); Banks v. Public Storage
Mgmt., 585 So. 2d 467, 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Hussain v. Side, No. 90-2632, 1991
Fla. App. LEXIS 9146, at *6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Burton v. Linotype Co., 556 So. 2d
1126, 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (" 'Fraud is an intentional tort and thus not subject
to the cathartic effect of the exculpatory clauses found in contracts.'" (quoting L. Luria &
Sons, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 460 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)); Hardage
Enter. v. Fidesys Corp., 570 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); LaFrenz v. Lake
County Fair Bd., 360 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
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formation."259 Because factors (2), (3), and (5) all weighed for plain-
tiffs, the Third Circuit refused to rule as a matter of law that
plaintiffs' reliance on the facts contained in the law firm's opinion
letter was unreasonable.
260
Contrary to the suggestion of critics of Kline that it "creates a
conflict of interest between an attorney and his or her client because
it requires an attorney to investigate and verify each and every fact
supplied by the client, 261 Kline imposes no duty to investigate.
Rather, it merely prevents lawyers, accountants, and underwriters
from representing client-supplied representations as true in situations
where, with or without the benefit of an investigation, the profession-
als have learned that the representations are inaccurate.262
b. Participation
A second major situation in which collateral defendants should
be liable for the misrepresentations (or omissions) of their clients
arises when they are participants in their clients' fraud. This is a
broader liability provision than suggested in the previous section.
There, the defendants' participation plus visibility led to an implied
259. Kline, 24 F.3d at 488 (citing Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (3d Cir.
1976)).
260. See id. at 488.
261. See Herpich, supra note 197, at 684 (citing Brief Amici Curiae of Business and
Financial Lawyers and of The National Association of Bond Lawyers in Support of Peti-
tioner, filed with cerL petition in Arvey, Hodes, Costello & Burman v. Kline, cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 613 (1994)).
262. A similar disclaimer was raised by an accountant in United States v. Benjamin, 328
F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1964). The accountant argued that he could not be held liable for
false statements in a financial statement because he had labeled it "pro forma." The
court responded aptly:
It would be insulting an honorable profession to suppose that a certified public
accountant may take the representations of a corporation official as to compa-
nies it proposes to acquire, combine their balance sheets without any
investigation as to the arrangements for their acquisition or suitable provision
reflecting payment of the purchase price, and justify the meaningless result by an
applique of two Latin words.
Id.; see also Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting as a de-
fense disclaimer that attorney had not made an attempt to independently verify the
various representations of client when facts made it clear that attorney simply did not
care if representations were accurate or not); In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln
S&L Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1448-49 (D. Ariz. 1992) (auditor may not protect itself
by making highly qualified representations concerning client whom it suspects of wrong-
doing).
Numerous persuasive reasons for discounting such disclaimers appear in a recent ar-
ticle. See Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk. Some Lessons for Law from




misrepresentation by the collateral defendants for which they were
naturally liable. In other words, it was a hybrid situation where de-
fendants were held liable for implicitly making misrepresentations
about others' statements. Their duty to injured parties arose from
their having made an implied misrepresentation.
In this section, I argue that the broad liability view embodied in
such cases as ZZZZ Best and Software Toolworks is essentially valid
and should be adopted. In other words, collateral defendants who
significantly participate in their clients' misrepresentations should be
liable even when they hide behind the scenes not because they can be
said to have impliedly vouched for the accuracy of the clients' lies,
but simply because they participated in them. Their knowing partici-
pation in a fraud in a situation where they know that investors will be
injured creates a duty to those injured investors. Everyone has a duty
not to defraud or participate in the defrauding of others. Nowhere in
the common law or pre-Brennan Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 jurispru-
dence were plaintiffs limited to suing only persons who had not only
defrauded them but also simultaneously breached a fiduciary duty to
them. Everyone owes a duty not to defraud other persons, even if
those others are total strangers.
And, it is clear, one can be a party to a fraud without necessarily
being the person who speaks a specific misrepresentation. At com-
mon law, there were multiple situations where persons could be liable
for the fraudulent statements of others.2'6 At common law, mere par-
ticipation in a fraud was clearly sufficient to impose primary liability.
The general rule for common-law fraud liability, as stated in the 1943
Corpus Juris Secundum, is this:
One who, by fraudulent representations, induces another to
act to his damage is liable for the damages suffered, and it is
not essential that there should have been privity of contract
263. This was clearly the case in 1934. See, e.g., Lewis v. McClure, 16 P.2d 166, 170
(Cal. App. 1932) (several defendants involved in fraud who all told plaintiffs separate lies
for their own reasons held liable for other defendants' lies even though no conspiracy was
alleged); Jacobsmeyer v. Frank J. Falzone & Co., 260 S.W. 764, 766 (Mo. App. 1924)
(trust held liable for fraudulent statements of its 100% owner); King v. Shawver, 30
S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. App. 1930) (A held liable for B's lies after telling plaintiff that B
was trustworthy); see also MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUD 378 (1877)
("[W]here a man has combined and conspired with others to cheat and defraud the plain-
tiff in the sale of certain property, by fraudulent concealments and misrepresentations,
and the fraud has been perpetrated accordingly, though by some other member or mem-
bers of the company, he will be liable, even where he has not himself made any of the
misrepresentations complained of." (emphasis added)).
More recent cases agree. See, e.g., Vikse v. Flaby, 316 N.W.2d 276,284 (Minn. 1982);
Kopperud v. Agers, 312 N.W.2d 443,445 (Minn. 1981).
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or personal dealings; but a person cannot be held liable for a
fraudulent misrepresentation unless he made it himself or
authorized another to make it for him or in some way par-
ticipated therein.2"
American Jurisprudence concurs in the participation standard, 26 as do
a plethora of cases both on the books at the time the 1934 Act was
passed2 and decided since. 67
At common law, all participants were jointly and severally liable,
not just the wrongdoer who had direct contact with the victim. 2 1 All
264. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 61, at 346 (1943) (emphasis added).
265. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 305, at 403 (1968) ("A person may not be
held liable for fraudulent representations not made, authorized, or participated in by
him." (emphasis added)).
266. See, e.g., Lewis, 16 P.2d at 170 (plaintiffs could recover against each defendant
shown to have participated in the fraud); Purdum v. Edwards, 141 A. 550, 553-54 (Md.
1928) (participants in deceit acting in different ways held jointly liable); Powers v. Ameri-
can Traffic Signal Corp., 209 N.W. 16, 17 (Minn. 1926) (whoever participates in a fraud is
liable); Orlann v. Laederich, 92 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Mo. 1936) ("Any one or more of several
persons participating in the perpetration of an actionable fraud becomes a fraud-
feasor and... is liable."); Leimkuehler v. Wessendorf, 18 S.W.2d 445,452 (Mo. 1929) (all
persons participating in fraud are liable); Hotaling v. A.B. Leach & Co., 214 N.Y.S. 452,
458 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1926) (all promoters, officers, and directors who participated in pre-
paring and circulating corporation's false prospectus held liable); King v. Cliett, 31 S.W.2d
350, 353 (Tex. App. 1930) (all those who participated liable to defrauded party).
267. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909,918 (2d Cir. 1980) (a participant in fraud is
liable as a principal even if it was not his idea); FDIC v. Hudson, 758 F. Supp. 663, 670 (D.
Kan. 1991) (Kansas law) (active participation sufficient for liability of corporate officer or
director); Stratton v. Miller, 113 B.R. 205, 211 (D. Md. 1989) (Maryland law) (willfully
aiding fraud sufficient for liability), aff'd sub nom. In re First American Mortg. Co., Inc.,
900 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1990); Beaver v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 414 N.E.2d 1339,
1341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (to be liable for fraud one must have participated in it or at least
had some knowledge of it); Boisdore v. Bridgeman, 502 So. 2d 1149, 1155 (La. Ct. App.
1987) (knowing participation leads to fraud liability); Nye v. Oates, 385 S.E.2d 529, 531
(N.C. App. 1989) (one who "facilitated" fraud is liable); Pumphrey v. Quillen, 141 N.E.2d
675, 680 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955) ("All of those who actively participate, by cooperation or
request, in a tortious act to defraud which results in damage, or who lend aid to the
wrongdoer, or ratify or adopt the acts done for their benefit, are equally liable."), aff'd,
135 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio 1956); Crisp v. Southwest Bancshares Leasing Co., 586 S.W.2d 610,
615 (Tex. App. 1979) (all who participate in fraud are liable); Galloway v. Afco Dev.
Corp., 777 P.2d 506, 508 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (parties who participate in fraud are
jointly liable); Israel Pagen Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 792 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(party cannot be liable for fraud unless he participated in it); Kaas v. Privette, 529 P.2d
23,29 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (every participant in fraud is liable).
268. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. on Clause (b) (1979) ("If the
encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one
giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is responsible for the consequences of the other's
act."). Interestingly, the case that started it all, Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insur-
ance Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), used
section 876's language to develop the notion that one who renders substantial assistance
to a fraud is liable for aiding and abetting. See 286 F. Supp. at 708. However, the Re-
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participants were equally at fault. No conspiracy was requisite for
the imposition of joint and several liability upon all the partici-
pants.2
69
The common law was very clear in holding that participants in
fraudulent schemes are liable to the schemes' victims. If all partici-
pants to a fraud were primarily (and jointly and severally) liable at
common law, they should also be primarily liable under Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 which, as noted above, should be applied in a more
pro-plaintiff fashion than was the common law. It is therefore clear
that the post-Central Bank cases like ZZZZ Best and Software Tool-
works which have applied simple participation tests, however
phrased, have quite properly followed established common-law
precedent. This is not only permissible, but is exactly the right course
of action.
Langevoort has strongly argued in favor of this common-law
standard, pointing out:
There is little sense, however, in limiting fraud liability to
those whose involvement is public and direct. The vast bulk
of securities law makes clear that behind the scenes in-
volvement in fraudulent disclosure (or actionable
nondisclosure), as opposed to mere participation in the
fraud, by no means absolves the participant from culpabil-
ity. The very nature of securities fraud often involves
obscuring the source and interests of its authors. People can
have a significant influence on how fraudulent disclosure is
packaged, and hence how effective it is, without being iden-
tifiable to the victim.
270
There is much to be said for Langevoort's view. Assume that A
(a) conceives of a plan to defraud an old lady; (b) induces B, a friend
of the victim, to go to her with a false story concocted by A about the
value of A Company's stock (which is actually worthless); and (c)
takes the bulk of the proceeds from the fraud once it is accomplished.
Is Langevoort not correct in concluding, as he no doubt would, that A
is a defrauder, rather than a mere aider and abettor, even though the
communication was B's? That conclusion is consistent with the
common law. For example, in the 1926 case of Hotaling v. A. B.
Leach & Co., " the court held promoters, officers, and directors of a
company primarily liable for the company's false prospectus "if they
statement section never mentions aiding and abetting; it describes the common-law pa-
rameters of primary liability.
269. See, e.g., Lewis, 16 P.2d at 170.
270. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 889.
271. 214 N.Y. 452 (Mun. Ct. 1926).
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participated in the preparation and circulation of it." n2 Langevoort's
position is also, as noted above,27 consistent with pre-Brennan Sec-
tion 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. It is also, Langevoort believes,
consistent with "a moderate reading" of Central Bank,274 although it
may not be consistent with Central Bank's vitriolic dicta attacking
securities fraud litigation.275
Riesenberg, an attorney for accountants, argues that there is no
statutory basis for the participation approach because the words
"participate" and "involvement" are not in the statute,7 6 There are
two problems with Riesenberg's argument. First, he proposes to de-
rive a test from the "seller" jurisprudence under § 12(2) of the 1933
Act,277 thereby committing the same alleged error-basing the stan-
dard on words that are not in the statute. Second, he ignores the
language of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), which, respectively, seek to pun-
ish those who "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,"
and who "engage in any act... which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person." 27' To "take part in" is a synonym
for both "participate" 279 and "engage in."'  Indeed, "participate" is
one of the accepted meanings of "engage."' ' This is very broad lan-
guage,8 and Riesenberg's attempt to read it narrowly is
unconvincing.2
272- Id. at 458.
273. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
274. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 889 ("Nothing in any moderate reading of Central
Bank precludes imposing liability on key participants.").
275. See id. at 892 ("How faithful this relatively broad approach is to Central Bank's
dicta is debatable.").
276. See Riesenberg, supra note 178, at 13.
277. Under § 12(2), the Supreme Court has held that only "sellers" are liable and that
the term "seller" includes only those who transfer title or "solicit" a sale. See Pinter v.
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1988). See generally Robert A. Prentice, Section 12 of the
1933 Act: Establishing the Statutory Seller, 40 ALA. L. REv. 417,443-70 (1989) (criticizing
the Supreme Court's opinion as inconsistent with congressional intent).
278. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996). Admittedly, the Supreme Court has noted that the
scope of Rule 10b-5 "cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress un-
der § 10(b)." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976). But no court,
including the Supreme Court, has held or hinted that subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5
are beyond the scope of congressional authorization.
279. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD THESAURUS 548 (revised ed. 1985).
280. Id. at 244.
281. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 610 (3d
ed. 1992).
282- See Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 917 (6th Cir. 1991)
("Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 is not limited to claims based on misrepresentations and omis-
sions but, rather, has been applied to a wide variety of fraudulent schemes .... ).
283. Riesenberg would apparently also require that the defendant have a direct finan-
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In ZZZZ Best, the court noted that the Supreme Court has often
held that Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5, including these provisions, must
be construed to eliminate "the full range of ingenious [fraudulent]
devices,"' 4 "any manipulative or deceptive device," and "all
fraudulent schemes,"' concluding:
Thus, the terms of the statute and rule extend liability to all
participants in any scheme or device that operates as a fraud
on investors. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, the
Supreme Court observed that "the second subparagraph of
the rule [10b-5(b)] specifies the making of an untrue state-
ment of a material fact and the omission to state a material
fact," but that "[t]he first and third subparagraphs [10b-5(a)
and (c)] are not so restricted." The Supreme Court held in
Affiliated Ute that the defendants violated Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 when they participated in "a 'course of business'
or a 'device, scheme or artifice' that operated as a fraud"-
even though these defendants had not themselves said any-
thing that was false or misleading.'
Admittedly, a "participation" standard sets a fairly low threshold
for liability. One dictionary defines "participate" as "[t]o take
part." In a variety of situations, courts have adopted a similar
cial interest in the transaction before primary liability could arise. See Riesenberg, supra
note 178, at 14. There is no basis for this requirement in either statutory language, court
precedent, or policy. Furthermore, it ignores how closely aligned with the interests of
their clients the interests of attorneys, bankers, and accountants already are. The desire
to have their fees (sometimes contingency fees) paid and the desire for future streams of
income provide a plentiful direct financial interest for collateral participants in the trans-
actions of their clients. See Painter, supra note 167, at 545 (lawyers want their clients'
deals to get done so that they get paid and their work isn't wasted). Additionally, the
language of Central Bank seems to reject such a requirement. See Coffee, supra note 16,
at B4.
284. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,477 (1977).
285. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,386 (1983).
286. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 11 n.7 (1971).
287. In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 971-72 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (citations
omitted). ZZZZ Best also cited In re Union Carbide Corporation Consumer Products
Business Securities Litigation, 676 F. Supp. 458, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), for the proposition
that even if an accountant could not be held liable under Rule 10b-5(b) because the false
statements were not fairly attributable to it, the accountant could still be liable under
subsections (a) and (c). See ZZZZ Best, 864 F. Supp. at 972; see also In re U.S.A. Classic
Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,837, at 93,048 (S.D.N.Y. June
16, 1995) (holding issuer and underwriter and corporate officials potentially liable for
issuer's false statements because they all allegedly participated in a scheme to defraud
and were therefore direct participants with primary liability); Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., 840
F. Supp. 799, 808 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding that all who "were involved in the [fraudulent]
scheme" owed a duty to plaintiff investors).
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meaning.289 But isn't it true that one who intentionally takes part in a
fraud should be punished and should have to compensate the inno-
cent victim? Actions such as drafting false communications, editing
false communications, and transmitting false communications are
clearly sufficient for liability if done knowingly by the client in whose
name the communications are issued. Because it has never been a
requirement that one actually be the speaker to be liable in a
fraudulent scheme, these same acts, if knowingly done by a collateral
defendant such as an attorney or accountant, must also lead to liabil-
ity.
Certainly, the term "to participate" is vague and confusion can
arise from various formulations of the test ("significant participa-
tion," "significant involvement," "intricate involvement," etc.). Does
drafting a client's communication satisfy the test? Does partial
drafting? How about editing? Proofreading? These are troubling
questions, especially given how far they run from the Supreme
Court's desired bright line. Still, I am not convinced any great effort
needs to be expended developing a bright-line test for defining
"participation." After all, so long as the people being sued have ac-
tually acted with the requisite element of scienter to help formulate
or communicate a false representation that they know will be relied
upon by investors, a relatively low level of participation should jus-
tify, both morally and legally, imposition of liability.2"
Nonetheless, Langevoort has suggested a somewhat more spe-
cific approach, 29 and I am happy to embrace it. He suggests:
289. See, e.g., Bayersdorfer v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 489, 491
(S.D. Ohio. 1937), aff'a 105 F.2d 595 (1939); Burrell v. Ford Motor Co., 192 N.W.2d 207,
211 (Mich. 1965); Key Life Ins. Co. of South Carolina. v. Tharp, 179 So. 2d 555, 557 (Miss.
1965); Bew v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 A. 859, 860 (N.J. 1921); Lee v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of America, 46 N.Y.S.2d 241, 246 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), affd, 48 N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1944); McConnell v. Ray, 71 P.2d 975, 978 (Okla. 1937); Lloyds of Texas v. Webb,
150 S.W.2d 181,184 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), rev'd, 152 S.W.2d 1096 (1941).
Other courts have noted that "participation" requires "action, effort, or direction."
See, e.g., Prinsen v. Travelers Protective Ass'n of America, 65 F.2d 841, 842 (10th Cir.
1933), rev'd, 291 U.S. 576 (1934). This requirement does, and should, eliminate mere
"standing around" liability.
290. In a post-Central Bank setting, Brennan, the original aiding and abetting case,
should also result in primary liability for the alleged aider and abettor which, consistent
with its own self-interest, adopted a mechanism for responding to investor complaints
about the primary wrongdoer that actually assisted the wrongdoer in identifying and mol-
lifying those customers most likely to turn him in to the authorities. See Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 723 (N.D. Ind. 1968), affd, 417 F.2d
147 (7th Cir. 1969).
291. In general, Professor Langevoort opposes writing undue specificity into Rule 10b-
5. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L.
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that the notion of participation or involvement in these
cases be redefined in terms of proximate causation or a
broad notion of "co-authorship." Any person who plays a
significant role in the formulation of a disclosure document
or other form of publicity that contains a material misstate-
ment or omission should be liable as a primary violator if he
or she acted with the requisite degree of scienter and all the
other requirements for Rule 10b-5 liability are met. A sig-
nificant role is one in which the person is invited, expected,
or is otherwise in a position to affect the form or content of
the disclosure-where the person has the ability to influence
its capacity to deceive. This could take the form of drafting,
editing, or providing information.2 2
The common law managed for several hundred years without
this specific a standard, but this particular one is neither inconsistent
with the common law nor objectionable on other grounds. I am
happy with it because it seems unlikely to impinge upon the long-
established discretion of judges and juries to impose liability upon
those who knowingly participate in a significant way to advance a
fraudulent scheme. 93
Finally, it must be noted that the Supreme Court itself has sug-
REV. S7, S19 (1993).
292. Langevoort, supra note 9, at 892 (footnote omitted).
293. One final point relating to the reliance element of a cause of action must be
stressed. The reliance that a plaintiff must establish to recover on a Section 10(b)/Rule
10b-5 participation claim is reliance upon the false representation, not upon any particu-
lar defendant's role in preparing it. Indeed, it is irrelevant that the plaintiff, at the time of
reliance upon the misrepresentation, does not know the identities of all who had a signifi-
cant role in preparing it. At common law and in pre-Brennan Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5
jurisprudence, all who played a substantial role in the preparation were potentially pri-
marily liable, even if their identities did not become known until after the transaction.
Central Bank has been read as holding that:
[I]t is not enough for a person who, throwing in his lot with other wrongdoers,
engages behind the scene in acts that are then packaged by the seller and sold to
deceive investors. Regardless of how reprehensible the defendant's conduct, the
issue becomes whether the plaintiff is entitled to rely on that conduct.
Maxey, supra note 79, at 2210-11.
Any such holding would be erroneous, but it appears that the Supreme Court did not
so hold. What the majority said was simply that "[a] plaintiff must show reliance on the
defendant's misstatement or omission to recover under Rule 10b-5." Central Bank of Den-
ver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994) (emphasis added). The
majority did not require reliance on defendant's conduct. If the misstatement or omission
is attributable to defendant, as it should be if the defendant participated substantially in
its preparation or communication, then the defendant is liable to a plaintiff who relied
upon the misstatement or omission regardless of whether plaintiff knew of defendant's
role at the time of the transaction. Any other holding would, inconsistent with the com-
mon law of fraud and deceit, reward those who can successfully cover their tracks, at least
for a time.
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gested that "participation" is the proper standard for Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability for both defendants and for plaintiffs facing
in pari delicto defenses. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,294 the
Court explained that one of the reasons that Section 10(b) should be
construed as providing a cumulative remedy supplementing that pro-
vided by Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act was that Section 11 did
not reach certain collateral defendants, including "lawyers not acting
as 'experts,' and accountants with respect to parts of a registration
statement which they are not named as having prepared or certi-
fied. ' ,295 The Court refused to hold that Section 11 provided the
exclusive remedy in public offerings because absent the availability of
a remedy under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5, injured investors
would have no recourse against such individuals [as lawyers
and accountants] even if the excluded parties engaged in
fraudulent conduct while participating in the registration
statement. The exempted individuals would be immune
from federal liability for fraudulent conduct even though
§ 10(b) extends to 'any person' who engages in fraud in con-
nection with a purchase or sale of securities.296
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly indicated in Huddleston that
collateral defendants such as lawyers and accountants who partici-
pate in another's fraudulent statement are to be held liable under
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. Any other holding would provide a bitter
irony in light of the Supreme Court's holdings regarding the in pari
delicto defense. In both Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner297 and Pinter v. Dahl,298 the Supreme Court borrowed com-
mon-law doctrine to fill out the interstices of the federal securities
laws, just as I am suggesting here. In both cases, the Court held that
defendants in federal securities litigation (Bateman Eichler was a
10b-5 insider trading case and Pinter was a '33 Act case) may raise
the common-law defense of in pari delicto.2 9  In Pinter, Justice
Blackmun rejected a "duty" standard, and selected a participation
standard, holding that a plaintiff could be barred from recovery from
a wrongdoing defendant if the plaintiff was "an active, voluntary par-
294. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
295. Id. at 386 n.22.
296. Id. (emphasis added).
297. 472 U.S. 299, 306-11 (1985).
298. 486 U.S. 622, 633-35 (1988).
299. In pari delicto mellor est conditio defendentis means "[w]here the parties are
equally at fault, the situation of the defendant is the more favorable." BALLENTINE'S
LAW DICTIONARY 631 (3d ed. 1969).
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ticipant in the unlawful activity."3°° Notwithstanding that the word
"participant" did not appear in the relevant statute, the Supreme
Court selected that standard and rejected a competing "duty" stan-
dard.3°1 Given that one of the main purposes of the federal securities
laws is to protect investors, it would be a vicious irony indeed if in-
jured plaintiffs were barred from recovery by their "participation" in
a fraud, whereas collateral defendants' equal "participation" would
exonerate them because they were not the "speakers" of the par-
ticular misrepresentation.
C. Primary Liability for Failing to "Blow the Whistle"
Collateral defendants should clearly be primarily liable for their
own fraudulent misstatements. That liability, I have argued, should
extend to situations (a) where defendants, by their visible and signifi-
cant participation in preparing or communicating statements of
others, impliedly vouch for the accuracy of statements that they know
are fraudulent;.3 and (b) where defendants knowingly and signifi-
cantly participate in a fraud, even behind-the-scenes.3
I now address the potential liability of such a collateral defen-
dant for the client's communications which the defendant knew were
false, but did not play a role in writing, editing, reviewing, or trans-
mitting. For example, assume that an accounting firm audits and
certifies a financial statement that is contained in a prospectus. The
financial statement is accurate in all respects. However, in the post-
effective period, it comes to the attention of the accounting firm that
the issuer is accompanying prospectuses with "free-writing" materials
that contain information that the accounting firm knows is false, even
though the firm played no role in preparing the materials. The ac-
counting firm would not have any Section 11 liability,305 but could it
300. 486 U.S. at 636 (emphasis added) (citing Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591,
604 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U.S. 944 (1976)).
301. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: The
Case of the Overly Eager Investor, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv. 697, 721-23 (1988-89)
(preferring duty test in that context).
302. The fact that the Supreme Court itself has twice suggested that the
"participation" standard is the appropriate one to apply in this context provides the best
hope that it will not in this area do what it did in Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248
(1993). See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (discussing Mertens decision). As
noted earlier, the Mertens Court, in the face of ambiguous statutory language, selected an
extremely conservative standard that led to a result Congress could not possibly have
intended.
303. See supra notes 191-262 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 263-302 and accompanying text.
305. See Ahern v. Gaussoin, 611 F. Supp. 1465, 1483 (D. Or. 1985).
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be primarily liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 for failing to
"blow the whistle" on the client's fraud?
The whistleblowing area is one where it can reasonably be ar-
gued that aiding and abetting liability could apply where primary
liability would not. There was no liability for failing to blow the whis-
tle at common law, unless a fiduciary duty existed between plaintiff
and defendant'0 6 Yet, it is arguable, for example, that an accounting
firm renders "substantial assistance" and thereby aids and abets a
client's fraud in which it did not participate by its act of failing to no-
tify investors of the fraud. Therefore, here is one area where Central
Bank seemingly has the potential to reduce the scope of collateral
defendants' liability.
In this section, I will (a) survey the pre-Central Bank case law to
demonstrate that the duty to blow the whistle on a client was em-
braced by some courts but was definitely a minority view;. (b)
conclude that Central Bank does seem to spell the end of any free-
standing duty by collateral participants in securities transactions to
blow the whistle; s and (c) argue that there remain a couple of situa-
tions in which a whistleblowing duty might just survive. 9
1. Pre-Central Bank Case Law
As noted earlier, when one makes affirmative misrepresenta-
tions and tells half-truths, a duty to those the speaker can foresee will
rely upon these misstatements arises.310 But failing to blow the whis-
tle on a client's fraud involves neither affirmative misrepresentations
nor half-truths. The Supreme Court, following the common law, has
made it abundantly clear that mere silence, in the absence of a duty
311to speak, is not actionable.
Before Central Bank, the key question, with which the courts
struggled mightily, was whether silence by collateral defendants
could meet the "substantial assistance" element of an aiding and
abetting claim.312 But this was faulty analysis. If a duty to blow the
306. See 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 61(b)(3) (1943) ("Mere silence in the face of a third per-
son's fraud will not render defendant liable unless there is a duty to speak.").
307. See infra notes 314-33 and accompanying text.
308. See infra notes 334-39 and accompanying text.
309. See infra notes 340-89 and accompanying text.
310. See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841 F.2d 502,506 (3d Cir. 1988).
311. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222,235 (1980); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (ist Cir. 1996).
312. Humphreys, supra note 38, at 399 ("The most difficult issue arising in aiding and




whistle did exist, a breach of that duty should have been deemed to
give rise to primary liability. Notwithstanding that error, the issue of
whether such a duty did exist was very controversial 3
a. Narrow View: No Duty to Blow the Whistle
Before Central Bank, most courts held that mere silence or inac-
tion could not give rise to even aiding and abetting liability, not to
meuition primary liability.34  A leading case is DiLeo v. Ernst &
Young,315 in which plaintiffs charged fraud in violation of Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 by Continental Bank and alleged that the bank's
accounting firm aided and abetted that fraud by "lending its name to
the financial statements and keeping its mouth shut about what was
really going on. 3 16 Under plaintiff's theory, Ernst & Young could be
liable even though all the financial statements it certified were accu-
rate (and even though Ernst & Young had not participated in any
313. See McNulty & Hanson, supra note 38, at 16-17, 39-50 (arguing that if there is no
duty to speak up or "blow the whistle" on a securities law violator, there should be no
liability for failing to do so).
314. See, e.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490-94 (4th Cir. 1991); Robin v. Ar-
thur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1990); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901
F.2d 624,628-29 (7th Cir. 1990); Latigo Ventures v. Laventhol & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322,
1327 (7th Cir. 1989); LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928,932-33 (7th Cir.
1988); Windon v. Third Oil & Gas Drilling Partnership v. FDIC, 805 F.2d 342, 347 (10th
Cir. 1986); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir.
1986); Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279,
283 (9th Cir. 1971) (fearing that imposing liability on a defendant solely for "inaction"
would lead to "serious mischief'); Leoni v. Rogers, 719 F. Supp. 555, 565-66 (E.D. Mich.
1989); Gutfreund v. Christoph, 658 F. Supp. 1378, 1385 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Mendelsohn v.
Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1086-87 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Gold v. DCL,
Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123, 1127-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
However, other courts disagreed. The foundation Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 case was
an inaction case. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681-
82 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss), 286 F. Supp. 702, 728 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (trial on
merits), aftd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1970); see also Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255,246-
67 (D. Or. 1972) (holding defendants liable for failing to make duly diligent inquiry into
accuracy of prospectuses); Anderson v. Francis I. duPont Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D.
Minn. 1968) ("An aider and abettor may be liable for damages even though his assistance
of the scheme consists of mere silence or inaction."); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 408
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding insiders liable where silence influences outsider not to make a
sale).
Commentators similarly disagreed. Compare David B. Isbell, An Overview of Ac-
countants' Duties and Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Laws and a Closer Look at
Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 278 (1974) ("I[T]here is no legal obligation on an
accountant to report to the [SEC] or other governmental authority his client's errors,
omissions, and misdeeds."), with Billings, supra note 38, at 1269 ("The policies of the
securities acts are served by sanctioning aiding and abetting-active and passive.").
315. 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990).
316. Id. at 628.
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way in the client's fraud), if it failed to blow the whistle on its client's
fraudulent activities.17
The Seventh Circuit began by noting a very important point that
I have tried to emphasize: Although plaintiffs' claim against Ernst &
Young was framed as aiding and abetting, it actually attempted to
state a cause for primary liability. If a duty to blow the whistle on a
client did exist, the court concluded, failure to live up to that duty
would constitute a primary violation of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5.
Professor Ruder has also made this point:
[M]ere inaction should not give rise to liability under rule
10b-5 in the absence of an independent duty to make disclo-
sure of the primary wrong. If such a duty does exist, liability
for nondisclosure will be based upon direct breach of a duty
to disclose rather than upon an aiding and abetting theory. I
However, the Seventh Circuit quickly ruled that no such duty
exists because, it thought, the federal "securities laws do not impose
general duties to speak. 3 0  Furthermore, the only other potential
source of such duties, state law,321 was viewed as unavailing to plain-
tiffs because Illinois law imposed no obligation on accountants to
"search and sing."32 In so ruling, the court cited many policy argu-
ments consonant with the Supreme Court's fears, articulated in
Central Bank, about the adverse effects of securities fraud litiga-
tion.323
317. See id&
318. See id. ("An accountant's liability for aiding and abetting is hard to distinguish
from primary liability. After all, the securities laws forbid material omissions that render
misleading what has been stated.").
319. Ruder, supra note 34, at 644 (emphasis added).
320. DiLeo, 901 F.2d. at 628 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 & n.17
(1988)).
321. See id& (relying on Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,
495 (7th Cir. 1986)).
322. Id. at 629 (citing Latigo Ventures v. Laventhol & Horwath, 876 F.2d 1322, 1327
(7th Cir. 1989)).
323. See id. The court explained:
Such a duty [to blow the whistle] would prevent the client from reposing in the
accountant the trust that is essential to an accurate audit. Firms would withhold
documents, allow auditors to see but not copy, and otherwise emulate the CIA,
if they feared that access might lead to destructive disclosure-for even an honest
firm may fear that one of its accountant's many auditors would misunderstand
the situation and ring the tocsin needlessly with great loss to the firm. Duties to
disclose or pay damages would raise the costs of all audits, as accountants in-
creased fees to cover anticipated liabilities. Honest enterprises would pay these
fees no less than dishonest (for until the audit ended, an accountant could not
tell which was which). So firms would purchase less accounting service, and in-
vestors in all firms would lose at both ends: the price would go up as the amount
762 [Vol. 75
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The court in In re Cascade International Securities Litigation324
took a similar view, holding:
[I]f an accountant does not issue a public opinion about a
company, although it may have conducted internal audits or
reviews for portions of the company, the accountant cannot
subsequently be held responsible for the company's public
statements issued later merely because the accountant may
know those statements are likely untrue. It follows there-
fore that an accountant who has not publicly expressed
support for the company's financial statements upon which
the public relied in connection with the sale or purchase of
securities has no duty to alert the public to the content, even
if inaccurate, of those statements in the future.32
b. Broad View: A Duty May Exist
The leading cases for the pre-Central Bank minority view that a
duty to blow the whistle might exist relied upon a flexible duty test
arising apparently out of federal law in order to arguably "invent" a
duty by lawyers and accountants to blow the whistle on their clients'
fraud.
One set of criteria was explicated in Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen
& Co.32' In Rudolph, a limited partnership's auditor issued various
reports and memos that it believed were accurate at the time they
were included in the limited partnership's private placement memo-
randum. However, plaintiffs alleged that thereafter auditor Arthur
Andersen learned (or recklessly failed to learn) that the general
partner planned to divert the funds invested for purposes other than
those stated in the memorandum. Plaintiffs claimed that Arthur An-
dersen's failure to blow the whistle constituted assistance of a cover-
up and, consequently, aiding and abetting of the general partner's
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 violation. As noted above, however, if
there is indeed a duty to blow the whistle, failure to do so constitutes
a primary violation, not mere aiding and abetting. Unlike the Sev-
enth Circuit in DiLeo, the Eleventh Circuit in Rudolph recognized
the possibility of such a duty:
The rule that an accountant is under no duty to disclose or-
dinary business information, unless it shows a previous
report to have been misleading or incorrect when issued, is a
of oversight went down.
Id.
324. 894 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
325. Id. at 443.
326. 800 F.2d 1040, 1043-45 (llth Cir. 1986).
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sensible one. It would be asking too much to expect ac-
countants to make difficult and time-consuming judgment
calls about the nature of routine facts and figures turned up
after a report has been completed. The situation is quite dif-
ferent, however, where the issue is disclosure of actual
knowledge of fraud. Standing idly by while knowing one's
good name is being used to perpetrate a fraud is inherently
misleading. An investor might reasonably assume that an
accounting firm would not permit inclusion of an audit re-
port it prepared in a placement memo for an offering the
firm knew to be fraudulent, and that such a firm would let it
be known if it discovered to be fraudulent an offering with
which it was associated. 327
Under what circumstances does an accountant owe a duty to
blow the whistle on a client's fraud? The Eleventh Circuit held that it
exists "where [a] the accountant's information is obviously superior
to that of the investor, [b] the cost to the accountant of revealing the
information is minimal, and [c] the cost to investors of the informa-
tion remaining secret [is] potentially enormous. ' '3 8 In such cases,
"standing around" liability can attach, according to Rudolph.
A similar five-part test has perhaps been more commonly ap-
plied. In Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co,3 9 an aiding and
abetting claim was again involved, but the court held that the ac-
countant's alleged knowledge of its client's misrepresentation while
allowing the use of its name in the client's offering memoranda "may
be sufficient to create a duty to disclose."330 As noted above, if a duty
to disclose does exist and is not performed, a primary violation oc-
curs, not mere aiding and abetting. The test invoked by the Ninth
Circuit involved five non-exclusive factors:
1. the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff;
2. the defendant's access to information as compared to
the plaintiff's access;
3. the benefit that the defendant derives from the relation-
ship with the plaintiff;
4. the defendant's awareness of plaintiff's reliance; and
327. Id. at 1044 (emphasis added).
328. Id.; see also In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln S&L Sec. Litig., 794 F.
Supp. 1424, 1443 (D. Ariz. 1992) (quoting Rudolph while holding that an auditor may not
stand by and withhold knowledge of client's fraud from the SEC); In re Rospatch Sec.
Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1251 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (adopting Rudolph approach).
329. 857 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1988).
330. Id. at 653.
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5. the defendant's activity in initiating the securities trans-
action in question.
331
Several courts have applied this five-factor test in deciding
whether or not a Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 defendant owed a duty to
disclose.332 Like Rudolph and Roberts, many of these cases involved
claims of aiding and abetting, but the analysis for an asserted primary
violation should be the same.
2. The Implications of Central Bank for the Whistleblowing Duty
It seems very unlikely that any whistleblowing duty can survive
Central Bank in light of the fact that the majority opinion thrice cited
Daniel Fischel's law review article in which he stated clearly that the
"'whistle blowing' theory of liability does not survive the abolition of
secondary liability proposed in this Article.,3 34 Hansen and Garrison
argue that there is no whistle-blowing duty in light of Central Bank
because (a) the text of Section 10(b) imposes no such duty; (b) the
auditor has no independent duty to investors arising under contract
or professional standards;335 and (c) the auditor's duty to the public
extends only to the audit engagement, not to matters arising outside
the audit engagement. 336 They suggest that Central Bank dramatically
undermines the rationale in Rudolph, because Central Bank suggests
that an auditor has no duty to blow the whistle on client fraud unless
331. Il at 653-54. These factors appear to be drawn from the common-law rules on
duty to speak discussed supra note 129.
332. See, e.g., Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 1991); Arthur Young & Co.
v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310,1330-31 (8th Cir. 1991), aff'd sub nor. Reves v. Ernst & Young,
507 U.S. 170 (1993); Pegasus Fund, Inc. v. Laraneta, 617 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1980);
First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977).
333. The Ninth Circuit is fairly schizophrenic in its use of this flexible duty test. It
appeared to jettison the requirement in Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564,
1570 (9th Cir. 1990). The court reasoned that this was too much of a negligence-based
test that had already been rejected by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). Yet the court continues to apply it from time to time. See,
e.g., Paracor Finance v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 79 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1996).
334. Fischel, supra note 4, at 103.
335. In any event, professional ethics rules as promulgated by state bar and accounting
associations have been rejected as providing the basis for federal securities law violations.
See Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 492 (4th Cir. 1991) (refusing to impose Rule 10b-5
liability on attorneys even though plaintiffs had obtained an ethics ruling from the Mary-
land State Bar Committee that under the alleged facts an attorney would have an
obligation to disclose client's fraud or withdraw from representing the client); Tew v.
Arky, Freed, Stearns, Watson, Greer, Weaver & Harris, 655 F. Supp. 1573, 1573-74 (S.D.
Fla. 1987), affd mem., 846 F.2d 753 (11th Cir.) (same).
336. See James D. Hansen & Michael J. Garrison, The Significance of 'Central Bank'
on Auditor Liability, 54 OHIO CPA J., June 1995, at 20,21-23.
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professional auditing standards require that disclosure.337
Thus, it seems clear that the Rudolph/Roberts line of whistle-
blower cases is unlikely to survive Central Bank.338 However, because
most courts had already rejected the whistleblower theory as a means
of imposing aiding and abetting liability even before Central Bank,
the overall impact on Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence will be
somewhat limited.
I suggest that the Central Bank impact is further minimized by
the fact that there are at least two limited situations in which primary
liability for failing to blow the whistle may actually survive Central
Bank.
39
3. Post-Central Bank Whistleblowing Duty
a. Fiduciary Duty Situations
The Supreme Court has held that a duty to disclose will exist if
there is "a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between" plaintiff and defendant.m Therefore, at the very least, ac-
countants and other collateral defendants owe a duty to blow the
whistle to warn third parties of their clients' fraud when they owe a
fiduciary duty to those third parties. Such situations will seldom
arise, however.
Accountants occasionally owe fiduciary duties to their clients,34'
337. See id. at 23.
338. Professor Maxey has suggested some other routes by which courts might develop
a duty of disclosure, such as state common law, state securities statutes, and professional
rules of conduct, see Maxey, supra note 79, at 2224-32, but these do not seem particularly
promising.
339. If I had my druthers, there would be a broader-based whistleblower duty. How-
ever, it seems extremely unlikely that I will be in possession of my druthers any time
soon, and this section is written from a realistic perspective. However, all hope is not lost.
Although no whistleblower duty for attorneys is likely to survive Central Bank, members
of the American Law Institute working on a proposed Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, recently approved a section permitting attorneys to reveal a client's past, pres-
ent, or intended fraudulent conduct in order to prevent fraud or rectify its financial
consequences. See Corporate Counsel Daily (BNA) (June 21, 1996), available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, BNACCD File. This development indicates that even the law profession
itself realizes that the courts are setting a scandalously low standard for the conduct of
corporate attorneys and that something needs to be done to begin raising the level of
expected behavior.
340. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)). I noted earlier, supra note 129, that the Su-
preme Court has unfortunately chosen to ignore a raft of other common-law situations
where a duty to speak up was imposed.
341. See generally M. Thomas Arnold, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, in ACCOUNTANTS'
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but only rarely will they develop the kind of sustained personal rela-
tionship with third parties typicall necessary to give rise to a
relationship of trust and confidence.Y Therefore, seldom will a situa-
tion arise where an accountant has a duty to blow the whistle on a
client in favor of a third-party investor or lender.343
Lawyers are even less likely to owe fiduciary duties to third par-
ties. 344 It is not simply a coincidence that Rudolph and Roberts (as
well as DiLeo and Cascade) involve accountant-defendants. Plaintiff
investors should realize that an issuer's attorneys owe a such strong
fiduciary duty to their client 4s that communications from the client to
the attorneys are typically confidential 6 and privileged,347 and that
the law mandates that the attorneys serve the client's interests first.m
All of these factors lead most courts to conclude that even when they
act as underwriters' counsel, attorneys do not owe public investors a
special duty to ferret out and disclose fraud.349 According to most
courts, attorneys do not typically owe duties of disclosure to noncli-
LIABILiTY 341 passim (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-506,
1994) (examining situations in which accountants may owe fiduciary duties).
342. See, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 988 (10th Cir.
1992) (noting that accountants generally have no duty to report a client's wrongdoing);
Ackerman, Jablonski, Porterfield & DeTure v. Aldhadeff, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,756, at 93,684-86 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 16, 1986) (stating that
attorneys owe no fiduciary duty to a clients' potential investors); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that account-
ants do not owe a duty to client's shareholders); Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters,
Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (observing that accountants typically owe
no duty to third parties to blow the whistle).
343. In Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 482 N.E.2d 955, 963 (Ohio App. 1983),
an accounting firm which did blow the whistle by telling one group of clients about the
financial difficulty of another client was held liable to the latter client for breaching its
duty of confidentiality.
344. See Maxey, supra note 79, at 2186.
345. Attorneys are bound to represent their clients "zealously within the bounds of the
law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1986).
346. An attorney may disclose only when necessary "to prevent the client from com-
mitting a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(b)(1)
(1995).
347. See Pratt v. State, 387 A.2d 779, 782 (Md. App. 1978), affd, 398 A.2d 421 (Md.
1979) (discussing theory behind creation of attorney-client privilege).
348. See Model RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1995); see also Page
v. Frazier, 445 N.E.2d 148, 153 (Mass. 1983) (stating that a client's interest takes prece-
dence over that of a non-client).
349. See, e.g., Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469, 474-75
(4th Cir. 1992); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490-95 (4th Cir. 1991); Abell v. Poto-
mac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1124-26 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. granted and judgment vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989); Barker v. Henderson, Frank-
lin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,497 (7th Cir. 1986).
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ents350 and will rarely be liable to third parties for their legal work
unless "[they] prepared a signed 'opinion' letter designed for the use
of a third party."' A common view is that expressed by the Fourth
Circuit in Schatz v. Rosenberg that "[t]he better rule-that attorneys
have no duty to 'blow the whistle' on their clients-allows clients to
repose complete trust in their lawyers."35 2 It is perhaps unfortunate
that a lawyer's theoretical duty to justice353 and to the public good has
been so totally overwhelmed by the duty of loyalty to a client, but
this seems unlikely to change any time soon.
Investors can make only a slightly stronger case for whistle-
blowing by underwriters in a public offering," and for most other
collateral defendants other than accountants, investors cannot rea-
sonably expect whistle-blowing.35  Therefore, the fiduciary
relationship scenario should be recognized, but will remain of limited
350. See, e.g., Bush v. Rewald, 619 F. Supp. 585, 590 (D.C. Haw. 1985); Quintel Corp.
v. Citibank, 589 F. Supp. 1235, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Typically, such courts have errone-
ously failed to distinguish between a duty not to defraud and a duty to blow the whistle on
another's fraud. As stressed repeatedly above, one party need not owe a fiduciary duty to
another in order to be under a legal duty not to participate in a scheme to defraud that
other person.
351. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1125 (5th Cir. 1988); accord Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485,
491 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Abell).
352. 943 F.2d at 493; see also Camp v. Dema, 948 F.2d 455,463 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating
that neither lawyers nor accountants need to report their clients' wrongdoing absent a
fiduciary duty); Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th
Cir. 1986) (same); Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 799, 808 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding
that attorney has no duty to "tattle" on client).
This is not to say that there have not been occasional cases hinting that a higher stan-
dard of whistleblowing conduct should be imposed on attorneys. Two classic cases in the
securities area are SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 712-14
(D.D.C. 1978), in which the SEC argued strongly, only to have the court basically avoid
the issue, that attorneys have a duty to disclose fraud to others than their own client, and
In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,169-73 (SEC
Feb. 28, 1981), an SEC proceeding in which the SEC hinted at a lawyer's duty to go to the
board of directors and/or the independent directors to insure that their clients' disclosures
of financial difficulties were not inadequate.
353. See Langevoort, supra note 39, at 78 (expressing this fear).
354. Underwriters have been characterized, like accountants, as owing some type of
duty to the investing public and therefore serving a role characterized as "adverse" to
their clients. Unlike attorneys, they do not owe a fiduciary duty to their clients. See
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("In a sense,
the positions of the underwriter and the company's officers are adverse. It is not unlikely
that statements made by company officers to an underwriter to induce him to underwrite
may be self-serving ... unduly enthusiastic... [or], on occasion, be deliberately false.").
355. In addition, these other collateral defendants, such as banks, are much less likely
than accountants, attorneys, or underwriters to have participated in the preparation of the
issuer's misleading communications. Their liability has tended to be of the "standing
around" variety and will not survive Central Bank. See Maxey, supra note 79, at 2209.
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impact. Collateral defendants' fiduciary duties tend to run to their
clients, not to third-party investors or lenders.
b. Accountants and the PSLRA
The strongest case for a whistleblowing duty has always existed
against accountants, particularly because of the Supreme Court's
statements in United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,356 where the
Court, while denying a federal law privilege for the workpapers of an
independent auditor, stated:
An independent certified public accountant performs a dif-
ferent role [than an attorney whose job is to serve the
client]. By certifying the public reports that collectively de-
pict a corporation's financial status, the independent auditor
assumes a public responsibility transcending any employ-
ment relationship with the client. The independent public
accountant performing this special function owes ultimate
allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as
well as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" func-
tion demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires com-
plete fidelity to the public trust. 7
The SEC has echoed this duty, contrasting it with the role of at-
torneys in securities law:
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting
as the client's advisor, defender, advocate and confidant en-
ters into a personal relationship in which his principal
concern is with the interests and rights of his client. The re-
quirement of the [1934 Securities Exchange] Act of
certification by an independent accountant, on the other
hand, is intended to secure for.the benefit of public inves-
tors the detached objectivity of a disinterested person.
Given that an independent auditor owes a duty not to the client
but to the investing public, it is certainly more than reasonable for an
investor to assume that an auditor will blow the whistle on the fraud
of the party to whom it does not owe a duty (the client) in order to
prevent substantial monetary loss to the party to whom it does owe a
duty (the investor). Nonetheless, as noted above, it is extremely un-
likely that cases such as Roberts and Rudolph can survive Central
Bank, even though they probably should.
356. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
357. lt at 817-18 (second emphasis added).
358. In re American Fin. Co., 40 S.E.C. 1043,1049 (1962).
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However, the story does not end there. The PSLRA of 1995..9
created a limited federal statutory duty for accountants, but not other
collateral defendants, to blow the whistle on the fraudulent acts of
their clients. This reform act, pushed heavily by the accounting pro-
fession's potent lobby, contained many pro-defendant provisions
which are quite favorable to accountants. However, it also contained
a new Section 10A amending the 1934 Exchange Act to require ac-
countants, in some cases, to report detected illegal acts directly to the
SEC.
This portion of the PSLRA was introduced in Congress inde-
pendently as early as 1985. Its original proponent was
Representative Wyden, and through various iterations it was gener-
ally known as the Financial Fraud Detection Act or the Financial
Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act. During the summer of 1995 it
was suddenly married to the bills that became the PSLRA.
L The Mechanics of New Section 1OA
In essence, the new Section 10A provides that each audit re-
quired by the 1934 Act is to include procedures designed to provide
reasonable assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct
and material effect on the determination of financial statement
amounts. ° If, during the audit, the accountant becomes aware of
information indicating illegal activity (whether or not material), then
the accountant is obligated to
(A) (i) determine whether it is likely that an illegal act has
occurred; and
(ii) if so, determine and consider the possible effect of
the illegal act on the financial statements of the issuer,
including any contingent monetary effects, such as
fines, penalties, and damages; and
(B) as soon as practicable, inform the appropriate level of
the management of the issuer and assure that the audit
committee of the issuer, or the board of directors ... is ade-
quately informed ....
361
359. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 737-65 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C.). The discussion of Section 10A refers to Title III, § 10A which is
codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78 j-1 (West Supp. 1996) and adds a new section, 10A, to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
360. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 10A(a)(1), 109 Stat. at 762-64. The audit is also to in-
clude procedures designed to identify material related-party transactions and an
evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the issuer as a going concern. See
id. § 10A(a)(2)-(3).
361. Id § 10A(b)(1).
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If senior management does not take timely and appropriate re-
medial action, then the auditors must report to the board of directors
if they believe the illegal act will have a material impact on the finan-
cial statement and that the failure to take such action is reasonably
expected to warrant departure from a standard report of the auditor
or, when made, warrant resignation from the audit engagement.36 2
When the board of directors receives such a report, it should in-
form the SEC within one business day and provide a copy of the
notice to the accountant. If the accountant fails to receive a copy of
this notice it shall on the following business day "(A) resign from the
engagement; or (B) furnish to the [SEC] a copy of its report.., not
later than [one] business day following such failure to receive no-
tice." ' 6' Even if the auditor chooses to resign, it shall nonetheless,
within one business day following the issuer's failure to inform the
SEC, furnish the SEC with a copy of its report.
To shelter the auditor somewhat, the law provides that "[n]o in-
dependent public accountant shall be liable in a private action for any
finding, conclusion, or statement expressed in a report made to [the
issuer or the SEC]."'36 However, if an auditor willfully violates these
requirements, including the duty to blow the whistle to the SEC, the
366SEC may impose a civil penalty under Section 21B.
iL The Impact of New Section 1OA
Although the accounting profession argues that this new provi-
sion simply codifies preexisting professional norms,317 it seems clear
that the new rule has the potential to alter in a fundamental way the
relationship between auditors and their public company clients.3 68 In
the words of one commentator, the new provisions "represent a
meaningful enhancement of the auditor's duty to report wrongdo-
ing., 3
69
The auditor's pre-PSLRA obligation to detect and report poten-
362. See id. § 1OA(b)(2).
363. 1d. § 1OA(b)(3).
364. See id. § 10A(b)(4).
365. Id. § 1OA(c).
366. See id. § 1OA(d).
367. See Donovan, supra note 95, at B1 (quoting accounting industry lawyers).
368. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., More Than "Classical GAAS": Audits and Corporate
Illegality Under the Litigation Reform Act, in 1 SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND
BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SECURITIES LAW 513, 516 (PLI Corporate
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-923, 1995).
369. Robert Sidorsky, Auditor's Duty to Blow the Whistle Under the Litigation Reform
Act, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 9,1996, at 1.
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tially fraudulent conduct was contained primarily in Statements on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 53, entitled "The Auditor's Responsi-
bility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities."' 370 While this
provision acknowledged, for the first time in accounting industry
standards, that auditors have a duty to detect fraud that would mate-
rially impact the client's financial statements, it also stands for the
proposition that the auditor has no duty to disclose fraudulent con-
duct to parties other than the client. SAS No. 54 addresses detection
of illegalities, but imposes no real duty on auditors to detect them.37'
If the auditor detects problems with errors, irregularities, or ille-
galities under SAS No. 53 and No. 54, and if the client declines to
take action, the strongest responsibility for the auditor is not to re-
port to the SEC or to third parties, but simply to withdraw from the
engagement.3 2 Pursuant to Item 304 of Regulation S-K, this will give
rise to a duty to the client to explain to the SEC why it has changed
auditors, but that is all.3n
While it is arguable that the only impact of the PSLRA is to en-
sure that the information surrounding the alleged illegality or
impropriety gets to the SEC sooner than it would have under the cli-
ent's self-reporting requirement of Regulation S-K, it is clear that
now the information may well come from a different source-the
auditor. Before, only the company had the duty to report this infor-
mation. Now the auditor has such a duty and breach of a duty
typically gives rise to liability.
Before the PSLRA was enacted, it was predicted that passage of
an earlier version of this portion of the Act would "increase the audi-
tor's exposure to liability under the federal securities laws., 3 4 It was
reasoned that the new provision "imposes a new affirmative duty on
independent auditors to establish a system for detecting and report-
370. CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, Statement of
Auditing Standards No. 1, § 316.03 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts. 1995).
371. See id. § 317.08. See generally Michael S. Rabb, Detecting and Preventing Finan-
cial Statement Fraud" The Roles of the Reporting Company and the Independent Auditor, 5
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 514 passim (1987) (examining proposed reforms of financial re-
porting); James L. Costello, Note, The Auditor's Responsibilities for Fraud Detection and
Disclosure: Do the Auditing Standards Provide a Safe Harbor?, 43 ME. L. REV. 265 pas-
sim (1991) (examining the role of auditors in fraud detection).
372. See Sidorsky, supra note 369, at 1.
373. See Item 304 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (1996) (requiring the issuer
to report a change of accountants and any "disagreements" with its former accountant
and to report four additional "reportable events").
374. Sidney H. Stein & Beth E. Goldman, The Wyden Legislation and Its Likely Effect
on CPA Liability, in ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY 35, 53 (PLI 1993) (speaking of the
"Wyden bill" which was the genesis for this provision of the PSRLA).
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ing illegal activity. With additional duties comes additional liabil-
ity.
,3 75
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 renders actionable a misleading omis-
sion where there is a duty to speak. New Section 10A creates an
enhanced duty to speak or to blow the whistle. The provision im-
poses a duty on auditors that arguably runs to investors. 6 Therefore,
it seems reasonable to argue that breach of a duty to blow the whistle
under Section 10A will give rise to Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity. I
Yet, two arguments can be lodged against imposing Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability here. The first argument is based on the
existence of a "safe harbor" provision in Section 10A. It has been
argued that "the statutory language is sufficiently broad to allow
auditors to maintain that they are not liable in any private action in
which the allegations pertain to matters disclosed or discussed in the
auditor's report., 37' However, the language of the safe harbor is
clearly limited. It provides that "[n]o independent public accountant
shall be liable in a private action for any finding, conclusion or state-
ment expressed in a report made pursuant to"379 the PSLRA's
requirements. So, the language provides a safe harbor from litigation
brought by clients only for reports that are made by the auditors. It
provides no safe harbor against litigation brought by investors for
reports that should have been filed, but were not. A lawsuit claiming
375. Id. at 56. This position is supported by the fact that passage of the PSLRA
prompted the AICPA to issue new, stronger rules on fraud detection in audits. See Eliza-
beth McDonald, CPA Institute Tightens Rules to Find Fraud, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1996,
at A6.
376. In one of the hearings regarding the Financial Fraud Detection Act, one of its
sponsors, Rep. Wyden, testified that the Act would, "for the first time, require account-
ants to report publicly when companies are ripping off investors. When this bill passes,
fraudulent managers will know that accountants will stick up for investors, not cover up
for the company .... [A]uditors are supposed to inform the public when they see compa-
nies committing fraud." Financial Fraud Detection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Fin. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, House of Repre-
sentatives, 103d Cong. 12-13 (1993) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
377. See Elizabeth McDonald, Auditors Are Ending Up Between a Rock and a Hard
Place over Securities Law, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1996, at C1 (quoting lawyers asserting
that PSLRA requirements that auditors detect fraud could increase their liability); Sidor-
sky, supra note 369, at 1 ("[I]t can now be argued that.., the auditor ha[s] a legal
obligation to notify the directors and make sure that the directors notif[y] the SEC...
[and, therefore, the PSLRA] could expose auditors to increased litigation for failure to
discover and disclose illegal acts other than management fraud.").
378. Pitt et al., supra note 368, at 517 n.10.
379. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 10A(c)
109 Stat. 737, 762 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(c) (West Supp. 1996) (emphasis
added).
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a failure to file such a report at all (in other words, failure to blow the
whistle), would not be based on "any finding, conclusion, or state-
ment expressed in a report."3
The legislative history underlying the safe harbor provision indi-
cates that it was not "intended to circumscribe in any way the existing
rights of private individuals to sue accountants with respect to other
matters including with respect to any failure by the auditor to file such
reports or any failure by the auditor to comply with GAAS. ' '38 A
House Report on an earlier version of this provision stated that the
"safe harbor" was intended to protect auditors from litigation "based
on the content of their direct reports to the Commission. ' ,31 In a
1993 hearing on the provision, one of its sponsors, Representative
Markey of Massachusetts, stated that the safe harbor provision was
"designed to protect auditors that comply with the reporting re-
quirements of the bill from exposure to private litigation. ,3" The
purpose of the safe harbor was to increase the odds that auditors
would blow the whistle on fraud by taking into account the fact that
under the current system they might be reluctant to do so in "that
their client or its shareholders might sue them if it turned out that
they were wrong about the fraud. ' 3  Auditors who do not comply
with the reporting requirements are given no protection at all.
A second argument that could be lodged is that Congress in-
tended the potential punishment it imposed for failure to blow the
whistle-civil fines imposed pursuant to section 21B-to be the ex-
clusive remedy. Furthermore, the text of the PSLRA provides that
nothing in the Act shall be deemed to create or ratify any implied
385
right of action. On the other hand, although the Act expressly pro-
vides for SEC-imposed civil penalties should an auditor willfully fail
to file a required report, 86 nothing in the Act implies that such penal-
380. Id.
381. JOHN D. DINGLE, FINANCIAL FRAUD AND DISCLOSURE Acr, H.R. REP. No.
102-890, at 25 (1992).
382. Id. at 15.
383. Financial Fraud Detection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-
tions and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives,
103d Cong. 2 (1993) (statement of Rep. Markey). Later in the hearings, Rep. Markey
made the same point, noting that "we create a whistle blower safe harbor for the auditor
as he or she goes to the SEC so that they don't feel as though they are going to be neces-
sarily exposing themselves to additional legal ramifications if they do so." Id. at 85.
384. Id. at 76 (statement of Rep. Markey).
385. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 203, 109
Stat. 737,762 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 1996)).
386. See id. § 10A(d) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1(d) (West Supp. 1996)).
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ties are exclusive. Furthermore, the fact that nothing in the Act is
meant to create an implied right of action does not mean that any-
thing in the Act is meant to eliminate the preexisting implied right of
action based on Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5. Nothing in the PSLRA or
its legislative history supports elimination of this firmly established
implied right of action. Rather, the Act makes changes in how the
cause of action should be implemented, for example, by altering the
circumstances in which joint and several liability will arise, thereby
clearly placing Congress's stamp of approval upon its continued exis-
tence. Indeed, the Conference Report accompanying the bill that
became the PSLRA expressly stated that "[p]rivate securities litiga-
tion is an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can
recover their losses without having to rely upon government ac-
tion."3 7 And a House Report on an early version (H.R. 4313) of the
Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act specifically stated that
the safe harbor
is not intended to circumscribe in any way the existing rights
of private individuals to sue accountants with respect to
other matters, including with respect to any failure by the
auditor to file such reports or any failure by the auditor to
comply with GAAS (including any auditing procedures the
Commission may establish pursuant to [this new section])
while conducting an audit or preparing other statements or
reports provided to the Commission.38
Congress appears to have made a judgment, albeit only regard-
ing accountant defendants, that a limited duty to blow the whistle is
justified.3 9 And breach of that duty appears to be actionable.
387. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM,
H.R. REP. Nos. 104-369, at 31 (1995).
388. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 102-890, at 25 (1992).
389. In so doing, Congress has implicitly rejected arguments that such a duty would
deal a fatal blow to the accountant-client relationship. Cf. Metzger, supra note 38, at 1412
(discussing arguments that liability for failure to disclose would lead to "the complete
erosion of the accountant-client relationship"). The Supreme Court had already dealt
that view a blow in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984), where it
held:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This "public
watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total independence
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.
Id. at 817-18.
Congress also implicitly rejected the argument that imposing such a duty puts ac-
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CONCLUSION
In Central Bank, Justice Kennedy rejected the argument that
aiding and abetting liability should be recognized because Section
10(b)'s language speaks of those who "directly or indirectly" violate
the rules."' Kennedy pointed out that "aiding and abetting liability
reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at
all."39' Therefore, all Central Bank really did was eliminate Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability for those "who do not engage in the pro-
scribed activities at all."" Only those who are merely "standing
around" near a fraud or who are so far away from it that they do not
participate in misrepresentations or omissions should escape post-
Central Bank liability (assuming that scienter and all other elements
of liability are present). 3
On the other hand, those who (a) make false representations or
omissions themselves; (b) by their visible and substantial participa-
tion in another's communications impliedly vouch for the accuracy of
those statements; (c) participate substantially in another's false
statements (or omissions) knowing that they are false and will be
shown to investors who will rely upon them; and (d) fail, in very lim-
ited circumstances, to blow the whistle on fraud when they have a
duty to do so, all do engage in the proscribed activities and should be
held primarily liable for Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 violations.394
The "participation" standard is the most controversial aspect of
my suggestions. Therefore, it bears repeating that "participation" in
a fraud, even if one is not the speaker, was sufficient to impose pri-
countants in a "no-win" situation. Cf Humphreys, supra note 38, at 405 (discussing the
test for an accountant's duty to disclose as formulated by the Eleventh Circuit and stating
that "the accountant's duty to disclose never ends for his audit clients."); Metzger, supra
note 38, at 1413 (describing the argument). The related argument that a whistleblowing
firm will lose business "for no company would hire an accounting firm so willing to turn
its back on its client," Metzger, supra note 38, at 1413, is not ultimately persuasive. First,
accounting firms have "blown the whistle" in the past, see, e.g., Wagenheim v. Alexander
Grant & Co., 482 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983), and still had lots of customers.
Second, the argument underestimates the value to firms of having a Big Six firm as an
auditor. See supra notes 214-25 and accompanying text. Given the PSLRA's new re-
quirements, all of the Big Six firms will, sooner or later, blow the whistle on their clients;
realistically, those clients have nowhere else to go. As noted, the Big Six firms have a
virtual monopoly on the business of auditing large public companies.
390. 511 U.S. at 175-76.
391. Id. at 176.
392. Id.
393. Professor Maxey suggests that remote collateral participants, like banks, who
cannot be linked to an issuer's misrepresentations or omissions will not be liable under
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 following Central Bank. See Maxey, supra note 79, at 2209.
394. See supra notes 2,3 (quoting Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
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mary fraud liability at common law, was sufficient to impose primary
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 liability before the advent of aiding and
abetting liability under the statute, was sufficient in several jurisdic-
tions to impose primary liability, as well as aiding and abetting
liability, during the heyday of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 aiding and
abetting cases, and has been chosen by the Supreme Court as the
proper standard for both imposing primary liability upon collateral
defendants and barring recovery by plaintiffs facing in pari delicto
defenses. Clearly, a "participation" standard is appropriate for de-
termining the scope of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 primary liability of
defendants post-Central Bank.
Setting these parameters on the scope of primary liability, even
though they are broader than many others have argued for, is un-
likely to lead to excessive litigation of the type decried in Central
Bank because (a) any private damages plaintiff must establish all the
elements of liability, especially scienter and reliance, in order to re-
cover;3 5 (b) the PSLRA establishes new pleading requirements which
will realistically prevent many, many plaintiffs from ever crossing the
first of many hurdles that must be surmounted in order to recover;391
395. For example, in a whistleblower case, McNulty & Hanson suggest that "[a] plain-
tiff will have to prove that he or she reasonably relied on the defendant to blow the
whistle about another's wrongdoing and that, if made, the disclosure would have pre-
vented him or her from entering into a transaction and sustaining a loss." McNulty &
Hanson, supra note 38, at 49. While their point is generally well taken, they are wrong in
this particular. If there is, indeed, a duty to "blow the whistle," plaintiffs will have a
rather easier time establishing reliance because, regarding actionable omissions, reliance
is presumed. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
396. Even before the PSLRA was passed, many courts viewed Rule 9(b)'s strictures on
pleading specificity as "especially designed to protect the reputation of accountants and
other professionals from injury caused by unsubstantiated charges of fraud." Griffin v.
McNiff, 744 F. Supp. 1237, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 996 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1993); In re
Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 547, 557 (S.D.N.Y.
1987). The courts had already taken it upon themselves to screen out deficient claims at
the pleadings stage and were granting more motions to dismiss than ever before. See
Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: 50 Defense Doctrines that Every Securities Liti-
gator Needs to Know, in AMERICAN CONFERENCE INSTITUTE, SECURITIES LITIGATION
AND ENFORCEMENT: NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND RECENT TRENDS 49, 49 (May 1995)
(courts are dismissing far more cases than in the past); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do
Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Un-
der the Federal Securities Laws; The Commission's Authority," 108 HARV. L. REV. 438,
446 (1996) (indicating that a substantial percentage of cases were dismissed before trial in
1992).
The PSLRA substantially heightened pleading standards by, among other things,
codifying a standard for pleading state of mind based on the most stringent rules then in
existence. See Avery, supra note 25, at 357. Those rules had been developed by the Sec-
ond Circuit. See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545,558 (2d Cir. 1979).
Professor Langevoort has pointed out, even before passage of the PSLRA, that it will
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and (c) joint and several liability, the chief bugaboo of collateral de-
fendants that has long been accused of forcing them to settle
nonmeritorious "strike" suits, has been largely eliminated by the
PSLRA.
3 7
Setting broad parameters of liability should reduce fraud,39 in-
crease fairness,3  improve the accuracy of financial reporting, and,
be rare when a plaintiff at the pleadings stage will have access to evidence that directly
implicates an issuer's attorneys absent some prior SEC proceedings and journalistic inves-
tigation. See Langevoort, supra note 39, at 93. Now that the PSLRA is on the books,
private plaintiffs will truly face very serious obstacles to ever seeing the inside of a court-
room.
397. See generally Avery, supra note 25, at 362-63 (indicating that henceforth, defen-
dants guilty of only recklessness will usually not face joint and several liability).
398. Auditors' judgments are heavily influenced by their incentive structures. See Karl
Hackenbrack & Mark W. Nelson, Auditors' Incentives and Their Application of Financial
Accounting Standards, 71 Accr. REV. 43, 54 (1996) ("[A]uditors tend to make the re-
porting decisions favored by their incentives .... "). Therefore, it stands to reason that if
the legal structure is modified substantially to alter the incentive structure for auditors,
and presumably other collateral defendants, by dramatically reducing their liability for
fraud, the accuracy of corporate reporting in America would suffer. There is evidence
that increased liability exposure for auditors has increased the quality of their work. See,
e.g., Ellen Benoit, A Gentleman's Game: Why the SEC is Thinking about Tougher Disclo-
sure Rules for Public Companies That Change Auditors, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 22, 1987, at 18
(noting that "litigation would seem to be the only thing that can really force auditors to be
tough"); E.P. Minnis, Professional Liability after Hedley Byrne, in ACCOUNTANTS'
LIABILITY IN THE 1980s: AN INTERNATIONAL VIEW 26,31 (E.P. Minnis & C.W. Nobes
eds., 1985) (British expert Paul Rutteman "sees the improvement in [audit] quality con-
trol in recent years as a direct by-product of the legal problems [of accountants]"); C.W.
Nobes, Summary and Highlights of Chapters Four to Seven, in id. at 37 ("One response to
increasing litigation has been a growing emphasis on quality."); David E. Wallin, Legal
Recourse and the Demand for Auditing, 67 Accr. REv. 121, 122 (1992) ("[T]he threat of
lawsuit will cause less frequent fraudulent reports.").
In many transactions, lawyers' fees are dependent on deals going through. Attorneys
"may use 'premium billing' for successful transactions or merely know that they will have
to reduce their fees if transactions fail to close." Painter, supra note 167, at 552. Such
arrangements give attorneys an incentive to assist fraud that will assist closure of transac-
tions, making useful a liability counterweight.
Perhaps no professionals are better known for producing conclusions that aid their
own self-interest than investment bankers. See generally Robert A. Prentice & John H.
Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy Reagan Defense": May Target Boards
"Just Say No"? Should They Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 468-472 (1990)
(noting that courts often view incentive-driven investment bankers' opinions as nearly
worthless). Again, a broad view of "primary liability" which would help better align the
investment bankers' interests with those of investors seeking accurate information would
be useful. See Bill Shaw & Edward J. Gac, Fairness Opinions in Leveraged Buy Outs:
Should Investment Bankers Be Directly Liable to Shareholders?, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 293,
319 (1995) (arguing that increased liability for investment bankers might restore the
"fairness" to fairness opinions); Giuffra, supra note 189, at 140-41 ("[L]iability will en-
courage [investment bankers] to render opinions with greater diligence.").
399. See Seligman, supra note 10, at 1441-42 ("[I]f a business corporation commits
fraud in the sale of securities and then goes bankrupt, who should ultimately bear the
loss?"). Should it be the innocent investors who were deceived? Or should it be those
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thereby, improve the efficiency of our financial markets consonant
with the goals established by Congress for the 1934 Act. Participa-
tion liability is firmly established at the common law and if Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 were read to unduly narrow that standard, it would
be very unfortunate. If professionals participate in clients' fraud,
they should be held liable, plain and simple. Any serious opposition
to this point is, at bottom, probably based on a fear that the
"recklessness" standard of liability has been loosened too far and will
result in professionals being held liable for their clients' fraud which
they truly did not know was occurring. That is a separate issue. But
assuming the lower courts adopt my view of primary liability, if
Central Bank ultimately has any major impact, it likely will be be-
cause it emboldened the Supreme Court to hold at some later date
that recklessness is insufficient as a standard for fraud liability,4 or
perhaps that the "in connection with" requirement must be dramati-
cally tightened.4°'
who significantly participated, visibly or behind the scenes, in perpetrating the fraud? See
id. In terms of equity, this is not a difficult question to answer.
400. Some have observed that the reasoning of the Central Bank majority "seems to
ring a death knell for recklessness." Wager & Failla, supra note 69, at 1460. Fortunately,
in my opinion, the lower courts have tended to disagree. See, e.g., In re Leslie Fay Co.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 693-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (recklessness is still a viable
standard); In re Phar-Mor, Inc. Sec. Litig., 892 F. Supp. 676, 685-86 (W.D. Pa. 1995)
(same).
401. Section 10(b) prohibits fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale" of securi-
ties. See supra note 2. The "in connection with" requirement may present difficulties for
some plaintiffs. Courts have applied different tests depending on whether the misrepre-
sentation was a relatively private one made by defendants to individual plaintiffs or a
relatively public one made by defendants to the market at large. See Prentice & Lang-
more, supra note 30, at 56-60. In the former situation, most courts have been split among
three possible views. The narrowest view is that an affirmative misrepresentation is "in
connection with" the purchase or sale of a security only if it relates directly to the value of
the security or the consideration offered therefor. See, e.g., Gurwara v. LyphoMed, Inc.,
937 F.2d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 1991). A slightly more liberal approach requires that there be
a "nexus" between the defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation and plaintiff's invest-
ment decision, focusing on whether the policies underlying Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
would be advanced by applying it to the particular transaction. See, e.g., Brown v. Ivie,
661 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1981). The most pro-plaintiff view is that the "in connection
with" requirement is largely a restatement of the transaction causation requirement and
therefore adds no additional element to the plaintiff's burden of proof. See Superinten-
dent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 n.7 (1971).
In cases of public misrepresentations, courts generally hold that the "in connection
with" requirement is met when the affirmative misrepresentations are made in a setting
reasonably calculated or reasonably expected to influence the investing public. See Pren-
tice & Langmore, supra note 30, at 60. On the other hand, if the defendant did not expect
the statements to be communicated to the investing public, the "in connection with" re-
quirement is not met. So, if accountants or attorneys, for example, provide opinions or
representations to the clients with the expectation that they will be used only internally,
yet the clients transmit the documents to investors, those opinions or representations are
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When the decision was made to promulgate Rule 10b-5, Com-
missioner Sumner Pike commented, "Well, we are against fraud,
aren't we?"4 2 If we are still against fraud, primary liability under
Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 must be applied broadly as I have argued
above.
not "in connection with" investment decisions later made by investors. See, e.g., Zoelsch
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (private statements to Ger-
man accounting firm were not transmitted to the public so the "in connection with"
requirement was not met even though they were included in the latter's report which was
used by German investors); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 281-82 (9th Cir. 1971)
(financial statements prepared for client company's internal use only held not "in connec-
tion with" investor's subsequent purchase).
But at least one post-Central Bank case has used that opinion's reasoning to drasti-
cally alter the meaning of the "in connection with" requirement, holding that a false
statement by a collateral defendants such as an accountant in a publicly-filed document is
not "in connection with" secondary market trading. See McGann v. Ernst & Young, No.
SA CV 93-814 AHS, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11116, at *25 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 1995), rev'd,
95 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1996). Such false statements, this trial court held, are actionable
only if they are contained in "selling documents." See id. This view is clearly erroneous
in that (among other things) it totally ignores the efficient market hypothesis which the
Supreme Court adopted lock, stock, and barrel in the Basic case. See Basic, Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988) (recognizing efficient markets hypothesis as basis for
adoption of "fraud on the market" theory of reliance). Fortunately, the case was reversed
and better reasoned opinions have rejected the "selling documents" restriction. See
Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (N.D. Cal. 1995); In re Leslie
Fay Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686, 697-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Spear v. Ernst &
Young, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 198,399, at 90,743-44
(D.S.C. Aug. 15, 1994).
402. Remarks of Milton Freedman on Administrative Procedures (Nov. 18 & 19,
1966), in Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 BUs. LAW. 793,
922 (1967).
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